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This thesis argues that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia- People’s 
Army (FARC-EP), Latin America’s oldest and most powerful guerrilla organization, has 
not abandoned its ideological beliefs and devolved into a criminal enterprise as a result of 
its immersion in the drug trade and participation in other illicit activities.  Rather, the 
movement remains an ideologically committed, guerrilla insurgency whose strategic 
objectives include the defeat of the Colombian military, the toppling of the central 
government, and the establishment of a regime founded on Marxist-Leninist and 
“Bolivarian” principles.  While recognizing the important role that resources earned from 
criminal activities have played in strengthening the FARC-EP’s challenge to the 
government, this thesis argues that the guerrilla organization’s involvement in the drug 
trade serves exclusively as a means to an end. 
However, numerous factors including recent changes in leadership, the 
recruitment of non-ideologically motivated and poorly educated fighters, and the 
increased operations tempo have led to the weakening of the ideological commitment of 
the base.  Consequently, many of the FARC-EP’s newer recruits are poorly educated in 
the political goals of the insurgency.  This, combined with the weakening of the 
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In the early 1980s, after nearly two fruitless decades of prolonged guerrilla 
warfare against the Government of Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP), today Latin America’s oldest and most powerful 
Marxist-Leninst insurgency, was a small, peasant based, movement whose size and 
limited military capabilities made it hardly more than a nuisance to the ruling elites of 
Bogotá.  Composed of less than a thousand members scattered among fifteen rural fronts, 
isolated in the backwaters of the Colombian periphery, the insurgency was expected to 
languish and eventually succumb to the combined assault of infectious tropical diseases 
and the Colombian military.  However, not only did the FARC-EP not disappear, but in 
fact it metastasized into a “little guerrilla army” that today poses a serious challenge to 
Colombia’s political stability and economic development. 
The FARC-EP’s evolution from a ragtag force composed of 1,000 combatants in 
1982 to a “little guerrilla army” of 18,000 insurgents in 2000 was due largely to the 
organization’s participation in the drug trade and its involvement in other illegal, yet 
highly profitable activities.  These illicit industries, which each year provide the 
insurgency with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues, have allowed the FARC-EP 
to extend its control over forty per cent of the nation.  However, the methods used to 
finance its war against the state have led some critics to allege that the organization has 
abandoned its ideological beliefs and quest for political power and devolved into a 
criminal enterprise focused primarily on profiting from illicit activities. 
This thesis challenges this view.  It argues that the FARC-EP is currently a 
hierarchically organized, politically motivated and ideologically driven insurgency whose 
objectives include the defeat of the Colombian military, the toppling of the central 
government, and the establishment of a socialist regime founded on Marxist-Leninist and 
“Bolivarian” principles.  While recognizing the important role that resources earned from 
criminal activities have played in strengthening the FARC-EP’s challenge to the 
government, this thesis argues that the guerrilla organization’s involvement in the drug 
trade serves exclusively as a means to an end. 
To ensure the guerrillas’ commitment to their cause and to prevent their 
degeneration into a criminal organization, the senior leadership of the FARC-EP has 
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centralized power in the Secretariat and Estado Mayor Central.  It also implemented a 
draconian disciplinary system known as the Reglamento de Régimen Disciplinario that 
executes members who fail to adhere to the principles of the organization.  In this way, 
the FARC-EP has been able to maintain discipline of the insurgency and channel the 
profits of its criminal activities toward political ends. 
However, recent changes in leadership as well as the recruitment of non-
ideologically motivated and poorly educated fighters have led to the weakening of the 
ideological commitment of the base.  Additionally, the increased operations tempo has 
prevented the insurgency’s leadership from dedicating sufficient time to the political 
indoctrination of guerrilla combatants.  Consequently, many of the FARC-EP’s newer 
recruits, while skilled guerrilla combatants, are poorly educated in the political goals of 
the insurgency.  This, combined with the weakening of the organization’s leadership 
could, if left unaddressed, result in the weakening of the ideological foundation of the 
insurgency, internal fragmentation, and devolution of the FARC-EP into several, small 
criminal enterprises. 
The debate surrounding the ideological or criminal nature of the FARC-EP has 
long-term policy implications.  If the FARC-EP is a not an ideologically committed 
guerrilla insurgency, but rather a criminal enterprise, then the organization can be 
attacked and disarticulated principally by police and judicial methods.  However, if the 
FARC-EP is a politically aggrieved, revolutionary movement then a comprehensive 
counterinsurgency strategy must be developed and implemented which, while seeking to 
defeat the insurgency on the battlefield, also contemplates long-ranging social, economic, 
and political reforms designed to addresses the underlying causes of the conflict. 
For the last forty-one years, the Government of Colombia has pursued strategies 
aimed at defeating a criminal enterprise rather than countering a guerrilla insurgency.  As 
such, it has fought an undeclared war against “delinquents,” “bandits,” or more recently, 
“narco-terrorists.”  However, the government’s refusal to recognize the true nature of the 
FARC-EP and to “know its enemy” has contributed to the prolongation of the conflict 
and the unintentional strengthening of the guerrilla movement.  To defeat the FARC-EP, 
the government must develop a counterinsurgency strategy which attacks simultaneously 
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the organization on multiple levels.  Some of these include the social, political, economic, 
and cultural levels.  Only by adjusting its strategy to attack the FARC-EP as a guerrilla 
insurgency that is vying for political power will the government be able to defeat the 
movement. 
This thesis draws heavily on Spanish-language analyses of the Colombian conflict 
and primary FARC-EP documents captured by the Colombian military in the last twenty 
years – sources that are often overlooked by U.S. analysts of the Colombian situation.  It 
also incorporates information obtained through numerous interviews conducted with 
members of Colombia’s private and public sectors, demobilized FARC-EP guerrillas, 
representatives from the U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, Colombia, and members of the U.S. and 
Colombian academic communities. 
This thesis examines the character of the FARC-EP at key moments in its 
development over the past two and a half decades (1982-2005).  It assesses the effects of 
the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the repudiation of Marxist-Leninist thought in most 
former communist countries on the FARC-EP.  Many observers hypothesized that the 
bankruptcy of international communism caused the guerrilla organization to abandon its 
ideological beliefs and to replace its revolutionary guerrilla struggle with a new rason 
d’être – the accumulation of vast financial revenues principally via its exploitation of the 
drug trade.  Similarly, the guerrilla organization’s immersion in this illicit industry in the 
1990s reinforced many critics’ belief that the organization had become the nation’s “third 
cartel.”  This opinion was only strengthened in subsequent years when the FARC-EP 
took advantage of the government-ceded despeje (1998-2002), or demilitarized zone, to 
cultivate 35,000 hectares of coca.  Its disingenuous participation in the peace talks with 
the administration of former President Andrés Pastrana Arango (1998-2002) and 
subsequent refusal to engage advancing Colombian military forces (2003-2005) 
confirmed in the minds of many that the FARC-EP’s political rhetoric was merely a 
smokescreen for its criminal enterprise.  Finally, this thesis concludes by discussing 
policy and strategy implications both for Bogotá and Washington. 
Chapter II examines the FARC-EP’s ability to survive the end of the Cold War by 
tracing the ideological, political-military, financial, and organizational development of 
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the FARC-EP in the 1980s.  It argues that, despite the collapse of international 
communism and the bankruptcy of Marxist-Leninist thought, the FARC-EP did not 
experience an ideological crisis because the movement’s heterogeneous and eclectic 
ideology was never based upon a dogmatic or mechanical interpretation of Marxist-
Leninism.  Rather it had employed a “liberal” interpretation of the communist ideology to 
guide the insurgency in its political growth and development.  Similarly, the political and 
military actions of the FARC-EP during the 1980s illustrate that the organization’s 
actions obeyed a revolutionary logic aimed at defeating the Colombian military and 
toppling the Government of Colombia.  The guerrilla organization’s involvement in the 
drug trade would play a key role in resourcing the FARC-EP to achieve its political-
military objectives, to grow, and eventually extend its territorial control.  Finally, the 
senior leadership’s concentration of authority in the Estado Mayor Central, the creation 
of the Financial Commission, and the appointment of financial advisors, or ayudantías, 
ensured that guerrilla commanders used their allocated funds to achieve their assigned 
political-military goals and not surrender to the temptations of capitalist luxury. 
Chapter III explains the FARC-EP’s ability to maintain its revolutionary focus, 
despite its immersion in the drug trade, by examining the political-military, 
organizational dynamics, and financial resources of the insurgency during the 1990s.  It 
shows that despite the guerrilla organization’s greater involvement in the drug trade, the 
movement did not descend into criminality, but rather remained a revolutionary 
organization focused on achieving political power “through the barrel of a gun.”  From 
1996-1998, the FARC-EP conducted a series of highly successful guerrilla offensives that 
inflicted tremendous losses on the Colombian military and caused many to think that the 
insurgency was winning the war.  This would later prompt the United States and 
Colombia to increase its pressure on the guerrilla organization and to seek a military 
solution to the conflict.  The FARC-EP’s decision to conduct these offensives only makes 
sense in political-military terms, since a criminally motivated enterprise would have been 
content to maintain a low profile and take advantage of the coca boom created by 
declining coca production in Peru.  This chapter details the rise of the movement’s 
clandestine political party, the Colombian Clandestine Communist Party (PCCC), and 
highlights the launching of the insurgency’s catch-all political movement, the Bolivarian 
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Movement for a New Colombia.  Emphasis is also placed upon illustrating the FARC-
EP’s efforts to reorganize radically its internal structure so as to facilitate the 
accomplishment of its political-military objectives. 
Chapter IV explains the FARC-EP’s strategy to acquire political power between 
1998 and 2005 by examining the political-military, organizational dynamics, finances, 
and ideology of the insurgency.  This chapter argues that the FARC-EP participated 
disingenuously in the peace talks of 1999-2002 with the administration of President 
Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) and utilized the government ceded demilitarized zone or 
despeje to further its political-military objectives.  These goals included the opening of 
urban fronts and transforming the despeje into an “independent republic.”  While 
recognizing the insurgency’s use of the zona to cultivate coca and to engage in other 
illicit activities, this chapter argues that the FARC-EP’s ideological compass was not 
affected as a result of its participation in these illicit activities.  Chapter IV also examines 
the FARC-EP’s strategic withdrawal and dispersal throughout the country as a result of 
the Colombian military’s 2003-2005 offensive into the guerrilla organization’s 
strongholds.  While recognizing that the FARC-EP’s commitment to its ideological 
beliefs has weakened, this chapter challenges contemporary arguments which interpret 
the FARC-EP’s withdrawal and avoidance of direct contact with military forces as 
evidence of the organization’s degeneration into a criminal organization.  It argues that 
while the insurgency has been weakened, it has not been defeated.  In fact, the FARC-EP 
is most likely waiting for the Colombian military to overextend and exhaust its forces 
before regrouping and attacking the military en masse. 
Finally, after highlighting some lessons-learned, Chapter V concludes by offering 
four recommendations to the Government of Colombia.  First, the Government of 
Colombia should focus its efforts on eliminating the principal leaders of the insurgency.  
Additionally, psychological operations should be conducted against both the rank and file 
guerrillas and their mid-level commanders.  Second, additional emphasis should be 
placed upon attacking the finances of the guerrilla organization.  Emphasis should be 
placed upon destroying the insurgency’s primary cash crops and on freezing its financial 
assets.  Third, the Colombian military should revisit its conceptualization of the FARC-
EP and the organization’s modus operandi.  By continuing to view the FARC-EP as 
7
 
nothing more than a criminal organization and failing “to know their enemy,” the 
Colombian military will continue to prolong the conflict and indirectly add to the 
strengthening of the insurgency.  Finally, the Government of Colombia should address 
legitimate social grievances and implement a meaningful agrarian land reform program 
that aims at resolving one of the primary causes of the ongoing conflict – the perennial 
issue of land tenure.  Additional financial resources should also be dedicated to 
improving the social infrastructure of the nation’s rural communities and of those areas 
formerly under guerrilla control.  In this manner, the state can extend its presence to the 
periphery of the nation, improve its legitimacy in the eyes of the rural populace, and 
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II. A BLUEPRINT FOR WAR: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
FARC-EP’S “STRATEGIC PLAN” (1982-1989) 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, People’s Army, as the 
most elevated expression of the revolutionary struggle for national 
liberation, is a political-military movement that carries out its ideological, 
political, organizational, propagandistic, and armed guerrilla actions, in 
agreement with the tactic of the combination of all forms of struggle, in 
order to achieve power for the people.2
The Statutes of the FARC-EP, Chapter One, Article One 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout Latin America, and indeed much of the world, Marxist-Leninist based 
revolutionary movements entered into decline with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.  
The ideological crisis occasioned by the collapse of international communism caused 
organizations to lose adherents, to fragment as internal factions disputed the appropriate 
way ahead, or to seek compromise with their erstwhile foes. The FARC-EP, in contrast, , 
expanded its membership and territory and became more intransigent and aggressive in 
the wake of the end of the Cold War.  This chapter argues that the paradoxical 
strengthening of the FARC-EP can only be understood by examining the events of the 
1980s.  It shows that the 1980s – not the end of the Cold War in 1989 -- represented a 
critical turning point in the FARC-EP’s development as a revolutionary organization. 
During this decade the movement designed an all-encompassing strategy that enabled it 
to grow from an ill-equipped and poorly trained guerrilla insurgency composed of 1,000 
combatants distributed among 17 rural and impoverished fronts in 1982 to a “little 
guerrilla army” composed of 17,000 combatants assigned to 60 fronts by 2000.  The 
decade also witnessed, via the convening of peace talks with the presidential 
administrations of Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) and Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986-
1990), the emergence of the FARC-EP as an astute political actor and accomplished 
negotiator.  As a result, the FARC-EP would not only survive the end of the Cold War 
but, by 1996, threaten the Colombian military and Government of Colombia with 
imminent defeat. 
 
2 All translations from the Spanish are the author’s unless otherwise indicated. 
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Some observers have argued that the FARC-EP was able to survive the end of the 
Cold War because it had become an essentially criminal organization by 1989.  As such, 
it experienced no ideological crisis with the collapse of the Soviet Union and, instead, 
had a new motive for persisting and even thriving as an organization – the exploitation of 
the drug trade.  This chapter rejects these arguments by examining the ideological, 
political-military, financial, and organizational development of the FARC-EP in the 
1980s.  It shows that despite the collapse of international communism and the bankruptcy 
of Marxist-Leninist thought, the FARC-EP did not experience an ideological crisis. This 
was due to the fact that the movement’s heterogeneous and eclectic ideology was never 
based upon a dogmatic or mechanical interpretation of Marxist-Leninism, but rather 
employed a liberal interpretation of the same in order to guide the insurgency in its 
political growth and development. 
Similarly, the political and military actions of the FARC-EP during the 1980s 
illustrate that the organization’s actions obeyed a revolutionary logic aimed at defeating 
the Colombian military and toppling the Government of Colombia.  These actions, which 
did not limit themselves exclusively to guerrilla warfare, but rather encompassed efforts 
to attain political power via the organization’s clandestine and overt participation in the 
nation’s political process, illustrate the FARC-EP’s efforts to become a viable political 
force and not a criminal organization.  The FARC-EP engaged in criminal activity in 
order to acquire the financial resources necessary for sustaining its growth and territorial 
expansion.  The procurement of resources by any means possible was decided upon at the 
organization’s 1982 Seventh Guerrilla Conference as key to its transformation into a 
“little guerrilla army.”  Therefore, the FARC-EP’s increased involvement in this illicit 
industry should not be interpreted as the transformation of the organization into another 
narco-trafficking cartel, but rather as a means for securing the financial wherewithal 
required to finance its revolutionary intent. 
Efforts aimed at ensuring that revenues obtained from the movement’s 
participation in the drug trade and other illicit activities were used for revolutionary and 
not criminal purposes led to the creation of the FARC-EP Financial Commission.  This 
institution, composed of members from the organization’s senior-most ranks, was 
entrusted with the responsibility of managing the insurgency’s finances.  The Financial 
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Commission was granted the authority to establish yearly budgets for each of the FARC-
EP’s fronts and to serve as the central clearinghouse for all financial matters.  To further 
its control over subordinate units and to ensure that all profits and material goods made 
their way to the Financial Commission, unit-level finance commissions were established.  
Additionally, financial advisors, known as ayudantías, were assigned to each FARC-EP 
front and charged with ensuring that unit-level commanders used their allocated funds to 
achieve political and military objectives.  Those commanders failing to achieve their 
assigned objectives or suspected of taking part in criminal activities were remanded to the 
Financial Commission for trial and punishment. 
Finally, in order to accomplish its revolutionary objectives and to assure its 
control over its subordinate units, the senior-leadership of the FARC-EP centralized its 
power in the Estado Mayor Central (EMC).  This institution became the nerve center of 
the FARC-EP - responsible for the overall strategic guidance of the organization.  The 
senior leadership also created numerous training centers and academies in order to 
prepare promising FARC-EP combat leaders for greater levels of responsibility and 
command authority.  In addition individuals suspected of engaging in criminal activities 
were eliminated.  In this manner, the FARC-EP sought to solidify its members’ 
adherence to the revolutionary principles and codes of conduct of the organization while 
purging those motivated by profit and self-aggrandizement. 
The 1980s marked a turning point in the FARC-EP’s evolution as a revolutionary 
organization.  After reflecting upon the vegetative growth and limited successes enjoyed 
by the organization in the previous two decades (1964-1982), the senior-leadership of the 
organization realized that radical changes would have to be made if the FARC-EP were 
to achieve real political power. 
B. IDEOLOGY 
Some critics allege that FARC-EP was able to survive the ideological crisis 
occasioned by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of international communism, and 
the bankrupting of Marxist-Leninism by abandoning its communist ideology and 
devolving into a criminal organization that was driven by an unquenchable thirst for 
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greater revenues.3  According to this argument, the FARC-EP began to replace Soviet 
materiel aide in the early 1980s with profits earned through its participation in the illicit 
drug trade and involvement in other illegal activities. 
The 1989 collapse of international communism did not occasion a crisis within 
the FARC-EP for two main reasons.  First, Marxist-Leninism was only one part of the 
insurgency’s hybrid ideological belief set.  This lack of a defined ideology is perfectly 
consistent with Colombian history, where for more than a century supporters of Liberal 
and Conservative Parties took machetes to each other in defense of principles which 
everyone would have been at pains to describe.  The purpose of parties is to create 
subnational loyalties and networks in a country where the sense of national identity is 
weak, and where the absence of effective government forces citizens to organize to 
protect their interests and their lives.  Therefore, the FARC-EP’s “big tent” approach 
emphasizes its connectivity with Colombian reality rather than its dependence on the 
globalized fate of communism.  The remaining components of the insurgency’s ideology 
encompassed principles based upon agrarian land reform, socialism, and Bolivarianism. 
The hybrid nature of the FARC-EP’s political ideology was and continues to be reflected 
in the eclectic membership of the insurgency.  In fact, the FARC-EP finds its unity not in 
its ideology, but in its strategy, which is its commitment to the “armed struggle.” 
During the 1980s, the FARC-EP consisted of guerrillas who espoused Liberal, 
socialist, and Marxist-Leninist beliefs.  However, no single ideology dominated, but 
rather combined with elements from political belief sets to produce an ideological 
cocktail unique to the FARC-EP.  Manuel Marulanda Vélez, the supreme commander of 
the guerrilla organization, stated, “Well, within our organization there is a little bit of 
everything.  There are also Marxist-Leninists.  But the FARC-EP are before anything else 
an armed and guerrilla organization that has its doors open to all political, philosophical, 
religious, and ideological tendencies.  The FARC-EP allows for people who share the 
common ideal of liberating the country to come and work together.”4
 
3 See William W. Mendel, “Colombia’s Threat to Regional Security,” Military Review, (May-June 
2001): 3. 




                                                
The ideological diversity of the FARC-EP can be explained in part by considering 
the social class backgrounds of the original members who joined the organization.  Many 
of the founding members of the guerrilla movement had previously belonged to one of 
the nine so-called “peasant republics” that were destroyed by the Colombian Army 
during the Presidential administration of Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1964-1970).  The 
peasants who belonged to these communities were largely drawn from the Communist 
and Liberal parties.  However, other apolitical individuals – usually members of local, 
non-Spanish speaking, indigenous tribes or communities - also coexisted with the 
aforementioned groups.  The interaction of the communists, socialists, and indigenous 
peoples produced an ideology and way of life unique to the “peasant republics.”  Later, 
when the FARC-EP was established, many former members of the “peasant republics” 
joined the guerrilla organization.  In this manner, the heterogeneous ideology of the 
“peasant republics” was preserved and incorporated into the belief set of the FARC-EP.5
Second, the FARC-EP never applied a literal interpretation of Marxist-Leninism 
to its political cause, but rather borrowed from its general thoughts and principles to 
construct its own political reality. Current FARC-EP political ideologue and senior 
member of the insurgency, Iván Ríos, explains the use and nature of Marxist-Leninism 
within the insurgency: 
We borrow from Marxism but not in a dogmatic manner.  There are a few 
general points in common from the historical point of view that are 
applicable, and in fact if you sit down and read our documents you’ll see 
there are a few quotes or citations that we use textually, because we take 
the general concepts and then apply them to the Colombian reality.  
Obviously, if you are going to build a house, you have to have some kind 
of idea how to do it.  But how are we going to build it?  That’s a problem 
that we haven’t been able to solve here.  Let’s say that that’s how we 
approach Marxism, we borrow from the general concepts….For us, the 
fundamental postulates, general proposals, methodology of knowing and 
understanding society and of historic evolution, and society’s 




5 For additional information regarding the “peasant republics” and the founding members of the 
FARC-EP see, Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, Las FARC (1949-1966) De la autodefensa a la combinación 
de todas las formas de lucha, with the collaboration of Ricardo Peñaranda (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo 
Editores, 1991), 39-54, 167-186. 
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philosophy, class struggle, the concept of Marxist political economy, the 
Marxist understanding of capitalism, those are the basic concepts to which 
we subscribe.6
As a result, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the international repudiation of 
communism as a failed political ideology did not affect the FARC-EP’s devotion to 
Marxist-Leninism or revolution.  As one recently demobilized FARC-EP political 
ideologue -- citing Iván Márquez -- stated, “The FARC doesn’t owe one peso or one idea 
to anyone and because of that not one brick from the Berlin Wall ever fell on the 
FARC.”7  FARC-EP commander Fernando Caycedo explains: 
That Marxist-Leninism operated in one way or another in the Soviet 
Union, that’s the Soviet Union’s problem. We’re in Colombia.  Here there 
are other realities, we’re living in different times.  We have to apply 
Marxism to the Colombian reality and to the historic moment in which we 
live.  This isn’t about mechanically copying Marxism or saying that we 
want to apply Soviet-style Marxism to Colombia.  As if to say that as 
communists we never make mistakes.  We think that the greatest virtue 
and principle of the communists is criticism and self-criticism, recognizing 
when we’re wrong.  If we didn’t, we would continue to create the same 
mistakes.8
The ideological eclecticism and vitality of the FARC-EP is evidenced by its 1988 
initiation of a successful recruiting campaign based upon a new addition to its ideological 
belief set – Bolivarianism.  This ideological concept, based very loosely upon the 
political philosophies of Simón Bolívar, the great South American general who liberated 
the Andean region of the continent from Spanish control during the colonial Wars of 
Independence, emphasizes Latin American political, military, and economic unity and 
espouses a strong anti-imperialistic policy especially towards the United States and 
Europe.  Bolivarianism’s emphasis on the expropriation and devolution of land to 
indigenous peoples, denunciation of inherited social class privileges, and calls for upward 
social mobility for members of the army is aimed at urban, lower-middle class workers, 
 
6 Juan Guillermo Ferro Medina and Graciela Uribe Ramón, El orden de la guerra (Bogotá: Centro 
Editorial Javeriano, 2002), 122. 
7 A demobilized mid-level, FARC-EP guerrilla who served as a political ideologue for the guerrilla 
organization for more than ten years (identity withheld by request), interview by author, tape recording, 
Bogotá, Colombia, 20 September 2005. 
8 Anonymous, “Así son las FARC-EP: Entrevista con Fernando Caycedo,” available from 
http://sodcolsoli.www3.50megs.com/fcay.htm; Internet; accessed on 2 February 2005. 
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scholars, and artisans. 9  Consequently, the FARC-EP’s adoption of Bolivarianism not 
only allowed the organization to increase its numbers, but also to diversify its 
membership.  It is important to note that the shift to Bolivarianism preceded the end of 
the Cold War and was largely motivated by the FARC-EP’s desire beginning in 1982 to 
expand its appeal in the urban sectors of society.10
Prior to 1988, the insurgency had been an overwhelmingly rural, peasant-based 
phenomenon whose members generally possessed a primary school level of education.  
However, following the FARC-EP’s stepped-up recruiting effort, the ranks of the 
guerrilla organization swelled to include high school and university graduates from the 
nation’s middle and upper classes.  Intellectuals, students, professionals, doctors, lawyers, 
Catholic priests, and university professors all joined the FARC-EP during the 1980s.11  
Bolivarianism appealed to many different social classes and professions due to its 
inclusion of “…a series of proposals that combined nationalist and leftwing ideas, but 
that sidelined traditional ultimate ideological goals such as the establishment of a 
classical socialist model.”12  The FARC-EP’s professed allegiance to this ideology as 
well as its increased attacks against the Government of Colombia for failing to solve 
“…the country’s biggest problems (social inequality, crime, and deficient public 
services)” allowed it to gain territory in the battle for new and better educated recruits.13
For instance, former FARC-EP Finance Minister Juvenal Ovidio Ricardo Palmera 
Piñeda, alias Simón Trinidad, prior to becoming the FARC-EP’s chief of finances, was a 
banker and member of Colombia’s high society.14  However, following the 1986-1988 
assassination of some 550 members of the FARC-EP’s political party, the Patriotic Union  
 
 
9 Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramón, El orden de la guerra, 127. 
10 Román D. Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25 (2002): 130-131. 
11 Arango Z, FARC-EP, Veinte Años: De Marquetalia a la Uribe, 33. 
12 Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia,” 130. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Anonymous, “Colombia Extradites Rebel Leader ‘Trinidad’;” available from 
http://www.educweb.org/webnews/ColNews-Jan05/English/Articles/ColombieunmembredesFARC-
EPex.html; Internet; accessed 14 April 2005. 
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(UP), he became radicalized and joined the FARC-EP.  Rising quickly through the ranks, 
Trinidad eventually became a member of the organization’s senior staff – the Secretariat 
– where he oversaw and directed the finances of the insurgency. 
C. POLITICAL-MILITARY 
The FARC-EP’s decision to innovate ideologically and its attempt to appeal to 
urban sectors on the basis of Bolivarianism was largely the product of the organization’s 
assessment of its own failures during the Seventh Guerrilla Conference.  Held from 4-14 
May 1982 in the mountainous Sumapaz region of Cubarral, Meta, the conference resulted 
in a shift from a strategy that focused on the territorial defense of small areas of land 
under guerrilla influence, to an offensive strategy that sought to defeat the Colombian 
military and occupy new territory.  Failed peace negotiations with the Government of 
Colombia during the 1980s and the assassination of thousands of its members who 
attempted to participate in politics would only confirm for the FARC-EP the wisdom of 
its decision to boost decisively its military capabilities. 
After nearly two decades (1964-1982) of sustained guerrilla warfare against the 
Colombian military, the FARC-EP in 1982 consisted of only 1,000 guerrilla fighters 
dispersed among 17 rural and ill-equipped fronts scattered throughout the nation.15  The 
organization remained an overwhelmingly rural, peasant-based phenomenon that derived 
its limited support from that agrarian-based social class upon which it depended for 
virtually all of its political, military, and logistical needs. Militarily, the organization 
continued to operate much as it had in the previous eighteen years – focusing its efforts 
on carrying out uncoordinated and largely ineffective hit-and-run guerrilla attacks against 
small and poorly defended Colombian military and National Police units.16  Politically, 
the insurgency proselytized to and recruited from peasant farmers living in traditional 
areas of guerrilla influence located in southern and southwestern Colombia.  However, 
lacking sufficient manpower, a coherent political and military strategy, and the financial 
means to purchase the military equipment that would allow them to achieve significant 
military victories, the FARC-EP in 1982 remained an isolated nuisance whose 
 
15 Arturo Alape, Tirofijo: Los sueños y las montañas, 2d ed.  (Bogotá: Editorial planeta colombiana, 
2002), 183. 
16 Colombian Army, “Procedimientos delictivos de las FARC-EP: Combinación de todas las formas 
de lucha,” Unpublished Colombian Army Internal Document, May 2000, 5. 
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“vegetative growth”,17  provoked little to no concern among Colombia’s urban-based 
elites and senior civilian and military leadership. The organization’s high command, well 
aware of the insurgency’s lack of progress, realized that radical changes would have to be 
made if the FARC-EP were to triumph over the Colombian military and achieve its 
revolutionary goals.  These changes, which would forever transform the outlook and 
strategic behavior of the FARC-EP, would first be discussed at the insurgency’s Seventh 
Guerrilla Conference. 
The continued, rapid urbanization of Colombian society and its impact on the 
FARC-EP dominated the discussions.  As FARC-EP leaders realized, social conditions 
had significantly changed since the war began in 1964.  No longer was Colombia a 
predominantly rural society, but had become a highly urbanized nation with fully 70% of 
the populace residing in the country’s primary and secondary cities.18  Consequently, the 
FARC-EP’s political and military strategy had to change in order to reflect the 
environment in which the insurgency was operating. 
The massive influx of rural-based citizens to the nation’s cities created numerous 
social problems throughout the country.  Those migrants who were fortunate enough to 
find jobs were often poorly paid and forced to work long hours in terrible conditions.  In 
the meantime, those who arrived from the countryside unskilled and academically 
unprepared to work in the country’s cities resorted to crime and other means of survival.  
The growing dissatisfaction with their new urban lives caused many migrant workers to 
carry out strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of social protest that did not go 
unnoticed by the FARC-EP.  In fact, the insurgency developed a political-military-social- 
and economic strategy that sought to capitalize upon this urban unrest.  The then leading 
Marxist-Leninist political ideologue of the FARC-EP, Luís Morantes (better known by 
his nom de guerre Jacobo Arenas), explains:19
 
 
17 Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, Una democracia asediada: Balance y perspecitivas del conflicto 
armado en Colombia, (Bogotá: Editorial Norma, 2004), 87. 
18 Alape, Tirofijo: Los sueños y las montañas, 180. 
19 Arango Z, FARC-EP, Veinte Años: De Marquetalia a la Uribe, 54. 
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In the [Seventh Guerrilla] conference it was said: the persistence of social 
struggles has to be given a new emphasis.  And the FARC-EP must design 
a strategy that responds to the social conditions that exist within the 
nation. And in the conference it was decided that the FARC-EP had to 
develop a struggle that would tie the armed revolutionary activities of the 
countryside with the insurrectional activities of the country’s major 
cities….  That is to say, everything should function as one strategic 
concept that would serve to define the taking of power…..20
To increase urban support for the FARC-EP and to establish a nexus between the 
rural based FARC-EP units and their urban based sympathizers, the senior members of 
the FARC-EP created Solidarity Nuclei (los Núcleos de Solidaridad).21  These 
clandestine political organizations were charged with organizing “the masses” into 
syndicates and other community based organizations that would rally in support of 
leftwing politicians that were sympathetic to the FARC-EP.  The guerrilla members were 
also responsible for convincing local residents to vote in support of politicians and 
measures that indirectly benefited the guerrilla organization.  Finally, Solidarity Nuclei 
members were tasked with the infiltration of primary and secondary schools, universities, 
and community action groups.22  Supreme FARC-EP commander Manuel Marulanda 
underscored the importance of the FARC-EP’s clandestine participation in politics when 
he stated, “We have shown that the fight has to be waged not only on the military level, 
but also on the political.  In those conditions it is only natural that we are going to 
intervene, where the conditions permit us, in the political struggle.”23  In this manner, the 
FARC-EP was able to bridge the gap between the rural and urban divide and unify its 
supporters behind its political-military strategy – known as the “Strategic Plan for Taking 
Power” - for achieving revolutionary power. 
The all-inclusive, eight year-long (1982-1990), “Strategic Plan for Taking Power” 
was divided into three phases – offensive, government, and defense of the revolution –24 
 
20 Alape.  Tirofijo: Los sueños y las montañas, 180. 
21 FARC-EP, “Informe central a la septima conferencia,” Historia de las FARC, Unpublished FARC-
EP Internal Document, 17. 
22 Alape, Tirofijo: Los sueños y las montañas, 178. 
23 Arango Z, FARC-EP, Veinte Años: De Marquetalia a la Uribe, 111. 
24 Colombian Army, “Apreciación evolutiva de las FARC-EP,” Unpublished Colombian Army 
Internal Document, May 2000, 5. 
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that were designed to weaken and later topple the central government and to guide their 
actions once in power. According to the strategy, the political and military actions of the 
rural and urban guerrillas and their support networks would facilitate the development of 
the “necessary conditions” required for fomenting large-scale popular insurrections 
throughout the country.  Once these strikes, protests, and other manifestations of political 
and social discontent occurred, the FARC-EP expected the Colombian military – in a 
virtual reenactment of the events associated with the 1948 Bogotazo and subsequent 1951 
coup d’etat led by General Rojas Pinilla - to attempt to regain control over the nation by 
seizing power.  Jacobo Arenas articulated the FARC-EP’s intentions when in response to 
the question, “Is the FARC-EP becoming the subjective factor that will produce a 
situation similar to what we saw on 9 April 1948?” he stated:25
Naturally.  It has to be that way.  We have to play a directing role in the 
insurrectional process.  But not just us.  The workers, if they’re able to 
unite, will also play a key role….The revolutionary political parties will 
also play an important role.  The Colombian Communist Party will play a 
very important role.  We assign to the Communist Party that great mission 
that other communist parties have played in other revolutionary processes 
that have taken place in other countries.26
Upon the Colombian military’s overthrow of the civilian government and 
establishment of a military dictatorship, the FARC-EP planned, in coordination with its 
urban and rural supporters, to stage a military offensive against Bogotá that would isolate 
it from the rest of the nation and, after a prolonged siege, eventually lead to the city’s 
capitulation.  In the meantime, general insurrections carried out in the country’s primary 
and secondary cities would distract and preoccupy the Colombian military and 
Colombian National Police allowing the bulk of the FARC-EP’s guerrilla army to 
encircle, besiege, and eventually storm the city of Bogotá.  Once the capital fell, the 
Strategic Plan for Taking Power called for the FARC-EP to establish a provisional 
revolutionary regime that later would call for the creation of a constituent assembly  
 
 
25 On 9 April 1948, Liberal Party presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was assassinated in 
Bogotá provoking a violent insurrection between Liberal and Conservative party members that claimed the 
lives of an estimated 3,000 people and left large sections of the capital in ruins. 
26 Arango Z, FARC-EP, Veinte Años: De Marquetalia a la Uribe, 45. 
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charged with drafting a new constitution.  The provisional revolutionary regime would 
remain in power until the new constitution was created and the new, revolutionary 
government established. 
To accomplish this, Manuel Marulanda Vélez and his senior staff recognized at 
the Seventh Guerrilla Conference the need to construct a “little guerrilla army.”  
According to FARC-EP documents, the military portion of the plan called for the creation 
of a revolutionary guerrilla army composed of some 28,000 guerrilla combatants, 
distributed among 48 guerrilla fronts that would be capable of challenging and soundly 
defeating the regular Colombian military.27  To highlight the FARC-EP’s transition to a 
“little guerrilla army,” the senior leadership changed the name of the organization from 
its original FARC to FARC-EP – adding two additional letters – “EP”- signifying 
“People’s Army.”  Although a seemingly unimportant addition, these two letters had a 
significant impact on how the organization’s members conceived of themselves and the 
insurgency.   Instead of identifying themselves as a revolutionary organization focused on 
survival and the defense of small, rural territories, the Seventh Guerrilla Conference 
provided the insurgency with an offensive strategic plan and course of action.  No longer 
would the FARC-EP remain a political, social, and military ambiguity largely ignored 
and depreciated by society, but rather would emerge as a revolutionary army capable of 
defeating the Colombian military and bringing to fruition its revolutionary plan of action.  
“The Seventh Conference gave the movement a clear operational and strategic 
conception for forming a revolutionary army, which marked a readjustment of all its 
mechanisms for guidance and control.”28
To set the stage for this revolutionary showdown, special emphasis was placed 
upon establishing a so-called “axis of strategic deployment” (el eje de despliegue 
estratégico) in the Eastern Mountain range.  To this end, at least twelve fronts were to be 
assigned to this key area and placed in a chain formation that would link la Uribe, Meta 
 
27 Thomas Marks, “Colombian Army (COLAR) Counterinsurgency,” Crime, Law, and Social Change 
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department – the city in which the FARC-EP’s former headquarters, La Casa Verde, was 
located - with Venezuela. 29  In this manner, the Eastern half of the country, consisting of 
the regions known as la Orinoquía and la Amazonía – were to be cut off and isolated 
from the rest of the nation.  The FARC-EP senior leadership also ordered the creation of 
numerous fronts charged with the encirclement and besieging of Bogotá. 
The Conference attendees ordered the creation of a hierarchical military chain of 
command for each specific level of guerrilla authority.  Additionally, each level of 
guerrilla command was assigned specific political-military objectives to be accomplished 
within each unit’s geographic region of the country.  Above all, FARC-EP senior 
leadership emphasized the importance of linking insurgent attacks to the successful 
accomplishment of political-military objectives.  If an assault or attack against a given 
target did not accomplish a given political-military objective, it was to be avoided at all 
costs. 
Finally, the Seventh guerrilla conference acted to change the manner in which the 
FARC-EP operated at a tactical level.  For the previous twenty years, the insurgency had 
largely been a defensive organization that had carried out uncoordinated, guerrilla attacks 
against largely unsuspecting Colombian military and CNP forces.  The guerrillas took 
advantage of the Colombian military’s preference for large-scale, conventional tactics 
that were entirely ill-suited to the environment.  As a result, the FARC-EP was able to 
harass and inflict some limited damage upon the Colombian military and CNP.  
However, by the early 1980s, the insurgency’s enemies had learned from their mistakes 
and were successfully employing highly effective counter-guerrilla tactics against the 
FARC-EP.  Caught off guard by the Colombian Army’s (COLAR) sudden transition to 
irregular warfare and successful implementation of counter guerrilla tactics, the FARC-
EP quickly began to take significant losses.  A panic settled in as the Colombian military 
time and again dealt significant blows to the guerrilla organization. 
The FARC-EP’s senior leadership addressed this crisis at the Seventh Guerrilla 
Conference by developing a new tactical operating procedure by which it could strike at 
 
29 Colombian Army, “Apreciación evolutiva de las FARC-EP,” May 2000, location of publication and 
author are unknown, 5. 
22
 
                                                
and defeat the Colombian military.  This new method of guerrilla warfare, known as the 
“new method of operating” (el nuevo método de operar)30, emphasized the use of highly 
mobile, heavily armed, guerrilla elements that conducted coordinated attacks against 
Colombian military targets.  Emphasis was placed upon the coordinated use of offensive 
military units operating in secrecy that tracked down, attacked, and destroyed COLAR 
counter guerrilla units and related military targets.  Three key elements – surprise, 
mobility, and secrecy 31 – served as the guiding principles for planning and carrying out 
attacks against the Colombian military. 
However, before this new strategy could be implemented,  former President 
Belisario Betancur surprised everyone by announcing on inauguration day, 7 August 
1982, his intention to conduct the country’s first-ever peace talks with the nation’s 
insurgent organizations.  As a result, the implementation of the “new method of 
operating” and its accompanying “Strategic Plan for Taking Power”, were temporarily 
placed on the backburner until late-1989.  In the meantime the FARC-EP engaged in an 
unsuccessful, six year-long peace process (1982-1988) first with the Betancur and later 
the Virgilio Barco Vargas administrations.  However, by the time the FARC-EP 
withdrew from the peace process in 1988, it had achieved something that it had not 
accomplished in the previous twenty four years of political and military struggle – 
official recognition as a political actor.  Additionally, the assassination of hundreds of 
Patriotic Union (UP) candidates at the hands of the paramilitaries and the unwillingness 
of the “fascist” Colombian military to comply with the orders of the “oligarchic” central 
government would convince the FARC-EP that a political resolution to the conflict was 
not possible at that time. 
1. Belisario Betancur and the Peace Process (1982-1986) 
Armed with a strategic political-military plan and better organized than ever 
before in the insurgency’s history, the FARC-EP set out in late May 1982 to begin what it 
recognized would be a prolonged struggle against the Government of Colombia.  
However, the presidential inauguration of Belisario Betancur on 7 August 1982 and his 
 
30 Alape, Tirofijo: Los sueños y las montañas, 178. 
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surprise decision to conduct the country’s first-ever peace talks with the nation’s guerrilla 
organizations, led the FARC-EP to decrease temporarily its participation in  armed 
guerrilla actions ostensibly in order to pursue peace negotiations. 
The Betancur administration’s peace process consisted of three parts.  First, under 
Congressional law 35, signed on 18 November 1982, a general amnesty was granted to 
all guerrilla combatants.  Second, the administration recognized the need to broaden and 
amplify participation in the nation’s political system.  Third, peace talks were scheduled 
with the nation’s various insurgent groups.32  Two governmental commissions - the 
Peace Commission (la Comisión de Paz) and the Multipartite Political Summit (la 
Cumbre Política Multipartidaria) were created to carry out the so-called “great dialogue” 
between the Government of Colombia, Colombian political and civil society, and the 
guerrilla organizations.  However, no sooner was the Multipartite Political Summit 
created, than it quickly languished and was quietly abandoned because of the 
unwillingness of many of the Summit’s participants, which included a broad range of 
representatives from the political parties and private sector, to participate in the “great 
dialogue” with the subversive organizations.  This left the Peace Commission as the only 
viable mechanism for conducting talks with the guerrillas. 
The Colombian military reacted harshly to the initiation of peace talks with the 
guerrillas.  Then Minister of Defense, General Fernando Landazábal, expressed his 
contempt for the peace process and stated that the Colombian military would not accept 
any truce reached between the various guerrilla insurgencies and the Government of 
Colombia. The General would subsequently write in his 1985 book, El precio de la paz, 
that the peace talks were “the new strategic model…for guaranteeing the ascendance of 
subversion throughout the American continent.”33  As a result of Landazábal’s public 
defiance of civil authority, the general was relieved of his position and subsequently 
retired. 
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The FARC-EP, upon learning of the government’s offer to hold peace talks, 
appointed its own National Peace Commission headed by Jacobo Arenas.  For fourteen 
months, from 30 January, 1983 to 28 March 1984, representatives from the FARC-EP 
and Government of Colombia met to discuss a political solution to the then twenty year-
old conflict. Finally, on 28 March 1984 el Acuerdo de la Uribe was reached between the 
two parties.  According to the terms of this document, the FARC-EP agreed to a year-
long, unilateral ceasefire beginning on 28 May 1984.34  Second, the FARC-EP 
condemned kidnapping and promised to cease its participation in the illegal activity 
pending the government’s compliance with the terms of the accord.  Third, although the 
Government of Colombia did not grant official demilitarized status to the region located 
between La Uribe and Guayabero in the department of Meta, it agreed to prohibit 
Colombian military and police forces from operating in that region.35
The Agreement of La Uribe also created a Verification Commission (una 
Comisión de Verificación) that, upon determining that hostilities had in fact ceased 
between the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP, would grant the guerrilla 
insurgency one year from the day of that determination to organize itself politically, 
socially, and economically as it saw fit.  On 26 November, 1984, at a meeting that took 
place at an unknown location simply referred to as La Esperanza, the FARC-EP 
recommended to the Verification Commission that it report to the Government of 
Colombia that hostilities between the two parties had ended.  The insurgency then 
requested on the same date to be allowed to begin preparations beginning 1 December, 
1984, to organize a legitimate political party.  The Government of Colombia later granted 
the FARC-EP’s request and, three months later, on 7 March 1985, the guerrilla 
organization’s political party, the Patriotic Union (la Unión Patriótica), was born.  
However, the creation of the UP did not mark an end to the FARC-EP’s insurrectional  
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de Paz: Acuerdos en Colombia, 1902-1994, eds. Medófilo Medina and Efraín Sánchez (Bogotá: Alcaldía 
Mayor de Bogotá D.C., 2003), 292. 
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political or military objectives, but rather signified a diversification of the insurgency’s 
strategy to include a fight for power within the legitimate political process.  In this way, 
the FARC-EP consummated its old strategy of “struggle by all means possible”. 
2. The End of the Peace Process and the Road to War (1986-1989) 
The UP made its official debut in November 1985 and shortly thereafter began to 
prepare for the local and national-level elections of 1986.  In August 1986, the UP scored 
some impressive electoral victories.  Voters elected “…fourteen congress members to the 
Senate and the House (among them Iván Márquez, current member of the FARC-EP’s 
Secretariat), eighteen deputies in eleven departmental assemblies, and 335 counselors in 
187 councils, tripling the vote the Left traditionally received.”36  Perhaps of greatest 
significance, however, is the fact that the UP presidential candidate, Jaime Pardo Leal, 
received 350,000 votes, or 4.5 percent of the total vote – this after the party had only been 
in existence for some eight months.37
But the victory enjoyed by the leftwing UP would soon be cut short as members 
of anti-communist, paramilitary, death squads, allegedly guided by Colombian 
intelligence, conducted violent, assassination campaigns against the political party and its 
supporters.  Between 1985 and mid-1988, some 550 members of the UP, including 1986 
presidential candidate Jaime Pardo Leal and four UP congressmen, were murdered.38  
Pardo Leal’s replacement for the 1990 presidential elections, Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, 
would later be assassinated in March of that same year.  By 1998, some 4,000 UP and 
Colombian Communist Party (PCC) members would be killed, which allowed the FARC-
EP plausibly to assert that the Colombian elites and military would never allow a leftist 
party even to participate in the political process. 
In the meantime President Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986-1990), who came into 
office on 7 August 1986, surprised many when he announced early in his administration 
 
36 FARC-EP.  “The Illegality of ‘Legal Opposition’ in Colombia: About the Bolivarian Movement,” 
available from http://www.FARC-EPep.org/pagina_ingles/articles/illegality.html; Internet; accessed on 27 
March 2005. 
37 Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramón, El orden de la guerra, 190. 
38 U.S Department of the Army, “Minor Third Parties,” available from 
http://countrystudies.us/colombia/88.htm; Internet; accessed on 27 March 2005. 
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that there would be no new initiative for dealing with the guerrilla problem.39  Although 
the Barco administration was able successfully to negotiate the demobilization of the M-
19, one of Colombia’s smaller yet extremely violent urban guerrilla organizations, little 
was accomplished in terms of securing a lasting peace agreement with the FARC-EP.  
The president’s perceived lack of attention to the three year-old peace process with the 
guerrilla organization and his emphasis instead, under U.S. pressure, on narcotics and 
urban terrorism concerned many senior FARC-EP members, who began to clamor for an 
end to the ceasefire and a return to hostilities by early 1987.  While this position was 
based on numerous factors at least three deserve to be highlighted.40  First, the genocide 
committed against the UP and PCC allowed many senior guerrilla leaders to argue that 
the Colombian elites and “fascist military” would never allow a leftist political party to 
achieve real political power.  The door to political reform, they insisted, had been closed, 
leaving the insurgency only an armed course of action to follow.  Second, the 
Government of Colombia’s unwillingness or inability to enact political reforms, a 
requirement that was stipulated in the Agreement of La Uribe as a precondition for 
continued participation in the cease fire, allowed many senior FARC-EP members to 
question the Government of Colombia’s commitment to the political transformation of 
Colombian society.  Third, the Colombian military’s and paramilitaries’ decisions to 
conduct counterinsurgency operations – in direct violation of the Agreement of La Uribe 
-  against FARC-EP targets located in guerrilla held zones understood to be off-limits to 
the Colombian military, proved to many senior guerrilla leaders that the Colombian 
military was an out-of-control organization that ignored central governmental authority.  
These factors convinced many senior FARC-EP members to abandon the cease fire and 
to return to violent armed struggle. 
However, these demands were tempered by more prudent voices which argued in 
favor of prolonging the cease fire in order to prepare FARC-EP combat units for an 
unavoidable return to hostilities.  In the end, a compromise was reached between the two 
 
39 Harvey F. Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994 (Tucsaloosa: The 
University of Alabama Press, 1999), 33. 
40 The following three points are derived from FARC-EP, “Conclusiones Internas del Pleno Estado 
Mayor FARC-EP,” Historia de las FARC, Unpublished FARC-EP Internal Document, 123. 
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factions.  While the FARC-EP would continue to participate in the peace talks, it would 
also develop a secret “emergency plan” that would rapidly allow it to return to guerrilla 
war when the peace talks collapsed.  In this manner, the cease fire served two functions.  
First, it bought the FARC-EP time to prepare for a return to guerrilla warfare.  Second, it 
seemed to demonstrate that the insurgency was willing to dialogue with the government 
and seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict.  The latter action was useful in acquiring 
additional political support from the populace as well as international support from 
interested third party nations. 
But nearly four years of participating in the peace process and focusing its efforts 
on the development of a national political infrastructure had dulled the military edge of 
the FARC-EP.  Senior military leaders within the insurgency found their combat units to 
be undisciplined, lethargic, and generally ineffective.  Consequently, actions were taken 
during the Guerrilla Plenum of 25-29 December, 1987, to reorient the insurgency towards 
guerrilla warfare.41  Emphasis was once again placed on implementing the “new method 
of operating” – the FARC-EP’s new operating procedures for fielded combat guerrilla 
units which emphasized secrecy, mobility, surprise, and coordinated attacks against the 
Colombian military.  Although the “new method of operating” had been adopted during 
the Seventh Guerrilla Conference of 1982, most FARC-EP units by late-1987 had failed 
to implement the new strategy and instead continued to rely upon ineffective guerrilla 
techniques that had been pioneered during the early 1970s. The inability of FARC-EP 
combat leaders to implement the “new method of operating” was attributed to a lack of 
training and doctrine.  Consequently, the attendees to the Guerrilla Plenum of 25-29 
December 1987 decided to remedy this problem by offering specialized military training 
courses at the FARC-EP’s Hernando González military academy located in los Llanos del 
Yarí, Caquetá.42
But while the FARC-EP leadership endeavored psychologically and physically to 
prepare its combat forces for a return to war, it also sought to augment its clandestine 
 
41 FARC-EP, “Pleno Ampliado del Estado Mayor de las FARC-EP.  Diciembre 25-29 de 1987.  
Primera Gran Conclusión,” Historia de las FARC, Unpublished FARC-EP document, 154. 




                                                
political apparatus and improve its relationship with “the masses.”  This was 
accomplished by creating political discussion groups known as Bolivarian Town 
Meetings (las Reuniónes Bolivarianas del Pueblo).43  In these meetings, FARC-EP 
guerrillas clandestinely met with members of local communities in order to discuss items 
of political, social, and economic significance.  The guerrillas also used these meetings to 
disseminate FARC-EP propaganda and to suggest political projects aimed at resolving 
local community problems.  Above all, Bolivarian Town Meetings allowed the FARC-EP 
to establish and continuously improve its relationship with “the masses”. This, according 
to FARC-EP documents and Maoist guerrilla teachings, would be key in assuring the 
insurgency’s victory over the Colombian military. 
3. The 1989 FARC-EP Plenum 
By 1989, the senior leadership of the FARC-EP had decided that the time had 
come to abandon the peace process and return to guerrilla hostilities.  As previously 
mentioned, this decision was based on the assessment that the ongoing peace talks with 
the Government of Colombia were not making any progress.  Additionally, the FARC-EP 
felt that, although it had not taken maximum advantage of the cease fire to grow, develop 
its combat techniques, and territorially expand, further participation in the talks would 
simply weaken the organization and demoralize its troops.  Consequently, at the 
organization’s 10-17 May, 1989, plenum, the guerrilla organization charted a course for 
all-out war against the Colombian military, which would be launched in January 1990. 
Building upon the conclusions reached at the Seventh Guerrilla Conference, the 
FARC-EP developed and initiated an eight-year military plan, known as the Bolivarian 
Campaign for a New Colombia (la Campaña Bolivariana por una Nueva Colombia).  
This political-military strategy was divided into four phases, each of which was 
scheduled to last two years.  In the first phase (1990-1992), the FARC-EP aspired to 
grow from a military force of approximately 5,000-8,000 guerrillas assigned to 44 fronts 
to a force of 18,000 distributed among 60 fronts.44  Emphasis was placed on the 
acquisition of weapons, communications equipment, and even aircraft which were 
 
43 FARC-EP, “Pleno Ampliado del Estado Mayor de las FARC-EP.  Diciembre 25-29 de 1987. 
Primera Gran Conclusión,” Historia de las FARC, Unpublished FARC-EP Internal Document, 153-154. 
44 FARC-EP, “Conclusiones Generales del Pleno del Estado Mayor de las FARC-EP.  Mayo 10 – 17 
de 1989,” Historia de las FARC-EP, Unpublished FARC-EP Internal Document, 179. 
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estimated to cost an approximately $56 million dollars.45  In the second phase (1992-
1994), the FARC-EP hoped to grow to a total of 32,000 members dispersed among 80 
fronts.  An estimated US$200 million dollars would be required to finance this portion of 
the organization’s expansion. 
In phase three (1994-1996), the FARC-EP would finally employ its “new method 
of operating” and, in accordance with the plans developed during the Seventh Guerrilla 
Conference, would launch its first major offensive against Bogotá and other select 
targets.  The FARC-EP expected to employ half of its 32,000 guerrilla combatants or 
16,000 troops as irregular guerrilla fighters.  The remaining 16,000, however, would be 
employed according to the FARC-EP’s “new method of operating” to “…overrun 
military bases, civilian populations, and other objectives.”46  This would require the 
intricate, coordinated movement of large-scale, near conventional strength, FARC-EP 
units operating across large swaths of territory against regular COLAR and CNP target 
sets.  In phase three, irregular and “regular” guerrilla units would support one another in 
conducting joint attacks against preplanned targets.  
These plans would later be carried out between 1996 and 1998 when the 
insurgency attacked, overran, and destroyed Las Delicias Military Base – a major 
Colombian military counternarcotics installation - captured the departmental capital of 
Mitú, Vaupés, attacked a military base located at Patascoy, Nariño department, and 
annihilated an elite counter-guerrilla unit – the 52nd Counter-guerrilla battalion, Third 
Mobile Brigade – located at El Billar, Caquetá.47
Phase four (1996-1998), which was only to be executed if the offensive planned 
for phase three operations failed, called for all FARC-EP units to fall back to  
 
 
45 Colombian Army, “Apreciación evolutiva de las FARC-EP,” Unpublished Colombian Army 
Internal Document, May 2000, 9-11. 
46 FARC-EP, “Líneas generales del Plan Militar Estratégico de Ocho Años, Julio 89-97,” Historia de 
las FARC, Unpublished FARC-EP Internal Document, 180. 
47 Fuerzas Militares para la Guerra: La agenda pendiente de la reforma militar, by Alfredo Rangel 
Suárez, director (Bogotá: Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, 2003), 21-25.  Additional information 
regarding these attacks and the FARC-EP’s employment of the “new method of operating” will be 
discussed in Chapter III. 
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predetermined positions in order to regroup and plan a second offensive. Additionally, 
urban guerrilla units such as the Solidarity Nuclei were charged with inciting the 
Colombian populace into carrying out mass-based general insurrections. 
Two additional political-military organizations – the Bolivarian Militias and the 
Regular Militias - were created during the 10-17 May, 1989, plenum to assist the 
Solidarity Nuclei in mobilizing the populace.  These organizations receive their orders 
directly from the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and carry out specific missions that 
support both political and military objectives.  The members of both groups are full-time 
civilians with normal civilian jobs that dedicate only a fraction of their time to activities 
in support of the FARC-EP.48  The difference between Bolivarian militia members and 
regular Militia members is that Bolivarian militiamen are more politically indoctrinated 
than their regular militia counterparts.  Additionally, Bolivarian militiamen dedicate some 
portion of the year to participating in rural-based combat operations while regular 
militiamen do not. 
While the Solidarity Nuclei, Bolivarian Militias, and Regular Militias were 
mobilizing the urban populace, rural based FARC-EP combat units would splinter into 
smaller combat cells scattered throughout the country.  These cells would then attack the 
Colombian military and force them to disperse into ever smaller units.  This strategy was 
based on the principle of forcing the Colombian military to disperse over large areas of 
territory.  Once this occurred, commando-size FARC-EP units would then regroup into 
larger guerrilla formations that would gradually attrit the geographically isolated 
Colombian military units. 
In addition to standard guerrilla warfare, the FARC-EP also aspired in phase four 
operations to conduct terrorist attacks against the national infrastructure.  Emphasis was 
to be placed upon paralyzing the national highway system, destroying electrical towers, 
and disrupting communications throughout the nation. These attacks against the national 
infrastructure would be designed to bring the country’s economy to a grinding halt. 
 
48 Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramón, El orden de la guerra, 55-57. 
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Finally, once the FARC-EP had attrited Colombian military forces and encircled 
the capital, a general strike called by the FARC-EP would paralyze the nation.  The 
FARC-EP forces in and around Bogotá would then take advantage of this strike to move 
their forces into the capital and overthrow the government.  Upon defeating the 
Government of Colombia and removing the former leaders from power, a provisional 
revolutionary government would be established that would call for a plebiscite to write a 
new constitution.  Upon the adoption of this new constitution, the FARC-EP would 
consider its revolution complete and would abandon its violent revolutionary struggle. 
D. RESOURCES 
The FARC-EP’s 1982 decision to create a “little guerrilla army” required a 
significant shift in the organization’s strategy for securing resources.  Prior to 1982, the 
organization subsisted on those limited financial resources it could acquire through what 
Alfredo Rangel refers to as “predatory” activities - extortion, bank robberies, and random 
kidnappings.49  However, the amount of revenue obtained from the organization’s 
participation in these activities was insufficient to allow significant territorial or military 
gains, restricting numbers as well as the FARC-EP’s firepower to those weapons the 
guerrillas could recover from the battlefield or steal from local peasants.50
Marulanda rejected the possibility of materiel support from the former Soviet 
Union or Cuba, because he feared undue outside influence on the FARC-EP.  FARC-EP 
commander Fernando Caicedo and Chief Political ideologue Iván Ríos insisted that, “but 
the Soviet Union never helped us out at all, because it occurred to someone in the FARC-
EP, I don’t know who it was…some say it was Manuel Marulanda, that we could not tie 
ourselves to the ideas of anyone else, even if they were revolutionaries….”51
The FARC-EP’s decision to transform itself into an irregular guerrilla army drove 
the insurgency to develop an economic base of support that would allow the guerrilla 
organization to achieve its ambitious goals.  Accordingly, following the Seventh 
 
49 Alfredo Rangel Suárez, “Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy of 
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Guerrilla Conference in 1982, the FARC-EP began to target and exploit four types of 
resources - livestock, commercial agriculture, oil, and gold – found in the resource-rich 
departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Meta, Caquetá, Magdalena, Córdoba, Santander, 
Bolívar, and Putumayo.52  In fact, the emergence of new FARC-EP fronts in the early-to-
mid-1980s corresponded with those regions of the country undergoing an economic 
boom.53  The money obtained from the extraction of these resources and their sale on the 
black market, as well as revenues obtained through the extortion of commercial business 
enterprises, allowed the FARC-EP to expand its political and military presence into new 
zones of guerrilla influence. 
Another source of financial revenues derived from the FARC-EP’s increased 
involvement in the drug trade.  Although many senior guerrilla leaders such as Jacobo 
Arenas, the FARC-EP’s former Marxist-Leninist political ideologue, ardently fought to 
prevent the organization from getting further involved in this “corrupting” and “counter-
revolutionary” industry,54 the financial requirements needed to support the development 
of the “little guerrilla army” eventually prevailed.  Nevertheless, efforts were made in the 
1980s to limit the FARC-EP’s involvement to protecting the raspachines (peasant 
farmers who cultivate and harvest coca leaves) and to charging narco-traffickers taxes to 
transport illicit drugs and related materials through guerrilla-held areas.  However, by the 
1990s, the FARC-EP’s involvement in the drug trade would greatly expand. 
Although little information is known regarding the amount of revenues the 
FARC-EP earned during the 1980s from its participation in the drug trade and other 
illegal activities, it is widely recognized that these revenues fueled the growth and 
territorial expansion of the insurgency.  Between 1982 and 1989 the FARC-EP grew to 
approximately 7,000 combatants assigned to 27 fronts – a 700% increase in guerrilla 
combatants in just seven years.  This impressive growth is underscored when one  
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considers that, in the first eighteen years of the insurgency’s existence (1964-1982), the 
FARC-EP had barely been able to establish a guerrilla forced composed of 1,000 
combatants. 
Despite this impressive growth, the FARC-EP’s senior leadership was not 
satisfied with size of the “little guerrilla army.”  Consequently, at the 10-17 May 1989 
plenum, the organization’s senior leadership ordered its subordinate units to make the 
acquisition and diversification of financial resources its number one priority.  Transcripts 
from this plenum illustrate the preeminence given to achieving this objective: 
The successful execution of the Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia 
will depend upon the correct interpretation and application of the FARC-
EP’s financial policies….It is necessary that we make a greater effort to 
explore new possibilities for obtaining greater financial resources.  The 
increased acquisition of the aforementioned resources will assist us in 
improving our national political presence, the authority of the movement, 
and our relationship with the masses.  Of equal importance is the 
attainment of financial resources derived from the mining industry – 
especially the gold, and oil industries.  We should also look into the 
possibility of generating resources from the marble, platinum, and other 
mineral related industries.  We need to study the feasibility of investing 
our money so as to create an economic base of support for the movement.  
We should continue to pursue all means available of acquiring 
international support.55
This decision would have a major impact on the strategic behavior of the FARC-
EP and would lay the foundation for the organization’s dramatic growth and territorial 
expansion in the 1990s. 
E. ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 
Throughout the 1980s, the FARC-EP implemented a series of internal structural 
changes designed to facilitate the organization’s transformation into a guerrilla army and 
to guarantee that this process of expansion would not undermine the essential 
revolutionary character of the organization.  First, in an effort to ready their fighters for 
the transition to maneuver warfare, several training and educational centers were 
founded.  These guerrilla “academies” provided their students with political, ideological, 
and military training that would allow them to carry out operations directly in support of 
 




                                                
the Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia.  Second, a number of changes were 
focused on establishing greater centralized control over the geographically dispersed 
FARC-EP fronts and their financial resources.  These innovations, as well as the 
application of a stern penal code and the swift implementation of revolutionary justice, 
were designed to ensure that the FARC-EP’s increasing reliance on the drug trade for 
financing would serve, rather than jeopardize, the organization’s revolutionary aims.  The 
combined efforts allowed the EMC to assert itself as the dominant political-military force 
within the FARC-EP and to consolidate its control over the burgeoning guerrilla 
organization. 
1. FARC-EP Education, Institutions and Training Facilities 
One of the first changes to be enacted was the creation in 1982 of the Hernando 
González School of Cadets (la Escuela de Cadetes).  This guerrilla training center was 
established in order to introduce tactical-level commanders to the “new method of 
operating.”56  Accordingly, the FARC-EP’s best and brightest guerrilla commanders 
traveled to the military academy, located in los Llanos del Yarí, Caquetá where emphasis 
was placed upon mobile guerrilla warfare, military psychology, urban guerrilla warfare, 
communications, first aid, cartography, artillery, and related topics.57  Students also 
received political and ideological training and participated in seminars dealing with the 
FARC-EP’s Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia.  Towards the end of the 1980s, 
the Hernando González military academy began to offer specialized courses in such 
subjects as the use of plastic explosives and intelligence gathering.  It also produced a 
series of study guides or manuals that were freely distributed throughout the insurgent 
organization. 
However, a shortage of classes and instructors prevented the FARC-EP from 
more rapidly implementing the “new method of operating.” FARC-EP documents speak 
of the need to increase the amount of classes offered throughout the year and to train 
more tactical-level commanders in the art of the “new method of operating.”  Although  
 
 
56 FARC-EP, “Pleno Ampliado del Estado Mayor Central de las FARC-EP.  Diciembre 27 de 1984 – 
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the documents do not specifically state why these classes and training opportunities were 
offered on a limited basis, budget constraints as well as increased operations tempo may 
have played a role. 
In addition to the Escuela de Cadetes, the FARC-EP also established regional 
training facilities for each section of the country.  At those locations, new recruits 
completed their basic training and received introductory level classes in weapons 
familiarization, explosives, and tactical-level guerrilla warfare.  According to one former 
member of the FARC-EP’s elite Teófilo Forero Mobile Column, alias Paola, basic 
training lasted four months and began with twenty, eight-hour long days, of political and 
ideological indoctrination.58  Emphasis was also placed upon teaching the guerrilla 
recruits the FARC-EP’s penal code and the organization’s Statutes of Political 
Organization. 
2. FARC-EP Control of Financial Resources 
Beginning in 1982, FARC-EP fronts engaged in illicit activities in order to meet 
their annual financial contributions demanded by the organization’s highest political and 
military command authority – the EMC.  However, the resource availability of a given 
geographic region determined the ability of the fronts to meet or exceed their financial 
obligations.  In some resource poor sections of the country, FARC-EP fronts literally 
starved to death while their comrades, located in resource-rich sections of the country, 
enjoyed extravagant lifestyles.59 According to FARC-EP internal documents, the leaders 
of some of the wealthier fronts, especially those that operated in the coca-rich 
departments of Putumayo and Caquetá, had reportedly adopted lifestyles approximating 
those of the local narco-traffickers.  These “corrupted” and “bourgeois” members of the 
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while others were accused of purchasing expensive automobiles and other luxury items.60  
FARC-EP commander Julio Rincón commented on his time in command of a front based 
in Caquetá during the 1980s: 
Narcotrafficking corrupted many within our command that’s for 
sure...There are thousands of cases like this which took place in el Caguán 
(Caquetá).  That’s why my first decree was: no one will wear gold chains.  
Give me the chains and I’ll send them to the Secretariat.  All that gold 
from el Caguán was used to make medals, and military decorations 
honoring Isaías Pardo, one of our guerrilla fighters from the Marquetalia 
era.  We don’t wear any kind of gold; it was prohibited while I was 
there.61
While such activities were obviously forbidden within the FARC-EP, the 
decentralization of authority prevented the EMC from exerting control over its 
subordinate units.  Consequently, the levels of corruption found within select fronts 
increased while loyalty to the revolutionary cause began to wane. 
By 1985, the tremendous discrepancies noted between the rich and poor FARC-
EP fronts had begun to create fissures within the guerrilla organization.62  Members of 
the poorer fronts resented the ostentatious and extravagant lifestyles of their 
economically richer comrades. Conversely, guerrilla fighters assigned to economically 
prosperous units began to refuse orders that would have redeployed them to resource-
poor regions of the country.  Additionally, rumors abounded regarding the theft of 
FARC-EP revenues, the misrepresentation of financial assets, and the general 
misappropriation and abuse of organizational assets. 
In an effort to resolve these problems, the senior leadership of the insurgency met 
from 27 December 1984 – 2 January 1985 when they determined to centralize control of 
all FARC-EP finances in a newly created National Financial Commission.  This entity 
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resources to the subordinate FARC-EP units. Additionally, this organization was granted 
authority to approve major purchases and determine overall financial policies for the 
guerrilla organization. 
At the subordinate front levels, each FARC-EP element would be assigned a 
budget and provided with the means to accomplish its political and military objectives.  
Additionally, front-level Financial Commissions that operated independently of the 
political and military apparatuses of each guerrilla unit were established and required to 
account for all money spent by a given front.  In this manner, the EMC hoped to both 
increase accountability and reduce the potential for corruption. 
Later in 1987, after reports of corruption and graft persisted within the FARC-EP, 
the EMC announced the creation of ayudantías (advisors).63  These individuals, who 
were specially selected by the EMC and assigned to each front, were given the 
responsibility for assuring that every front commander utilized allocated funds to 
accomplish the political and military objectives of their unit.  Ayudantías provided 
political, military, and economic advice to the tactical-level unit commanders.  Failure to 
use the financial allocations appropriated by the National Financial Commission in a 
“correct” manner resulted in the ayudantía’s referral of the local commander to the 
National Financial Commission for investigation and trial.  Similar actions were taken if 
the ayudantía felt that the unit-level commander was failing to accomplish his assigned 
political and military objectives.  If it was proven that the FARC-EP commander had 
stolen from the insurgency or misappropriated organizational funds, the insurgent leader, 
in accordance with the FARC-EP’s disciplinary or penal code known as the Reglamento 
de Régimen Disciplinario, was usually removed from his position of authority and 
immediately assassinated by a single shot to the head (el tiro de gracia). 
The Reglamento de Régimen Disciplinario was also used to discipline rank and 
file guerrillas and to instill a strict sense of military discipline firmly rooted in fear.64  
 
63 FARC-EP, “Conclusiones de Finanzas del Pleno Ampliado del Comité Ejecutivo.  Febrero 18 de 
1987,” Historia de las FARC, Unpublished FARC-EP Internal Document, 129. 
64 Note: For a more detailed study of the FARC-EP’s penal code see Juan Guillermo Ferro Medina 
and Graciela Uribe Ramón, El orden de la guerra, 57-59 and Human Rights Watch, You’ll Learn Not to 
Cry: Child Combatants in Colombia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), 68-74. 
38
 
                                                
This code, which all guerrilla members are required to study closely, was created during 
the FARC-EP’s second guerrilla conference held from 25 April – 5 May 1966 and 
prescribes a variety of political and/or military punishments ranging from public self-
criticism to execution.  Of note, Article three of the penal code prescribes an immediate 
death sentence for those convicted of desertion, betrayal, fomenting rebellion and 
fractionalization, rape, theft, establishing businesses, and drug abuse.65  By swiftly 
implementing the punishments, the FARC-EP was able to root out discipline problems, 
encourage les autres, and regain control over subordinate units. 
Guerrillas accused of serious crimes were placed on trial in what is referred to as 
a “war council.”  During these trials, the accused guerrilla member was judged by a panel 
composed of his fellow guerrillas.  While the individual on trial was appointed an 
“attorney” to defend him – usually the accused’s greatest enemy - generally speaking, 
“war councils” almost always found the accused guilty and sentenced the convicted 
guerrilla to death.  This sentence was then carried out by the convicted guerrilla’s closest 
friend who, if unable to enforce the punishment, was also immediately executed.  In this 
manner, the FARC-EP utilized fear to maintain discipline and order within the 
organization. 
Finally, in an effort further to centralize its authority over the subordinate FARC-
EP units and their members, the guerrilla organization reinforced collectivization of all 
property.  All goods which entered the FARC-EP – even seemingly innocuous items such 
as birthday gifts – had to be surrendered to the local FARC-EP commander.66  This 
individual was then responsible for remitting such property to the local Financial 
Commission, which in turn forwarded it to the National Financial Commission.  The 




65 Personal correspondence received from retired Colombian senior-military officer with more than 
thirty years of experience regarding the FARC-EP.  Information received on 30 March 2005. 
66 Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramón, El orden de la guerra, 104-105. 
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The FARC-EP’s decision to centralize finances, create institutions responsible for 
the management of financial assets, and establish a common yearly budget from which 
each FARC-EP unit derived its financial allotments, resulted in the reduction of tensions 
among FARC-EP units and an improvement in organizational cohesion. 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has argued that the 1980s represented a key turning point in the 
historical evolution of the FARC-EP.  During this decade, the organization made great 
strides in developing a coherent strategy that would guide its growth and territorial 
expansion during the 1990s.  The FARC-EP also made efforts to consolidate its control 
over its subordinate units and to centralize its authority in the EMC.  These actions were 
taken to prevent the formation of fissures within the organization and to ensure the 
senior-leadership’s tight control of the insurgency.  Major purges were also conducted to 
remove undesirable, “bourgeois,” or “counterrevolutionary” elements and to ensure that 
only “true revolutionaries” remained in the ranks of the FARC-EP. 
The 1980s were significant in that, for the first time in the history of the FARC-
EP, the insurgency developed and acted upon a strategic plan for achieving revolutionary 
political power.  This plan, whose realization depended upon the acquisition of revenues 
obtained through the organization’s participation in the illicit drug trade, would drive the 
actions of the FARC-EP for the next twenty years and enable it to come within striking 
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III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE “BOLIVARIAN 
CAMPAIGN FOR A NEW COLOMBIA” (1990-1998) 
The FARC-EP apply the fundamental principles of Marxist-Leninism to 
the Colombian reality and are guided by the movement’s Strategic Plan 
and Revolutionary Program, the conclusions of its national conferences, 
the Plenums of the Estado Mayor Central, and its Internal Regulations.  It 
is inspired by the revolutionary thoughts of the Liberator, Simón Bolívar, 
anti-imperialism, Latin American unity, equality, and the well-being of the 
people.  The FARC -EP advocate the creation of an authentic Bolivarian 
Army.67
The Statutes of the FARC-EP, Chapter One, Article Two 
A. INTRODUCTION 
At the dawn of the 1990s, the FARC-EP was positioned to take its next 
revolutionary step forward.  Armed with a comprehensive strategic plan – the Bolivarian 
Campaign for a New Colombia - developed during the 1980s and financed largely 
through its involvement in the drug trade, the movement was eager to take the war to the 
Colombian military.  The 1990s would witness the successful execution of the guerrilla 
organization’s strategic plan.  By 1996, the FARC-EP’s victories against the Colombian 
military would become so definitive that many domestic and foreign observers would 
predict the imminent fall of the central government.68
Some observers have suggested that the 1990s marked the decade in which the 
FARC-EP completely abandoned its revolutionary cause and devolved into a criminal 
enterprise.  They cite the FARC-EP’s growing involvement in the drug trade and reported 
multi-million dollar yearly income as evidence of the organization’s devolution into a 
criminal enterprise.  By the beginning of the 1990s, this argument goes, the FARC-EP 
was no longer driven by revolutionary ambitions, but rather by an unquenchable thirst for 
greater revenues.  It sought, as one critic has argued, to fill the void left by the demise of 
 
67 All translations from the Spanish are the authors unless otherwise indicated. 
68 Fuerzas Militares para la Guerra: La agenda pendiente de la reforma militar, by Alfredo Rangel 
Suárez, director (Bogotá: Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, 2003), 26. 
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the Medellín and Cali cartels and to become the nation’s “third cartel.”69  This chapter 
refutes these arguments by examining the political-military, financial, and organizational 
development of the FARC-EP in the 1990s.  It illustrates that, despite the guerrilla 
organization’s greater involvement in the drug trade, the movement did not descend into 
criminality, but rather remained a revolutionary organization focused on achieving 
political power “through the barrel of a gun.” 
Between 1990 and 1998, the FARC-EP registered impressive military 
accomplishments, actions that obeyed a political-military logic aimed at achieving the 
strategic objectives set forth in the Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia. 
Throughout the 1990s, the FARC-EP carried out numerous offensives and attacked high-
value, strategic targets in an effort to sabotage the national economy, diminish the 
legitimacy of the state, and bring about the “necessary conditions” that would lead to a 
general insurrection.  To accomplish these objectives, the insurgency transitioned from 
guerrilla to maneuver warfare and implemented new tactics and techniques associated 
with the “new method of operating.”  It also organized a new political party - the 
Colombian Clandestine Communist Party (PCCC) – as a successor to the Patriotic Union 
(UP) and launched a grassroots, movement known as the Bolivarian Movement for a 
New Colombia.  Finally, in an effort to secure its control over the organization’s primary 
cash crop – coca – and to establish strategic dominance over a geo-strategically important 
region, the FARC-EP made a push into Southern Colombia.  By dominating this area of 
the country, the guerrilla organization would ensure a constant supply of weapons and 
war materiel from neighboring Ecuador while at the same time assuring the movement of 
coca into and out of the region. 
Similarly, in an effort to achieve its ambitious political-military objectives the 
FARC-EP underwent the most radical internal reorganization in the movement’s thirty 
year history.  More battle-proven and militant leaders, such as Jorge Briceño Suárez, alias 
el Mono Jojoy, were appointed to the movement’s senior positions.  Tighter political 
controls were implemented as the guerrilla organization was becoming immersed in the  
 
 




drug trade, so that illicit activities did not alter its revolutionary character or splinter the 
cohesion of the insurgency. This was due to the leadership’s stern enforcement of its 
draconian penal code –el Reglamento de Régimen Disciplinario. 
Finally, in an effort to increase its financial reserves the FARC-EP expanded into 
regions of the country where Colombia’s latest illicit crop – poppy – was grown.  The 
FARC-EP would also take advantage of the liberal reforms of the Constitution of 1991, 
which devolved political power to the departmental and municipal levels, to force local 
politicians to grant the organization access to departmental and municipal revenues.  The 
funds acquired through the organization’s participation in the illicit drug trade, extortion 
of private and public entities, and other illegal activities, allowed the movement to 
purchase the supplies, communications equipment, and war materiel necessary for 
prosecuting its war against the central government. 
B. POLITICAL-MILITARY 
The FARC-EP’s decision to abandon the legitimate political process and to seek a 
military resolution to the thirty year-old conflict was influenced by its perception that the 
Government of Colombia would never grant it a significant role in national politics.  
Consequently, the FARC-EP sought to obtain through violence what it could not attain 
through peaceful participation in the country’s electoral contest.  The large-scale FARC-
EP offensives of the 1990s against the presidential administrations of César Gaviria 
Trujillo (1990-1994) and Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) as well as the creation of the 
clandestine political movement, the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia, were 
carried out in an effort to weaken the state and discredit the Colombian military.  
Furthermore, the insurgency’s push into coca-rich Southern Colombia and strategic 
reprioritization of this area was driven at least as much by military objectives as by the 
desire to earn drug money.  The revenues earned from participation in this illicit industry 
were then used to support the growth and territorial extension of the “little guerrilla 
army.”  The launching of maneuver warfare against the Samper administration resulted 
from the combination of a long-in-the-making shift to the “new method of operating” and 
the determination that the FARC-EP should exploit a weak and internationally 
discredited presidential administration. 
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The fact that the FARC-EP’s large-scale guerrilla offensives and attacks against 
the national infrastructure coincided with its immersion in the drug trade illustrate that 
the organization acted with revolutionary and not criminal intent.  If the FARC-EP were a 
criminal organization, primarily interested in profiting from the drug trade, it would have 
adopted a low profile and sought to avoid contact with the state (unless the state initiated 
the offensive).  However, the FARC-EP initiated large-scale attacks and offensives 
against non-drug related targets including military bases, departmental capitals, and the 
national infrastructure.  These and other examples illustrate that the FARC-EP’s political-
military actions of the 1990s obeyed a political and not a criminal logic focused on the 
attainment of revolutionary power. 
In accordance with the decisions reached at the FARC-EP’s 1989 guerrilla 
plenum, the senior leadership of the insurgency in January 1990 directed its subordinate 
units temporarily to abandon its efforts to achieve revolutionary power via the ballot box 
in favor of a more direct, violent, military course of action.  Following the senior 
leadership’s guidance, subordinate FARC-EP units were ordered to implement the 
Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia.  Although at first the senior leadership’s 
decision to abandon the electoral politics process in favor of a primarily military strategy 
was somewhat controversial, four subsequent events in mid-to-late 1990 would vindicate 
this decision.70
First, on 10 August 1990, Jacobo Arenas, the FARC-EP’s political ideologue died 
of a heart attack.  Arenas’s death was significant in that, had he lived, it is unlikely that 
the FARC-EP would have completely abandoned its involvement in the nation’s political 
process.  This political ideologue was a staunch supporter of “the combination of all 
forms of struggle” – a guerrilla strategy in which insurgent activity in the political, 
economic, social, and military spheres combine to pressure the government into making 




70 Although the FARC-EP ceased to participate in the legitimate political process, it would later 
launch a clandestine political movement in 1996 known as the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia.  
This will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. 
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abandoning the political avenue to power reduced the effectiveness of the insurgency and 
constrained its options.  He, therefore, would have fought to prevent the FARC-EP from 
forsaking its participation in the political process in favor of a purely military strategy. 
A second factor which strengthened the militarization of FARC-EP strategy was 
the continued assassination of members of the guerrilla organization’s political party, the 
Patriotic Union (UP).  Between 1985 and mid-1988, 550 members of the UP, including 
1986 presidential candidate Jaime Pardo Leal and four UP congressmen, were 
murdered.71  By 1995, this number would grow to 2,500 before reaching a grand total of 
4,000.72  As Juan Guillermo Ferro Medina and Graciela Uribe Ramón observe, “…the 
extermination of the Patriotic Union signified for the FARC the closing of the legal 
democratic window; in other words, the abandonment of the legal political work carried 
out by movements that participate in the electoral contest.”73  The FARC-EP’s tie to the 
nation’s legitimate political process would be severed in the early 1990s when the UP, in 
favor of finding a negotiated political settlement to the internal conflict, abandoned the 
movement.  This left the guerrilla organization unrepresented in the nation’s political 
system. 
A third factor which increased FARC-EP support for a military solution to the 
conflict was then President César Gaviria Trujillo’s refusal to allow the insurgency to 
participate in the 9 December, 1990, elections for the Constituent Assembly which was to 
draw up Colombia’s first new constitution since 1886.  Gaviria’s decision was based 
upon two factors.  First, the FARC-EP refused to comply with the President’s demand 
that all guerrilla organizations wishing to participate in the Constituent Assembly lay 
down their weapons and demobilize.  Having seen the fate that met the members of the 
UP, the FARC-EP did not trust the government to protect their members and reserved the 
right to retain weapons to guarantee their safety.  Second, the FARC-EP in coordination 
with the Army of National Liberation (ELN), another guerrilla insurgency that refused to 
 
71 U.S. Department of the Army, “Minor Third Parties,” available from 
http://countrystudies.us/colombia/88.htm; Internet, accessed on 27 March 2005 
72 Geoff Simons, Colombia:  A Brutal History (London: Saqi Books, 2004), 96. 




                                                
demobilize, had carried out military offensives during the autumn of 1990 that were 
designed to pressure the government to back down on its for demobilization.  President 
Gaviria, however, was unmoved by the attacks and successfully urged the National 
Congress to prohibit the participation of the FARC-EP and the ELN in the elections. 
But the incident which confirmed the validity of the senior leadership’s decision 
to declare all-out war on the government was the Colombian military’s autonomous 
decision to bomb La Casa Verde – the former headquarters of the FARC-EP located in la 
Uribe, Meta department.  This attack, code named operation Centauro, took place on the 
same day, 9 December 1990, that Colombian voters elected the 70 delegates who would 
write the nation’s new constitution.  The destruction of La Casa Verde would have long-
term implications for the FARC-EP, the Government of Colombia, and the Colombian 
military.  According to Raúl Reyes, head of the FARC-EP’s international commission: 
After that operation [Centauro] the guerrilla struggle became stronger 
because people became more willing to participate in combat, they 
became more experienced, and there were a few, who, perhaps due to the 
gravity of the operation asked to be reassigned to combat units.  But there 
were others who, to the contrary, gained greater experience.  More people 
joined the FARC.  After the attack on La Casa Verde, the military 
structure of the FARC grew like never before.  However, at that moment, 
few critically evaluated the cost that President Gaviria’s act of war would 
have on the country.74
Immediately following the destruction of La Casa Verde, supreme FARC-
EP commander, Manuel Marulanda Vélez, stated, “We understand by this 
action that the government of Gaviria is closing the possibility of a 
negotiated settlement, and that he and he alone must assume the full 
responsibility for the consequences.”75
1. Operation Wasp: The First FARC-EP Offensive (1990-1991) 
On 31 December 1990, three weeks after the Colombian military’s razing of La 
Casa Verde, the FARC-EP and ELN initiated the largest guerrilla offensive in the history 
of the nation.  Code named “Operation Wasp,” this offensive was conducted in response 
to the destruction of the La Casa Verde and the Government’s refusal to allow the FARC-
 
74 Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramón, El orden de la guerra, 116-117. 
75 Douglas Farah, “Bogota Attacks Redoubt Of Leftist Rebel Forces; Revolutionaries Say Target Is 
Peace Talks,” The Washington Post, 14 December 1990, sec. A38; ProQuest, accession no. 72635788. 
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EP and the ELN to participate in the constituent assembly.  Within the first forty-eight 
hours of the offensive, the guerrilla organizations killed about 130 people and wounded 
an additional 200.76  Subsequent attacks carried out during the months of January – 
February 1991, in accordance with the strategic guidance provided in the Bolivarian 
Campaign for a New Colombia, focused on destroying the nation’s economic 
infrastructure by dynamiting natural gas and oil pipelines that crisscross the country.  
Colombian National Police and military personnel were also attacked while 
transportation and communication facilities were damaged.  By early February 1991, the 
joint FARC-EP and ELN offensive had resulted in the deaths of 250 guerrillas, 
government troops, and civilians and had cost the Government of Colombia more than 
$100 million dollars in lost oil revenues.77
The guerrilla offensive against the Government of Colombia continued 
throughout the winter and was punctuated by the decision of the FARC-EP and ELN to 
launch a second offensive on 7 February, 1991.  The date of the second joint offensive 
was set to coincide with, and protest, the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.  
During this second offensive, the FARC-EP and ELN continued to attack oil pipelines, 
spilling more than 38,000 barrels of crude oil in the first 40 days of 1991.  A 
representative from ECOPETROL, the state oil corporation, highlighted the impact of the 
guerrillas’ attacks against the pipelines when he stated that between 1986 – the first year 
in which such an attack occurred – and February 1991, more than 650,000 barrels of 
crude oil had been spilled into Colombia’s fragile ecosystem.  This number is two and a 
half times the amount of oil – approximately 260,000 barrels – that was spilled into 
Prince William Sound, Alaska by the Exxon Valdez oil tanker on 24 March 1989.78
By the time President Gaviria would leave office in August 1994, the guerrillas’ 
violent actions would cost the nation 12.5 billion pesos in lost revenues – “some 22.7 
 
76 “130 die, 200 injured in (sic) new year eve in Colombia,” The Xinhua General Overseas News 
Service, 2 January 1991, 5, Lexis Nexis, accession no. 0102025. 
77 Stan Yarbro, “Guerrillas Step Up Attacks in Colombia Violence: The Rebel Groups, Excluded from 
the Constitutional Debate, are Spreading Terror in the Capital.  The Death Toll Has Reached 47,” Los 
Angeles Times, 7 February 1991, 21, ProQuest, accession no. 61043337. 
78 Douglas Farah, “Car Bomb Kills 19, Injures 60 Outside Medellín Bull Arena,” The Washington 
Post.  17 February 1991, sec. A-.25, ProQuest, accession no. 72069552. 
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percent of the value of production in 1995, and close to the balance of the national public 
foreign debt.”79  Additionally, the political violence that would shake the country 
between 1990 and 1994 would result in the deaths of 3,400 people annually and cost the 
government 2.5 billion pesos in lost revenues each year.  The guerrillas’ violent actions 
would also cost the private sector 1.4 billion pesos, including more than 800 million as a 
result of kidnappings, extortion, and robberies.  Similarly, increased defense spending, 
additional security for the petroleum sector, and royalties lost as a result of attacks on the 
hydrocarbon network would cost the public sector approximately four billion pesos 
between 1990 and 1994.80  This inflicting of costs was part of the FARC-EP’s strategy 
for provoking the economic ruin of the country. 
The FARC-EP’s attacks against the national infrastructure and related targets 
would increase after President Gaviria, in reaction to a surge in violence attributed to the 
guerrillas and the Medellín cartel, announced a change in the country’s national defense 
policy.  Instead of planning and preparing for a war with neighboring Venezuela, Gaviria 
ordered the Colombian military to refocus its efforts on strengthening internal security.81  
The president, having declared a state of siege, then decreed the implementation of a 
“war tax” on 11 February 1991.  The revenues obtained from this tax would be used to 
equip the military with the necessary tools required “to counter violence.”  The military 
would later use the funds obtained via the war tax to improve the intelligence gathering 
capabilities of the armed forces, create two new mobile brigades totaling 1,500 soldiers, 
and establish patrol companies charged with protecting pipelines, oil fields, and mines.  
This new military strategy became known as the National Strategy against Violence (la 
Estrategia Nacional contra la Violencia).82
The FARC-EP viewed the Government’s new national security doctrine, 
strengthening of the military and anti-guerrilla political rhetoric as a declaration of war 
against the insurgency.  After years of perennial neglect, the guerrilla organization had 
 
79 “Economic Costs of Insurgency Studied, “El Espectador (Bogotá), 27 December 1995, sec. 1B, 
FBIS, accession no. FTS19951227000075. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Harvey F. Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994 (Tuscaloosa: The 
University of Alabama Press, 1999), 86. 
82 Alfredo Rangel, Guerra Insurgente  (Bogotá: Intermedio Editores, 2001), 364-365. 
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become accustomed to being placed last on the list of the government’s priorities.  
Therefore, President Gaviria’s announcement to take the war to the FARC-EP caught the 
insurgency somewhat by surprise. 
2. The Peace Talks of 1991-1992 
Realizing that it was not yet in a position to challenge the Colombian military, the 
insurgency, along with the ELN and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), entered into 
peace talks with the Government.  From June 1991 until October 1992, the three 
insurgencies, operating under an umbrella organization known as the Simón Bolívar 
Guerrilla Coordinator (CGSB for its acronym in Spanish), met with representatives from 
the central government first in Caracas, Venezuela and then in Tlaxcala, Mexico.83  
However, this round of peace talks with the Government would be different from those 
conducted during the 1980s in several ways.  First, the FARC-EP and its sister guerrilla 
organizations entered the peace process without the intention of making any concessions 
to the government.  In fact, the purpose of the peace talks, from the FARC-EP’s 
perspective, was to capitalize upon the presence of the national and international media in 
order to show the strength of the insurgency and the relative weakness of the central 
government.  This was accomplished by conducting the peace talks without the 
imposition of a cease fire.  Such conditions allowed the FARC-EP and its fellow guerrilla 
organizations to conduct joint military offensives against the Colombian military and the 
civilian populace.  In this manner, the FARC-EP, the ELN, and the EPL always arrived at 
the peace table with a military advantage.84  Second, from the very outset the peace talks 
of 1991-1992 showed little promise of achieving a negotiated settlement to the conflict.  
Representatives from both the Government and the CGSB could not even agree on a 
procedural format in which to carry out the negotiations.  This would only worsen with 
the passage of time and would culminate with the inability of the government and the 
CGSB to agree upon topics to be discussed at subsequent meetings.  The 1991-1992 
peace talks would ultimately fail due to belligerent actions which were committed in 
Colombia, but whose effects transcended international borders.  The kidnapping and 
 
83 For an in-depth study of the failed peace process of 1991-1992 see Kline, State Building and 
Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994, 87-118. 
84 Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994, 89, 98, 106. 
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subsequent death in captivity of influential politician Argelino Durán Quintero would 
eventually move President Gaviria to break off peace talks with the CGSB.  Despite the 
FARC-EP’s warning that “there will be total war” if the government did not return to the 
peace table, President Gaviria turned his back on the peace process and instead decided 
militarily to “win” the war.85
3. The Eighth Guerrilla Conference: Maneuver Warfare and the Push 
into the South 
Following the failed peace talks and the government’s repeated indications that it 
intended to pursue a military victory, the senior leadership of the FARC-EP met from 11-
18 April 1993 in a remote area of the Guaviare department.  There, the guerrillas held the 
FARC-EP’s Eighth Guerrilla Conference.  Most of the decisions reached at this 
conference dealt with changes that affected the internal structure and organizational 
dynamics of the guerrilla organization and will be discussed in great detail later in the 
chapter.  In addition, the senior leadership planned for the political future of the 
insurgency and readjusted its military strategy and tactics in preparation for its transition 
to maneuver warfare. 
In order to prepare itself for the organization’s presumed ascendance to political 
power, the FARC-EP announced a plan to provide for the academic training and 
preparation of an elite group of guerrillas.  These individuals, sometimes referred to as 
“the one hundred wise men” or “los cien sabios” in Spanish, were individually selected 
by the Secretariat and sent abroad to receive advanced university degrees in a variety of 
academic subjects.  In this manner, the FARC-EP created a group of highly trained and 
competent government bureaucrats who, the guerrillas hoped, would one day emerge 
from obscurity to become the nation’s new political leaders.86
In terms of military adjustments, the FARC-EP implemented the long heralded 
“new method of operating” and ordered the strategic reprioritization of southern 
Colombia. 
 
85 Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994, 107. 
86 Interview with alias Paola, a former member of the FARC-EP’s Teófilo Forero Mobile Column, 
interview by author, tape recording, Bogotá, Colombia, 20 September 2005.  Note: Two members of the 
Colombian military (identities withheld by request) later substantiated Paola’s comments. 
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In the Eighth Guerrilla Conference, the FARC-EP made a qualitative jump 
with regards to military affairs, noted FARC-EP commander Fernando 
Caicedo.  The traditional scheme of guerrilla warfare came to an end, the 
capability to attack en masse and destroy the enemy and later successfully 
retreat was developed.  All of this occurred within the concept referred to 
as the “new method of operating” which means: besiege, attack, 
overwhelm, and retreat.  This type of warfare, in terms of military 
strategy, would be referred to as maneuver warfare, but guerrilla style.87
The implementation of the “new method of operating” signified, in Maoist terms, 
a move from the first defensive phase of Revolutionary Warfare, to the second “War of 
Movement” phase.  In the latter, large-scale guerrilla columns generally consisting of 
hundreds of armed combatants are employed against military targets in what in essence 
constitutes a war of positions.  Independent guerrilla elements support the columns by 
conducting hit-and-run attacks against the enemy.  The simultaneous application of 
regular and irregular guerrilla forces is designed to confuse the enemy and catch him off 
balance.  If executed correctly, the combination of attacks will disorient the enemy and 
cause him to think that he is surrounded, thus allowing the insurgent force to overwhelm 
and destroy the besieged military unit.88  The “new method of operating” was to be used 
for “…seizing military bases, civilian populations, and other objectives.”89  
Unfortunately for the Colombian Government, the FARC-EP would apply these tactics 
with devastating success. 
In addition to implementing the “new method of operating,” the senior leadership 
decided to place greater emphasis on the territorial control and domination of southern 
Colombia.  This decision has at least three explanations.  First, the senior-leadership, 
recognizing the vast wealth of opportunity present in the coca-rich departments of 
Putumayo, Caquetá, and Guaviare, ordered its fronts to step up their efforts to increase 
FARC-EP colonization of those areas.  In this manner, the FARC-EP hoped to secure its 
control over those lands where geographic and climatic conditions favored the planting 
 
87 Juan Guillermo Ferro Medina and Graciela Uribe Ramón, El orden de la guerra, 117. 
88 For additional information on maneuver warfare see Ernesto “Ché” Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare.  
Translated by Marc Becker (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 155-156.  Another source which 
provides examples of maneuver warfare in practice is David Nolan, The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the 
Nicaraguan Revolution, 2d ed.  (Coral Gables: University of Miami, 1985), 99-100. 
89 FARC-EP, “Líneas generales del Plan Militar Estratégico de Ocho Años, Julio 89-97,” Historia de 
las FARC, Unpublished FARC-EP Internal Document, 180. 
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and cultivation of the organization’s number one cash crop – coca.  Revenues derived 
from the organization’s increased participation in the drug trade would then be used to 
fuel the growth and territorial expansion of the “little guerrilla army.”  But financial 
considerations were not the only reason why the FARC-EP’s attention was drawn to the 
south.  Access to the 630-km long porous border with Ecuador was also of great interest 
to the insurgency. 
Historically, numerous Colombian guerrillas of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries had escaped from the Colombian military or from rival factions by crossing the 
international border into Ecuador.  After years of constant exposure to the “invading” 
Colombian guerrillas, a border culture, based upon familial ties between Colombian 
guerrillas and northern Ecuadorian peasants, had developed.90  The senior-leadership of 
the FARC-EP hoped to exploit these relationships in order to create a logistical supply 
line that would funnel war materiel from Ecuador to Colombia. 91  In this manner, the 
small Andean nation to the south would become a supply depot and logistical chain of 
support for the guerrilla organization. 
Finally, the FARC-EP emphasized controlling the southern portion of the country 
because of the strategic location of the departments of Caquetá, Guaviare, and Guainía.  
By exercising control over these departments, the FARC-EP would be able to utilize the 
hundreds of rivers and streams which flow through those areas as veritable highways.  
[See Figure 2.]  In this manner, supplies originating in Ecuador could travel north to 
Putumayo where they would be placed on river boats and shipped east to the departments 
of Guaviare, Vichada, and Guainía.  Similarly, guerrillas operating in the eastern plains 
of the country could use the rivers to travel to the southern or southwestern portions of 
the country. This would prove key in augmenting fielded combat forces under attack in 
either the southern or eastern sections of the country.  For these and other reasons, the 
FARC-EP considered territorial control of southern Colombia essential to the successful 
realization of its strategic plan. 
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 Figure 2.   Illustration of Strategic and Mobility Corridors Linking Eastern and 
Southern Colombia92 
 
4. Major Victories against the Samper Administration (1994-1998) 
The inauguration of Ernesto Samper as the nation’s eighty-second president on 7 
August 1994 did not diminish the FARC-EP’s demands for radical and revolutionary 
change.  Elected on a platform which differed slightly from that of his competitor, 
Conservative Party member Andrés Pastrana, Samper favored continued peace talks with 
the guerrillas and increased investment in those regions where there was support for the 
rebels.93  However, Pastrana’s allegation that Samper had accepted campaign donations 
from the Cali cartel would haunt the president for the duration of his time in office and 
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members of his original cabinet, including Vice President Humberto De la Calle and 
Minister of Defense Fernando Botero, would resign either in protest or as a consequence 
of the President’s alleged connections to the narco-trafficking enterprise. 
International relations between the United States and Colombia were also 
damaged by the scandal, culminating in the U.S. decertification of Colombia in 1996 and 
1997.  Additionally, the drastic reduction in coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia, as a 
result of massive spray and manual eradication efforts in those countries and a fall in 
coca prices linked to the interdiction of aircraft ferrying coca leaf to traffickers in 
Colombia, forced narco-traffickers to find a new environment suitable for cultivating the 
illegal cash crop.  The lawless areas of southern and southeastern Colombia proved to be 
ideal locations.  As a result, coca cultivated areas increased by 66% from a total of 
67,200 hectares in 1996 to 101,800 hectares in 1998.94
The FARC-EP took advantage of Samper’s political isolation and the apparent 
weakness of the Colombian state to indicate its willingness to dialogue with the 
government.  However, this time the organization preconditioned its participation in 
future peace talks on the complete demilitarization of the municipality where the guerrilla 
organization’s former headquarters, La Casa Verde, had been located – La Uribe, Meta 
department.95  Although President Samper at first indicated his willingness to cede this 
territory temporarily to the FARC-EP, the Colombian military later pressured the 
President to deny this request.  Consequently the guerrilla organization and the 
government did not hold peace talks during the Samper administration. 
In April 1996, the FARC-EP made an unexpected move and launched a new 
political movement known as the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia. This 
political movement and its associated political party, the Colombian Clandestine 
Communist Party (PCCC), were created to replace the defunct Patriotic Union and to 
rally public support in favor of the insurgency.  According to the PCCC’s founder, 
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FARC-EP military strategist and member of the Secretariat, Jorge Briceño Suárez, the 
Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia was to be a clandestine political movement 
made up of members, or “militants”, drawn from all social classes and walks of life.  The 
PCCC’s members would “…create a platform of political opposition different from those 
of the traditional parties, capable of contributing with efficacy to the conveyance of the 
country towards destinies of equality and national sovereignty.”96  The Colombian 
Communist Clandestine Party advocated the creation of a socialist state founded in part 
on a liberal interpretation of Marxist-Leninism and “national democratic and 
revolutionary experiences.”  It also expressed a strong anti-imperialist agenda, rejected 
neo-liberalist economic policies, and sought to realize the Bolivarian dream – the 
unification of Latin America – by cooperating with other revolutionary groups active 
throughout the Western Hemisphere.  The movement also espoused the creation of a 
“Government of Reconstruction and National Reconciliation” based on ten points 
contained within the movement’s charter.  Collective decision-making and self-criticism, 
two principles which today continue to characterize FARC-EP behavior, were also 
implemented within the movement.97
The launching of the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia and the PCCC 
were significant in that they illustrate that the FARC-EP had not lost touch with its 
ultimate political rason d’être.  In fact, the guerrilla organization, although committed at 
this moment in time to obtaining political power through violence, recognized the 
importance of articulating a political platform by which it could disseminate its beliefs 
and acquire new adherents to its cause. The creation of this movement and the PCCC, 
immediately preceding the initiation of several large-scale guerrilla offensives, illustrates 
the forward thinking of the guerrilla organization and its expectation quickly to acquire 
control over new territories and their associated populations.  It is likely that the FARC-
EP created this movement so as to consolidate political-military control over the 
populations that it would conquer in the subsequent guerrilla offensives of 1996-1998. 
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On 30 August 1996, in what would become a string of decisive victories for the 
insurgency, the FARC-EP attacked and overran a small company of 120 soldiers assigned 
to Las Delicias counternarcotics base located in Putumayo. 98  In the 15 hour-long battle, 
54 soldiers were killed, 17 were wounded, and 60 were taken prisoner.99
Only a week later on 7 September 1996, the insurgency attacked and killed thirty 
soldiers assigned to the 2nd Mobile Brigade operating near La Carpa Military Base in San 
José del Guaviare, Guaviare department.  A similar attack occurred on 21 December 
1997, when the FARC-EP attacked a military base located in Patascoy, Nariño 
department. In this operation the guerrillas killed eight soldiers and kidnapped eighteen. 
The attacks on Las Delicias and Patascoy were followed by a guerrilla campaign 
focused on clearing entire areas of government presence.  As such, mayors, governors, 
elected public officials, and representatives of the central government were assassinated 
throughout the country.  In accordance with the Bolivarian Campaign for a New 
Colombia, special emphasis was placed upon isolating Bogotá from the rest of the 
country.  But perhaps the most significant guerrilla victories were yet to come. 
On 3 March 1998, the 52nd counter guerrilla battalion of the newly formed 3rd 
Mobile Brigade, an elite military unit composed exclusively of specially trained 
professional military soldiers, was ambushed and practically annihilated near El Billar, 
Caquetá.  Sixty two soldiers were killed in action while an additional forty three were 
taken prisoner.  However, the true gravity of this defeat for the Colombian military was 
felt when it was subsequently revealed that the soldiers belonging to the 52nd counter 
guerrilla battalion were on a special mission to “reestablish the state’s rule of law in the 
area and to destroy the criminal infrastructure that the narco-guerrillas had constructed 
within it.”100  In particular, the main objective of the secret mission was to capture Jorge 
Briceño Suárez, alias el Mono Jojoy, the FARC-EP’s military strategist and commander 
of the organization’s most powerful military command, the Eastern Bloc.  When this 
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information was divulged to the public, it had an extremely negative impact on the 
government’s image and on the morale of the Colombian military.  Colombian journalist 
and author Alfredo Rangel comments: 
The events which recently took place in Caquetá reveal in a very serious 
manner the military threat that the FARC represent to the state and the 
degree of vulnerability of the military forces.  What has happened there is 
very significant in that what occurred was combat in an open battlefield, 
on an important scale, between members of the Army’s and the guerrillas’ 
elite military forces:  professional military soldiers from a mobile brigade 
and the most experienced guerrillas from the FARC’s southern bloc.  
Different from what occurred at Las Delicias, a forgotten and marginal 
base composed of raw recruits, this was a forward operating base, a 
combat zone, with experienced soldiers.  The weight of this disastrous 
outcome resulting from the collision of military forces evidences the 
military situation of both bands.101
Finally, the last major attack that the FARC-EP executed during the Samper 
administration coincided with the run-up to the inauguration of newly-elected President 
Andrés Pastrana.  On 3 August 1998, 1,200 guerrillas under the command of Jorge 
Briceño Suárez attacked a company assigned to the 19th Infantry Battalion, Seventh 
Brigade, Fourth Division located at the Colombian National Police’s antinarcotics’ base 
in Miraflores, Guaviare.  One hundred police officers and soldiers were kidnapped, thirty 
were killed, and fifty were wounded in the FARC-EP’s final “goodbye” to President 
Samper and his administration. 
By 1998, the FARC-EP stood at the pinnacle of revolutionary guerrilla power.  
Consisting of 18,000 guerrillas distributed among 61 rural fronts, four mobile columns, 
15 mobile companies, and five urban fronts, the guerrilla organization had increased its 
membership by an astonishing 1,800% in just sixteen years.102  It maintained an armed 
presence in every department throughout Colombia and was reported to control 
approximately forty percent of the national territory.  During the 1990s, the FARC-EP 
achieved the heights of its military power and was positioned to deal what many believed 
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would be the death blow to the government of Colombia.103  However, rapid infusions of 
military hardware and badly needed financial assistance from the United States, as well 
as a rigorous program designed to transform the Colombian military, would allow the 
government of Colombia, at the dawning of the 21st century, to recover gradually some of 
the political and military ground ceded to the FARC-EP during the lost decade of the 
1990s. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 
In an effort to achieve the political-military objectives associated with the 
Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia, significant changes would have to be made to 
the internal structure of the FARC-EP.  These changes, which were more than a decade in 
the making, would allow the EMC to employ its fielded guerrilla forces with greater 
flexibility and lethality.  Similarly, the appointment of Jorge Briceño Suárez, alias el 
Mono Jojoy, as the FARC-EP’s military strategist and sixth in command of the guerrilla 
organization, would allow the movement to score significant victories against the 
Colombian military.  Interestingly, the rapid influx of new recruits to the guerrilla 
organization and the movement’s greater involvement in the drug trade did not 
undermine the revolutionary character of the insurgency or result in its criminalization.  
This was due to the FARC-EP’s stern implementation of its penal code – the Reglamento 
de Régimen Disciplinario – and its continued use of war councils to punish convicted 
guerrillas.  The repeated assassination or purging from the ranks of “bourgeois” or 
“counterrevolutionary” elements convinced most guerrillas to obey the dictates of their 
superiors.  This allowed the FARC-EP to maintain the revolutionary cohesion of the 
organization even while it increased its participation in the drug trade and other lucrative, 
yet highly illegal activities. 
At the FARC-EP’s Eighth Conference (11-18 April 1993) the senior leadership of 
the guerrilla organization ordered the most radical internal reorganization of the guerrilla 
movement in its thirty year history.  This decision was based on at least four 
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considerations.104  First, the Colombian military’s bombing of La Casa Verde on 9 
December 1990 convinced the guerrillas that from that moment forward the senior 
leadership of the organization would have to remain geographically dispersed. This 
would improve the survivability of the central command and limit, they reasoned, the 
possibility of losing the senior guerrilla leaders to a single, well planned and executed 
military attack. 
Second, the rapid increase in the number of guerrilla combatants and the 
proliferation of fronts throughout the length and breadth of the nation made the senior 
leadership realize that if the EMC were to maintain control of the guerrilla organization, 
it would have to devolve power to subordinate regional commanders and their staffs.  By 
1996, the insurgency would consist of 7,500 guerrilla combatants assigned to 62 rural 
fronts, three urban fronts, and nine mobile units.  It would maintain a strong presence in 
460 out of the nation’s more than 1,000 municipalities – a 28% increase since 1986.105  
The EMC would still act as the central command authority for the FARC-EP, establishing 
overall strategic guidance and policies, but the subordinate regional commanders would 
be responsible for implementing the EMC’s decisions and ensuring their successful 
execution. 
Third, the senior leadership reasoned that by appointing high ranking members of 
the EMC to head the regional commands, they would be able to extend a level of prestige 
and importance to the political and military actions occurring within each geographic 
region of the country.  Additionally, the appointment of members of the EMC to head the 
regional commands, or “blocs” as they would later become known, would allow the 
command authority to supervise the execution of the insurgency’s political and military 
plans.  It would also allow the bloc commanders the ability to hold their subordinate front 
commanders accountable for their actions. 
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Fourth, the guerrilla leaders realized that the current organization of the FARC-
EP, in independent, uncoordinated tactical level units known as fronts, would have to be 
altered if the movement were to transition successfully from guerrilla warfare to 
maneuver warfare.  In order to be able to construct the large guerrilla columns associated 
with a war of positions, regional commanders would have to be able to draw guerrillas 
from all of the fronts operating within their area of influence.  Similarly, it would also 
require the periodic transfer of guerrillas between fronts so as to augment other guerrilla 
units engaged in battle with the Colombian military or National Police.  Consequently the 
old system of guerrilla organization based upon tactical level fronts would have to be 
replaced by a new system based upon operational level blocs. 
The new system of internal guerrilla organization was based upon the creation of 
seven regional commands: five blocs - the Eastern, Southern, Northwestern, Caribbean, 
and Middle Magdalena - and two joint commands - the Joint Central Command and the 
Joint Western Command.  [See Figures 3. and 4.]  There are at least three differences 
between the blocs and joint commands.  First, while blocs are composed of at least five 
fronts that receive their guidance from a bloc commander, who is also a member of the 
EMC, a joint command consists of four or less fronts led by a “coordinator” that receives 
his guidance directly from the EMC.  As an example, Jorge Briceño Suárez, alias el 
Mono Jojoy, is currently the commander of the Eastern bloc, yet occupies simultaneously 
the position of military strategist on the EMC. 
Second, the EMC’s formal recognition of a bloc indicates that the FARC-EP has 
established a certain degree of guerrilla dominance within a given region of the country.  
The designation of an area as a joint command, however, indicates that the “necessary 
conditions” required for the insurgency to exercise a strong presence and influence over 
the region are still not present.  Therefore, according to these distinguishing traits, the 
natural progression for the FARC-EP would be for the organization to eventually consist 
of seven blocs. 
Third, each bloc has an Estado Mayor which supports the bloc commander by 
coordinating the various political-military campaigns that the subordinate fronts will 
subsequently execute.  These support staffs are also responsible for assisting the bloc 
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commander with the dissemination of information to the fronts regarding the 
implementation of new policies, procedures, and/or regulations.  Joint Commands, 
however, do not have such support staffs and are dependent upon the “coordinator” for 
the dissemination of such information. 
In addition to the creation of blocs and fronts the senior leadership also created 
the General Command (el Comando general).  This entity would only come into 
existence upon the execution of the FARC-EP’s final offensive against the government.  
The General Command, composed of members from the Secretariat and the Blocs, would 
provide the guidance and supervision necessary for defeating the Colombian military and 
seizing control of the nation.  However, as the FARC-EP has yet to attempt a final 
offensive, this command to date has never been activated.106
Finally, the senior leadership increased the number of members assigned to the 
EMC and the Secretariat from seventeen and five to twenty five and seven respectively.  
One of the new leaders to be appointed to the Secretariat, the top decision making body 
within the FARC-EP, was Jorge Briceño Suárez, alias el Mono Jojoy.  This nearly 
illiterate and poorly educated guerrilla leader was born and raised in the guerrilla 
community of El Duda located in the municipality of La Uribe, Meta department.107  He 
joined the FARC-EP in 1975 and quickly distinguished himself as a gifted military 
strategist and capable guerrilla leader.  Rising quickly through the ranks, el Mono Jojoy 
was appointed to the Secretariat in 1993 when he was given the position of chief military 
strategist and named the sixth in command of the guerrilla organization.  From his 
newfound position of power, el Mono Jojoy planned and coordinated some of the FARC-
EP’s most successful guerrilla attacks against the Colombian military including the siege 
and fall of Las Delicias and La Carpa military bases.  He also pioneered a guerrilla tactic, 
known as “massive attack”, in which hundreds or thousands of guerrillas attack a single, 
poorly defended target. 
The senior leadership’s decision to make Jorge Briceño Suárez a member of the 
Secretariat indicated the organization’s abandonment of “the combination of all forms of 
 
106 Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramón, El orden de la guerra, 51. 
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struggle” and the adoption of a hard line military approach to the conflict.  Combined 
with the insurgency’s radical internal reorganization and decision to switch from guerrilla 
warfare to maneuver war, the addition of el Mono Jojoy as the organization’s lead 
military commander illustrate the guerrilla organization’s efforts to realize its primary 
political and military objectives - the defeat of Colombian military and overthrow of the 
central government. 
 
Figure 3.   The FARC-EP’s Five Blocs and Two Joint Commands108 
 
                                                 




Figure 4.   FARC-EP Organizational Diagram109 
 
D. RESOURCES 
At the FARC-EP’s 1989 plenum, the senior leadership determined that, “The 
successful execution of the Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia will depend upon 
the correct interpretation and application of the FARC-EP’s financial policies….It is 
necessary that we make a greater effort to explore new possibilities for obtaining greater 
financial resources.…”110  In accordance with this strategic guidance, the guerrilla 
organization set out in the 1990s to establish various financial bases of support that would 
fund the movement’s transformation into a “little guerrilla army.”  One of the many 
sources that would finance the FARC-EP’s revolutionary dream was the drug trade. 
After a slight reduction in coca cultivation from 37,500 hectares in 1990 to 37,100 
hectares in 1991, coca production dramatically increased beginning in 1993.  This 
increase coincided with the FARC-EP’s decision, reached at its 1993 Eighth Guerrilla 
Conference, to take advantage of the geographic isolation and ideal climatic conditions of 
southern Colombia in order to transform it into the primary coca production center in the 
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country.  To aid in this endeavor, some 161,000 people immigrated to the coca rich 
department of Putumayo between 1993 and 2000. Within seven years the population of 
this southern department had more than doubled from 154,000 inhabitants in 1993 to 
315,000 in 2000.111
The dramatic influx of people into Putumayo - and later into Caquetá and 
Guaviare – provided the FARC-EP with a willing and able labor force eager to take 
advantage of the economic benefits associated with the “coca boom.”  Between 1994 and 
1998, coca production grew within the department from 5,000 hectares to 30,100 hectares 
– a 600% percent increase in just four years.112  On a national level, the quantity of coca 
produced in Putumayo accounted for 9.2% of the nation’s total of 44,800 hectares of land 
cultivated with coca in 1994.113  When combined with the amount of land cultivated for 
coca production purposes in Guaviare and Caquetá, the three departments accounted for 
83.2% of the nation’s total of coca cultivated areas in 1994.  By 2000, Putumayo would 
overtake Guaviare and Caquetá and emerge as the nation’s leading production center for 
coca accounting for approximately 40% or 66,022 hectares of the nation’s 163,289 total 
hectares.114  Although there would be some changes in the order of coca leaf production, 
Caquetá, Putumayo, and Guaviare would continue to be the primary production centers of 
coca, and FARC-EP wealth, for the next ten years. 
The FARC-EP’s involvement in the drug trade did not limit itself to coca 
cultivation, but rather encompassed a newly emerging drug on the Colombian market – 
heroin.  Between 1992 and 1994 more than 20,000 hectares of land – concentrated in the 
departments of Cauca, Huila, Santander, and Tolima - were cultivated with poppy.115  
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The Colombian version of this drug, which many U.S. law enforcement experts then 
considered to be the purest in the world, made its debut on the streets of the United States 
in 1991 and sold for $150,000 a kilo (2.2 pounds) – more than seven times the value of an 
equal amount of cocaine. 116  After an aggressive eradication campaign, the Colombian 
government was able to reduce the amount of poppy cultivated within its borders by 2001 
to its present level of approximately 4,026 hectares.117
Although the exact amount of money the movement earned during the 1990s is 
unknown, some estimates place the FARC-EP’s yearly annual income in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars.118  According to one recent report, “Even on the basis of a 
conservative estimate of an average of $100 million a year [earned through the FARC-
EP’s participation in the drug trade] the FARC and the AUC [United Self-Defense 
Forces of Colombia] would have earned $1 billion to $1.5 billion in the past ten to twelve 
years.”119  Of this amount, an estimated 45% - 50% was likely earned through the 
organization’s participation in the drug trade.120  The remaining amount was earned 
through the insurgency’s extortion of oil companies and other major corporations, 
kidnapping, and its participation in a relatively new phenomenon known as “armed 
clientelism.” 
The Constitution of 1991 decentralized political power to the departmental and 
municipal levels.  As a result, the mayors and governors of Colombia’s respective cities 
and departments were authorized to use revenues allocated by the central government as 
they saw fit.  The intention was to empower local government leaders, who were believed 
to have better knowledge of departmental and municipal concerns, to use the central  
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government revenues for the overall improvement of their communities.  Unfortunately 
for Bogotá and the rest of the nation, the FARC-EP planned to use the government 
allocated funds for purposes other than those originally intended. 
In an effort to acquire control over the municipal budgets, the FARC-EP in the 
early 1990s began to practice what later became known as “armed clientelism” (el 
clientelismo armado).  This tactic involved the identification of political candidates 
willing to grant the guerrilla organization access to municipal or departmental revenues.  
In exchange, the FARC-EP promised to finance the political campaigns of the politicians 
and to assure their election to public office.  Once installed, the politicians were expected 
to honor their agreements with the FARC-EP and to support and enact legislation that 
was favorable to the guerrillas.  Failure to comply with this “gentlemen’s agreement” 
generally resulted in the assassination of the public official.  In this manner, the FARC-
EP was able simultaneously to establish control over the local governments and obtain 
additional financial resources necessary for funding the Bolivarian Campaign for a New 
Colombia.121
The hundreds of millions of dollars acquired from the FARC-EP’s participation in 
the aforementioned illegal activities were not used for personal aggrandizement, but 
rather to equip and sustain the guerrilla forces.  In 1995, the Inter-Institutional Committee 
for the Study of Finances of the Subversives, described by a leading Colombian 
periodical as “a secret investigative group formed by the national government to follow 
the trail of the armed rebels’ money,” reported that the FARC-EP spent at least five 
billion pesos (approximately five million dollars) annually on the purchase or 
manufacture of military equipment.122  Subsequent reports detailed similar information 
and added that the quality and sophistication of the FARC-EP’s weaponry had improved 
in recent years.  This assessment was later confirmed when it was observed that the 
FARC-EP was employing high power firearms such as AK-47s, AKMs, Galils, and  
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FALs.123  More powerful military hardware including mortars, grenade launchers, 
machineguns, and semi-automatic rifles were also observed to be part of the movement’s 
standard military inventory. 
The FARC-EP also used its money to purchase advanced communications 
equipment necessary for coordinating large-scale attacks against the Colombian military.  
By 1998, it was estimated that the organization spent 14 billion pesos on personnel and 
rations (approximately nine million dollars), 30.3 billion pesos (approximately twenty 
million dollars) on war materiel, and 10.4 billion pesos (approximately seven million 
dollars) on logistics and related supplies annually.124  Subsequent reports indicated the 
organization invested an additional 2.1 billion pesos (approximately 1.4 million dollars) 
on explosives and 5.2 billion pesos (approximately $3.4 million dollars) on medical 
services and drugs.125
Absent from these reports is anything that suggests or implies that the 
organization might have used its revenues for purposes other than those associated with 
the Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia.  In fact, all financial statistics indicate that 
the FARC-EP used its resources to attain the political and military objectives associated 
with the organization’s strategic plan for defeating the Colombian military and toppling 
the central government.  Such information serves to bolster the argument that the FARC-
EP’s financial actions were taken in order to support its strategic plan for acquiring 
revolutionary power. 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has argued that the period 1990-1998 witnessed the FARC-EP’s 
overwhelmingly successful implementation of the Bolivarian Campaign for a New 
Colombia – the guerrilla organization’s strategic plan for defeating the Colombian 
military and toppling the central government.  It has been shown that the movement 
coordinated its political-military and economic actions so as to achieve its strategic 
objectives.  As part of this plan, the organization embarked upon the most radical internal 
 
123 Marks, “Colombian Army Counterinsurgency,” 90. 
124 Caballeros, “Sources, Amounts of Guerrilla Funding Noted,” 28-31. 
125 “Report on Guerrilla Organizations’ Finances,” El Espectador (Bogotá), 6 July 1998, FBIS, 
accession no. FTS19980706001407. 
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reorganization in the movement’s thirty year history.  As a result, from 1996-1998 the 
FARC-EP was able to engage and defeat consistently the Colombian military and 
National Police in large-scale battles involving hundreds and sometimes thousands of 
guerrillas operating in column formations.  The stunning victories of the guerrilla 
organization against the nation’s security forces would prove so decisive that some 
international observers writing in 1996 would predict the imminent fall of the 
Government of Colombia. 
This chapter has also shown that the FARC-EP’s actions, based on the strategic 
guidance reached by the organization’s senior leadership at its 1982 Seventh Guerrilla 
Conference, 1989 Guerrilla Plenum, and 1993 Eighth Guerrilla Conference, were 
consistent with those of a revolutionary guerrilla organization and not a criminal 
enterprise.  As such, the correct interpretation and understanding of the subversive 
organization’s actions must be viewed within this framework.  Finally, the significant 
achievements realized between 1990 and 1998 would enable the FARC-EP to dictate the 
terms of future peace talks with the presidential administration of Andrés Pastrana. 
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IV. FROM STRATEGIC ADVANCE TO STRATEGIC 
WITHDRAWAL (1998-2005) 
“The FARC is a state in gestation.”126
Juvenal Ovidio Ricardo Palmera Piñeda, alias Simón Trinidad, 
Former FARC-EP Finance Chief 
A. INTRODUCTION 
While the stunning victories of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – 
People’s Army (FARC-EP) over the Colombian military in 1996 and 1997 did not result 
in the government’s demise as the insurgency had hoped, they did lead the newly elected 
government of President Andrés Pastrana Arango (1998-2002) to grant two of the FARC-
EP’s key strategic objectives: an extended peace process and a 42,139 square kilometer 
demilitarized zone (or despeje).  The launching of peace talks and the granting of the 
despeje, in combination with the inauguration of U.S. financial aid for Plan Colombia, 
focused the attention of many domestic and international observers on the behavior of the 
guerrilla organization.  What they saw led many to speculate that the guerrilla 
organization had abandoned its ideological beliefs and devolved into a criminal 
enterprise. 
These critics cite the guerrilla organization’s use of the despeje to cultivate more 
than 35,000 hectares of coca, engage in illicit arms-for-drugs transfers, and house 
kidnapped victims for ransom as evidence of the insurgency’s degeneration into a 
criminal organization.127  They point to the numerous attacks that the insurgency 
launched against civilian and military targets, repeatedly undermining the peace process, 
as proof that the organization had no interest in concluding a peace agreement with the 
Government of Colombia and only participated in the peace talks in order to acquire the 
despeje – an area whose climatologic conditions, proximity to the international border, 
and isolation from the Colombian military and National Police made it the ideal location 
to expand the insurgency’s participation in the illegal drug trade. 
 
126 All translations from the Spanish are the author’s unless otherwise indicated. 
127 OxResearch, “US/Colombia: Rebels Complicate Drug Fight,” OxResearch, (2 March 2000): 1. 
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Finally, the critics see the guerrilla organization’s reluctance to confront 
advancing Colombian military troops during the period 2003-2005 and its withdrawal 
from areas that it had dominated for the last twenty years, as evidence that the 
organization is more interested in protecting its illicit resources than in defending its 
“revolutionary” cause. 
This chapter challenges these interpretations of the FARC-EP’s behavior between 
1998 and 2005, arguing instead that the organization remains a politically driven and 
ideologically motivated guerrilla insurgency.  The FARC-EP’s manipulation of the peace 
process and its illicit use of the despeje were designed to afford the guerrilla organization 
the time and space it needed in order to prepare its forces to advance to the next phase of 
war against the state – the urbanization of the conflict.  Similarly, the FARC-EP’s refusal 
to engage government troops carrying out a counteroffensive should be interpreted as a 
strategic withdrawal, designed to “wait out” the government. 
In addition, the insurgency’s mobilization of the despeje’s residents, its political 
indoctrination of the same in Marxist-Leninist teachings, and the organization’s efforts to 
construct an alternate society or shadow government within the zona – known as New 
Colombia (la Nueva Colombia) -- that directly challenged the legitimacy of the 
Colombian state and mobilized the populace in support of the revolution attest to the 
FARC-EP’s efforts to establish an independent republic. (The Colombian military 
discovered additional insurgent-created alternate societies or shadow governments 
located along the banks of the Caguán River during its 2004 offensive.)  Finally, the 
insurgency’s use of the despeje to cultivate coca and to engage in narco-trafficking was at 
best a secondary objective which provided the guerrilla organization with the means to 
achieve its revolutionary objectives.  In sum, the political-military behavior of the FARC-
EP from 1998 to 2005 shows that the organization had not weakened its commitment to 
its revolutionary goals despite its increased involvement in the drug trade during the same 
period. 
This chapter also addresses the claim that FARC-EP’s involvement in the drug 
trade may undermine the organization’s ideological character in the future by leading to 
an influx of recruits interested primarily in making a profit.  Indeed, there is evidence that 
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the average guerrilla member’s commitment to the organization’s heterogeneous 
ideology has weakened over the last five years.  However, this has been caused not by 
greater involvement in the drug trade, but rather by the increased pressure that the FARC 
–EP finds itself under as a result of its offensive against the government and the U.S.-
backed government counteroffensive.  In particular, the dilution of the FARC-EP’s 
ideological beliefs among rank-and-file guerrillas is attributable to three factors: the poor 
quality and youth of the new recruits, the limited education of most of the guerrillas, and 
the increased operations tempo which has prevented the thorough political indoctrination 
of the rank and file.  As a result of these obstacles, the average guerrilla’s understanding 
of the FARC-EP’s ideological beliefs has been severely eroded and, if left unaddressed, 
might result in the degeneration of the organization into a rebel movement without a 
cause. 
Finally, the chapter shows that the FARC-EP continues to allocate its resources in 
a way consistent with its ideological and political goals.  The insurgency utilizes its 
profits not only to finance its war against the Colombian government, but also to provide 
for the welfare of its guerrillas and their families.  The insurgency has also invested 
hundreds of thousands of dollars (or more) in the maintenance and upkeep of twelve 
internet pages, five clandestine radio stations, and various other means of 
communication.  Such actions, while highly unusual for a criminal enterprise, are 
consistent with those of a revolutionary organization that aspires to acquire international 
support via the dissemination of political propaganda.  These attempts to spread its 
message to the international community further illustrate that, despite the guerrilla 
organization’s diplomatic and international isolation, it continues to seek support from 
abroad and to justify its war against the Colombian military as a legitimate struggle for 
“social justice.” 
B. POLITICAL-MILITARY 
As the decade of the 1990s drew to a close, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) stood at the zenith of military power.  Consisting 
of approximately 18,000 guerrillas distributed among 61 fronts, equipped with modern 
automatic rifles and advanced communication equipment, and funded through its ever-
increasing involvement in the illicit drug trade, the ranks of the guerrilla organization had 
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grown by more than 1,800% in the course of just sixteen years.  [See Figure Five for the 
distribution of FARC-EP forces according to blocs, joint commands, and fronts as of 
April 1999.]  Such unparalleled growth combined with a radical internal reorganization 
and the implementation of the long heralded “new method of operating” had allowed the 
organization to inflict crushing defeats on the Colombian military between 1996 and 
1998.  The FARC-EP’s victories against the Colombian armed forces were so one-sided 
that some national and international observers writing during this period assessed that the 
insurgency was winning the war.128
However, despite these impressive accomplishments, the FARC-EP had failed to 
achieve many of the objectives outlined in the Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia 
– the insurgency’s war plan for defeating the Colombian military and toppling the central 
government.129  This realization caused the senior leadership of the FARC-EP to refocus 
its efforts in order to achieve four objectives key to the insurgency’s military defeat of the 
Colombian armed forces: the urbanization of the conflict; the recruitment, training, and 
equipping of an additional 14,000 insurgents; the procurement of specialized training in 
urban guerrilla warfare and explosives; and, the Government of Colombia’s and 
international community’s official recognition of the FARC-EP as a belligerent.  But 
accomplishing these goals would not be easy. 
The FARC-EP realized that, in order to achieve these objectives, it would need to 
acquire two elements essential to the success of any guerrilla organization:  space and 
time.  To acquire the first element, the FARC-EP would demand as a precondition for its 
participation in peace talks that the government cede a 42,139 square kilometer 
demilitarized zone (or despeje as it was more commonly referred to in Spanish).  What 
the insurgents referred to as a “peace laboratory,” was in fact a Switzerland-size base that 
it would use to prepare for its final offensive against the Colombian military. 
 
128 Fuerzas Militares para la Guerra: La agenda pendiente de la reforma militar, by Alfredo Rangel 
Suárez, director (Bogotá: Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, 2003), 26. 
129 For a more detailed description of the four phases associated with the Bolivarian Campaign for a 
New Colombia, see Chapter II of this thesis. 
 
Note:  The five blocs – Eastern (Oriental), Northwestern (Noroccidental), Middle 
Magdalena (Medio Magdalena), Southern (Sur),and Northern (Norte)  and two  joint 
commands - Western Joint Command (Occidental), Joint Central Command (Central), 
and Northern (Norte) are arranged according to color. 
Figure 5.   Disposition of FARC-EP Forces According to Blocs and Fronts as of 
April 1999130 
 
1. FARC-EP Motivations for the Creation of a Demilitarized Zone 
The senior leadership of the FARC-EP recognized at its 1982 Seventh Guerrilla 
Conference that taking the war to the so-called “Gordian knot of contradictions” – the 
nation’s cities – would be key in attaining a military victory against the Colombian armed 
forces.  However, difficulties associated with infiltrating rural personnel into the cities 
and later recruiting new members from among a largely unsympathetic, urban populace 
had prevented the insurgency from making any significant progress.  Additionally, 
intangible barriers, such as the FARC-EP’s lack of understanding of contemporary urban 
culture and of the concerns which preoccupy the average middle-class worker, prevented  
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the guerrilla organization from successfully articulating a political program that appealed 
to the majority of urban dwellers.131  Supreme FARC-EP commander, Manuel 
Marulanda, explains: 
I think that we’ve had an enemy, the worst of all enemies.  Do you know 
who it’s been?  I’m not talking about the army, or the informants….I’m 
talking about the isolation of this movement, that’s worse than doing 
without food for an entire week.  Between you guys, those of you who are 
from the cities, and us, those who are from the countryside, there is a huge 
mountain.  Your voices and our voices don’t hear one another, and only on 
rare occasions speak to one another….132
Nevertheless, the FARC-EP remained committed to establishing a robust urban 
guerrilla presence within the nation’s cities – an objective that the guerrillas continued to 
recognize as the sine qua non for winning the war.  However, to accomplish this goal the 
insurgency would first have to increase the size of its force. 
Since the FARC-EP’s 1989 guerrilla plenum, the insurgency had attempted to 
construct a “little guerrilla army” whose desired end state was 32,000 insurgents.  But, by 
1998, the guerrilla organization consisted of only 18,000 guerrillas.  In order to meet the 
FARC-EP’s strategic objectives, the insurgency would have to initiate a massive 
recruiting drive.  However, this represented only one part of a much larger equation.  
Once these raw recruits were selected, they would have to be trained, equipped, and 
ideologically indoctrinated before they could be sent into battle.  To complicate matters, 
all of this would have to take place while the insurgency fought a guerrilla war against 
the state. 
Nor, as the senior leadership of the FARC-EP recognized, did the guerrilla 
organization possess the necessary skills required to conduct urban guerrilla warfare.  
Additionally, its homemade gas cylinder bombs and other rudimentary explosive devices 
had proven to be highly inaccurate and largely ineffective.  Consequently, the FARC-EP 
realized that it would either have to send its guerrillas abroad to receive specialized 
training or, conversely, employ representatives from outside sources to accomplish the 
 
131 Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramón, El orden de la guerra (Bogotá: Centro Editorial Javeriano, 2002), 
152. 
132 Ibid., 154. 
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training in rural areas of the nation.  Given the danger that FARC-EP guerrillas traveling 
abroad were liable to arrest and detention by INTERPOL, and aware that it would be 
more economical to bring the trainers to Colombia, the insurgency would later choose the 
latter option. 
Finally, in an effort to acquire belligerent status -- a legal term, that under the 
international rules of war, would have granted the FARC-EP recognition as a state 
building entity, prevented the Colombian government from accusing or judging captured 
guerrillas, and obligated third party states to remain neutral until the “dispute of 
legitimacies” was resolved -- the insurgency would offer for the first time to participate in 
a prisoner exchange.133  The senior leadership, well-aware of the fact that only states can 
participate in such activities, looked to extract this concession from the government by 
inviting members of the international media to televise images of the more than 400 
soldiers, policemen, politicians, and citizens held captive deep in the jungles of 
Southeastern Colombia.  The insurgency hoped that the public, upon seeing the wretched 
conditions in which the captured personnel lived, would pressure the national congress to 
pass a law that would allow for a prisoner exchange. 
To accomplish these four objectives, the FARC-EP, beginning as early as 1997, 
demanded the government’s temporary cession of a 42,139 square kilometer area – 3.7% 
of the national territory - to the insurgency.134  Manuel Marulanda made clear in a 2 
March 1999 interview that negotiations would not lead to disarmament: “…the FARC 
would not repeat ‘past errors,’ such as the negotiations in the mid-1980s that led to the 
demobilization of the M-19 guerrilla movement, and would continue the struggle ‘until 
victory’.”135  The despeje was also to be used in order to bring the “little guerrilla army” 
within striking distance of Bogotá, and ultimately to win the war.  All that the FARC-EP 
needed to acquire the demilitarized zone was a politician willing to make a deal. 
 
 
133 Geoff Simons, Colombia:  A Brutal History (London: Saqi Publishing, 2004), 197-198. 
134 Thomas Marks, “Colombian Army Counterinsurgency,” Crime, Law and Social Change 40 
(2003): 6. 
135 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001), 39, 
available from http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1339/; Internet; accessed on 29 July 2005. 
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2. The FARC-EP – Pastrana Pact and the Creation of the Despeje 
In the presidential election of 1998, Horacio Serpa Uribe from the Liberal Party, 
Andrés Pastrana Arango from the Conservative “New Democratic Force”, and Noemí 
Sanín from the independent “Yes, Colombia Movement,” squared off in what many at 
first considered to be an election that could have resulted in a significant political shift in 
Colombia.  Noemí Sanín, the former finance minister during the Samper administration 
that had improved Colombia’s trade relations with Venezuela, rejected the Conservative 
and Liberal Parties and appealed to a disenchanted populace tired of “ineffectual political 
leadership.”136  Her opponents, generally viewed by most political commentators and 
analysts as out of touch with the Colombian people and as men who recalled disgraced 
President Samper, ran on lukewarm political platforms that did little to impress the 
voters.  Surprisingly, none of the candidates developed a strong position regarding an 
issue of great significance to many Colombians – peace talks with the guerrillas.  This 
would change, however, on 31 May, 1998 when none of the candidates succeeded in 
obtaining the required 50.1 percent vote required to win the presidential election.  As a 
result, a run-off ballot was subsequently scheduled for 21 June 1998, between the two 
candidates that received the largest percentages of votes – Horacio Serpa and Andrés 
Pastrana.137
In the weeks following the 31 May election, Pastrana and his team of campaign 
advisors realized that the former mayor of Bogotá’s success in the second round of voting 
would depend upon his ability to develop quickly and articulate a strong position 
regarding the peace process with the FARC-EP.  Acting on the advice of the former 
Minister of Mines, Álvaro Leyva Durán, Pastrana ordered Víctor G. Ricardo, a member 
of his campaign committee, to meet with Marulanda.  On 15 June 1998, Ricardo traveled 
to a remote site near the town of San Vicente del Caguán, Caquetá where he met with 
Marulanda and Jorge Briceño Suárez, alias el Mono Jojoy.  During the meeting, Ricardo 
told Marulanda and Briceño Suárez that Pastrana would demilitarize the five 
 
136 Simons, Colombia: A Brutal History, 183. 
137 Horacio Serpa received 34.6 per cent of the vote, Andrés Pastrana received 34.4 per cent of the 
vote, and Noemí Sanín shocked the nation by winning an unprecedented 27 per cent of the vote – the 
largest percentage of votes ever obtained by a non-traditional political party.  Source: Simons, Colombia:  
A Brutal History, 183. 
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municipalities that the insurgency’s senior leadership had previously demanded and 
personally lead the peace process with the guerrilla organization if he won the election.  
Ricardo then requested that the FARC-EP, if interested in Pastrana’s offer, publicly 
express its willingness to enter into peace talks with the Government of Colombia, but 
only if Andrés Pastrana won the presidential election.  Marulanda and Briceño Suárez 
agreed to Ricardo’s offer and stated that Raúl Reyes, the spokesman for the FARC-EP’s 
International Commission, would soon make an announcement from Mexico City 
affirming the guerrilla organization’s support for the Conservative Party candidate. 
On 21 June 1998, Andrés Pastrana was elected the new President of Colombia 
receiving 6,086,507 votes – almost 500,000 more votes than Horacio Serpa.138  Shortly 
thereafter on 9 July 1998, Pastrana flew to an undisclosed location where he participated 
in a secret meeting with Marulanda and Briceño Suárez.  During this face-to-face 
encounter, the senior leadership of the guerrilla organization and Pastrana held a two-
and-a-half hour long meeting in which they agreed to five key points involving the peace 
talks.  First, four municipalities located in the department of Meta and one municipality 
located in the department of Caquetá would be demilitarized.139  Second, the 
Government of Colombia would fight the paramilitaries.  Third, social protests and other 
public demonstrations would be decriminalized.  Fourth, an alternative crop substitution 
and development plan would be created.  Fifth, the Government of Colombia would 
discontinue the use of “wanted” posters and financial incentives for information 
regarding the whereabouts of FARC-EP guerrilla leaders.140  Pastrana later promised to 
give the FARC-EP forty-eight hours advanced notice before initiating efforts to retake the 
despeje.  With the meeting between the senior leadership of the FARC-EP and Pastrana 
concluded, the newly elected President of Colombia returned to Bogotá where he 
publicly announced the results of his meeting with the guerrilla organization. 
 
 
138 Edgar Téllez, Oscar Montes, and Jorge Lesmes, Diario íntimo de un fracaso (Bogotá: Editorial 
Planeta Colombiana, 2002), 35. 
139 The four municipalities located in Meta that were included in the despeje were: Vistahermosa, La 
Macarena, la Uribe, and Mesetas.  The one municipality located in Caquetá that was included in the despeje 
was San Vicente del Caguán. 
140 Téllez, Montes, and Lesmes, Diario íntimo de un fracaso, 41. 
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3. FARC-EP Participation in the Peace Process (1998-2002) 
The peace talks between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP 
occurred without a cease-fire in place and were characterized by long periods of silence, 
punctuated by brief episodes of extreme violence.  In the interim, the insurgency and the 
Pastrana administration, both of whom refused to allow a third party state or international 
organization to mediate the talks, made overtures indicating their willingness to arrive at 
a negotiated settlement to the conflict, but in reality did little to achieve this “common 
goal.”  Instead, the peace talks between the two were prefaced consistently by FARC-EP 
attacks against the Colombian military and National Police.  In this manner, many 
observed, the guerrilla organization continuously arrived at the negotiation table with the 
upper hand. 
In recent years at least two hypotheses have been offered which attempt to 
account for the FARC-EP’s dualistic behavior of “making war and talking peace.”141  
The first one argues that the guerrilla organization was not serious about peace talks with 
the Government of Colombia and only participated in order to acquire the despeje.  A 
second and more convincing hypothesis argues that the guerrilla organization had no 
incentive to negotiate a peace accord or cease fire with the Government of Colombia 
because it believed that it was winning the war.  Evidence for this assessment can be 
found in a conversation that reportedly took place between the former commander of the 
FARC-EP’s Southern Bloc, alias Joaquín Gómez, and Jorge Briceño Suárez.  In this 
conversation, Gómez asks Briceño Suárez to explain why the movement was entering 
into peace talks with the Pastrana administration if it was clear to everyone that the 
FARC-EP was winning the war?  Although Briceño Suárez did not provide Gómez with 
an answer, he invited the guerrilla commander to a high-level meeting where the senior 
leadership of the insurgency “…would explain the FARC-EP’s strategy.”142
As a result, a “mutually hurting stalemate,” defined as a condition in which the 
opposing parties in a conflict “…believe that things will get worse if the status quo 
 
141 International Crisis Group, “Colombia’s Elusive Quest for Peace,” ICG Latin America Report No 
1, 26 March 2002, 24.  Available from 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400594_26032002.pdf. Accessed on 15 
July 2005; Internet. 
142 See Téllez, Montes, and Lesmes, Diario íntimo de un fracaso, 34-35. 
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continues and that another alternative (settlement) is available that will be better than 
continued war,” never existed between the FARC-EP and the government.143  Because 
the insurgency believed that it was winning the war, it had no incentive to negotiate in 
good faith with the Pastrana administration and instead manipulated the peace process in 
order to buy the organization the time and space necessary to further its political and 
military objectives.  The FARC-EP’s actions during its time in the zona de distensión 
substantiate this argument. 
4. FARC-EP Use of the Despeje for Military Purposes 
The despeje was officially established on 7 November 1998, three months after 
Andrés Pastrana’s inauguration.  While this meeting zone was originally scheduled to last 
for just ninety-days, eleven subsequent extensions of the FARC-EP’s “lease” on this 
prime real estate would allow the insurgency to maintain control over the territory 
inhabited by some 90,000 people until 20 February 2002.  During this time, the FARC-
EP utilized the despeje “…as a sanctuary, to support their drug trafficking operations, 
launch terrorist attacks, and recruit and train their forces.”144
While the FARC-EP’s use of the despeje to carry out illegal activities is 
undeniable, they were carried out as part of a larger political-military strategy aimed at 
strengthening its position in Southern and Eastern Colombia as well as in and around 
Bogotá.  To accomplish this objective, the FARC-EP traded coca for weapons, munitions, 
and war materiel and engaged in a major rearmament program.  This allowed it to acquire 
“…more than 20,000 East German assault rifles, grenade launchers, mortars, SAM-12 
surface to air missiles, sophisticated electronic communications equipment and its own 
small air force.”145  These weapons were then issued to the estimated 5,000 insurgents 
that were then believed to be operating within the despeje and later employed in offensive 
guerrilla attacks against civilian and military targets located outside of the zona.   [See 
Figure 6 for a map depicting these attacks.]  The purpose of the offensives was to reduce 
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the Colombian military’s and National Police’s presence in the areas located adjacent to 
Bogotá.  In this manner, the FARC-EP hoped to improve its chances of consolidating its 
control over key overland routes, including strategic and mobility corridors, which link 
the northern tip of the despeje, via the Sumapaz mountain chain, to the outskirts of 
southern Bogotá. 
One of the FARC-EP’s boldest offensives included the July 1999 multifront 
attack of 4,000 guerrillas against military towns and bases located in the departments of 
Meta, Guaviare, Huila, Putumayo, and Caquetá.  This was followed in January 2000 by a 
series of attacks carried out by some 800 guerrillas against military and police positions 
located in the towns of Une, Quétame, and Guayabetal – some sixty kilometers south of 
Bogotá.  Following the last aforementioned set of attacks, the FARC-EP subsequently cut 
off land communications between Bogotá and Villavicencio, the capital of Meta 
department, located approximately 170 kilometers to the southeast of the capital.146  
Jorge Briceño Suárez was later reported to have stated that the FARC-EP was in a 
position to capture the departmental capitals of Florencia, Caquetá and Villavicencio, 
Meta but pulled its punches to spin out the peace talks with the Pastrana 
administration.147
In an effort to prepare its forces to take the war to the nation’s cities, the FARC-
EP contracted the services of Niall Connolly, Martin McCauley and James Monaghan.  
Connolly, who according to the Cuban government served in Havana as the Latin 
America representative for the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) political wing, Sinn Fein, 
traveled in 2001 with McCauley, and Monaghan, a former member of the executive 
board of Sinn Fein and one of the IRA’s leading experts on bombs and explosives, to the 





146 Rand Corporation, “Colombian Labyrinth,” 43. 
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skills.148  The IRA’s influence on the FARC-EP would manifest itself in 2003 when the 
guerrilla organization carried out eleven bombing attacks against civilian and military 
targets in Bogotá, Cúcuta, Florencia, Neiva, Cali, and Medellín.149
But the FARC-EP’s outside assistance was not limited to the IRA.  The guerrillas 
also allegedly received training from Cuban and Venezuelan soldiers in the use of 
explosives and larger-caliber arms.  Special emphasis was reportedly placed upon 
shooting down helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.150
The Islamic Republic of Iran also reportedly expressed interest in supporting the 
FARC-EP.  According to Téllez, Montes, and Lesmes, in June 1999 the High 
Commissioner for Peace, Víctor G. Ricardo, the Iranian Ambassador to Colombia, and an 
undisclosed representative of the cattle ranching industry from San Vicente del Caguán 
signed an agreement that called for the construction of the largest slaughterhouse and 
meat processing facility in all of Latin America. 151  The facility, in which 20,000 tons of 
meat was supposedly to be processed and later exported to Iran, was to be located next to 
an airstrip longer than any of those found at Bogotá’s Eldorado International airport.  
According to the terms of the agreement, regular flights from Iran would land in San 
Vicente del Caguán where meat would be loaded onto the transport aircraft and flown 
back to the Middle Eastern nation.  To oversee the construction of the slaughterhouse, 
meat processing facility, and landing strip, Iranian representatives would travel to San 
Vicente del Caguán where they would remain for two years. 
The agreement between the Iranian and Colombian governments looked 
suspicious from the beginning.  However, even more attention was focused upon this 
effort when it was proven that there were not enough cattle in the San Vicente del Caguán 
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area – or in the entire despeje – to meet the requirements of such a large-scale meat 
processing facility.  This aroused the suspicions of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
and the Pentagon, who after closely reviewing the blueprints for the construction of the 
facilities, determined that the meat processing plant could be used for the storage of 
missile batteries and similar armaments.  Additionally, the materials used in the 
construction of the facilities would prevent U.S. and Colombian intelligence platforms 
from identifying the materials contained within the building.  Consequently, the CIA 
advised the Colombian military to do its utmost to prevent the deal between the 
Colombian and Iranian Governments from coming to fruition.  As a result of the United 
States’ intervention, the Colombian government backed out of the deal with the Iranians 
and prevented the FARC-EP from acquiring weapons that could have turned the tide of 
the war. 
 
Figure 6.   FARC-EP Offensives Originating from the Despeje152 
 
 
                                                 





                                                
5. FARC-EP Use of the Despeje for Political Purposes 
In addition to using the despeje for military purposes, the FARC-EP intended to 
take advantage of the Government of Colombia’s territorial concession in order to 
establish the Independent Republic of the Caguán (a.k.a. Manuelandia, a.k.a. 
Farilandia).153  To accomplish this, the FARC-EP planned to rely upon its prior 
experience in state building. 
During the 1960s the FARC-EP, along with members of the Liberal and 
Communist parties, participated in the creation of nine leftwing, independent republics 
located to the south of Bogotá.154  Although these areas were later invaded and destroyed 
by the Colombian military between 1964 and 1966, the creation of these independent 
republics provided the FARC-EP with a valuable learning experience.  The guerrilla 
organization would later capitalize upon its prior efforts at state building and seek to 
replicate its experience in the Middle Magdalena region of the country. 
Beginning in 1986 and continuing into the early 1990s, the FARC-EP attempted 
to establish the Independent Republic of Middle Magdalena.  However, this political 
entity, which was to be composed of three small towns -- Puerto Boyacá, Puerto Berrío, 
and Puerto Parra -- located in the Middle Magdalena region of northern Colombia, never 
came to fruition as paramilitary forces, under the leadership of Nelson Lesmes and Iván 
Roberto Duque, conducted a violent and bloody counterinsurgency campaign which 
defeated the FARC-EP and drove it from the region.155
Despite these initial failures, the FARC-EP persisted in its efforts to consolidate 
its political-military control over isolated regions of the country and to establish a new  
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and independent republic.  A retired Colombian military officer with more than thirty 
years’ experience, and currently a political-military advisor to the Colombian 
government, explains the insurgency’s strategy for achieving this objective: 
Since the guerrilla organization’s Seventh Guerrilla Conference in 1982, 
the FARC-EP contemplated in phase two of its strategic plan the 
consolidation of independent republics. Up until that time, the FARC-EP 
thought that it would be able to employ a strategy similar to that of 
Mao’s…liberating areas where they would displace [state] authorities and 
later replace them with local juntas or provisional co-governments.  In this 
way the FARC-EP hoped to establish control over many municipalities.  
Later, when several neighboring municipalities had been “liberated” the 
FARC-EP intended to consolidate and integrate them into regions known 
as “liberated areas.”  That was what the FARC-EP originally planned to 
do. 
But as it was that they were not able to accomplish this goal and lacked 
the military strength to take the municipalities by force, the FARC-EP, at 
its Eighth Guerrilla Conference in 1993, began to talk about the 
demilitarization of several municipalities.  The FARC-EP argued that if it 
could convince the state to participate in negotiations and give them a 
despeje, in three or four months time they would be able to consolidate 
political control over the area, win supporters to the cause and create 
political structures that would allow them to maintain their hold on the 
territory indefinitely.  The FARC-EP believed that once the state granted 
the insurgency this despeje, it would never demand that the guerrilla 
organization vacate the area.  In this way, the FARC-EP believed that it 
would be able to maintain a permanent hold on the demilitarized zone and 
establish an independent republic.156
After the FARC-EP was granted the zona, it attempted to establish its political 
control over the area by “…bringing together the whole population between the ages of 
13 and 60 for two or three days” in order to indoctrinate them in Marxist-Leninst theory 
and “train them in the use of heavy weapons.”157  The FARC-EP organized some of the 
locals into guerrilla militias known as “Citizen Vigilance” that were charged with “spying 
on civic, religious, and business groups” and informing the guerrilla organization as to 
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the existence of potential dissidents. Other citizens were forced to take part in communal 
activities such as repairing existing roads, painting revolutionary murals, or 
reconditioning airstrips.158
The FARC-EP also used the despeje to launch its long-in-the making, clandestine 
political movement -- the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia.  This movement, 
which was originally conceived in 1996, was launched on 24 April 2000 in San Vicente 
del Caguán, Caquetá. The implementation of the movement, a product of the FARC-EP’s 
21-25 March 2000 Guerrilla Plenum, was designed to rally disparate elements of society 
behind the guerrilla organization’s revolutionary plan for seizing power.  According to 
FARC-EP commander Fernando Caicedo, the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia 
is not an electoral based organization, but rather an accumulation of individuals from 
various political backgrounds who sympathize with the FARC-EP’s revolutionary plan.  
These “Bolivarians” operate clandestinely and aid the guerrilla organization by 
mobilizing the masses in support of political projects designed to further the 
organization’s revolutionary objectives.159  By establishing clandestine “Bolivarian” cells 
throughout the country, the insurgency hoped to attract new members to its cause and 
prepare the population for the “inevitable fall” of the central government. 
Finally, the FARC-EP took several measures designed to consolidate its political 
and military control over the despeje.  First, the guerrilla organization issued new 
identification cards (los carnets) to each of the 90,000 citizens residing in the despeje’s 
five municipalities.  Second, it required all visitors to the zona to have the official 
permission of a local front commander before entering the demilitarized area.  Third, the 
insurgency established several rules and regulations governing the behavior of the 
residents which resulted in a drastic reduction in crime rates.  According to the New York 
Times, only four killings occurred in the first six months that the FARC-EP controlled 
the despeje (October 1998 to April 1999) compared with about ten a week in the months 
before the guerrilla organization’s arrival.  Robbery, theft, and rape also dropped 
 
158 Larry Rother, “Colombia Rebels Reign in Ceded Area,” New York Times, 16 May 1999, sec. 1, p. 
18. 
159 Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramón, El orden de la guerra, 148-149. 
86
 
                                                
significantly.160  Fourth, the FARC-EP placed statues and portraits of Lenin and Simón 
Bolívar outside of its headquarters in San Vicente del Caguán.  Finally, the guerrilla 
organization imposed “taxes” on the populace including a 10,000 Colombian peso tariff 
(approximately US$3.00 dollars) on each head of cattle owned by the local cattle 
ranchers.161  The revenues collected through the FARC-EP’s simple, yet effective 
taxation system, were then used to pay for expenses associated with war. 
6. The Dissolution of the Despeje and the End of the Peace Process 
By late 2001, a series of factors including the FARC-EP’s illegal use of the 
despeje, the Pastrana administration’s inept handling of the peace process, the guerrilla 
organization’s continued attacks against the civilian populace, and strident opposition 
from the military and police increased pressure on the administration to dissolve the zona 
and end the peace process.  Nevertheless, President Andrés Pastrana, convinced that he 
was on the verge of achieving an elusive peace, persisted in his efforts to achieve a 
ceasefire agreement and a political resolution to the conflict.162  However, a series of 
events in early 2002 – including the FARC-EP’s hijacking of a civilian aircraft en route 
to Bogotá and its forced landing on a highway near Neiva, Huila department; aerial 
photographs which revealed that the FARC-EP had cultivated 35,000 hectares of coca in 
the southern portion of the despeje; and, the kidnapping of Senator and President of the 
Senate Peace Commission, Eduardo Gechem -- conspired against the President’s wishes 
and forced him to order the Colombian military to retake the zona de despeje on 20 
February 2002. 
After three years of unsuccessful peace talks with the insurgents and eleven 
extensions on the despeje’s lease, the Pastrana administration had nothing to show for its 
efforts.  However, if the Government of Colombia learned anything from its experiences 
with the FARC-EP, it was that the insurgency would not negotiate in good faith unless a 
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realizations, as well as popular disillusionment with both Pastrana and the FARC-EP, 
would propel the May 2002 election of hard-liner and independent candidate, Álvaro 
Uribe Vélez, to the presidency. 
7. Colombia and the United States Declare War against the FARC-EP 
The FARC-EP greeted President Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s ascension to office on 7 
August 2002 by launching a mortar attack against the presidential palace that killed 
twenty and wounded more than sixty civilians.163  President Uribe, who had promised to 
take the war to the FARC-EP and restore governmental control to the entire nation, 
would later respond by developing a national security doctrine known as the Democratic 
Security and Defense Policy.  This strategy, which calls for the state to reassert its control 
over lawless territories and to provide security to all sectors of society, was based on the 
fundamental need to strengthen the Colombian military and National Police.164
The transformation of the Colombian military, which had begun during the 
Pastrana administration, would continue throughout Uribe’s term in office and result in a 
much better organized and powerful military institution.  The revenues needed to finance 
this transformation were provided by the Colombian Government’s increased allotment  
for defense spending – currently 4.5% of GDP – and the implementation of a “war 
tax.”165 The United States also played a key role in modernizing and reforming the 
institution.166
According to the 9 May 2005 Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress, between fiscal year (FY) 2000 and FY2004, the United States gave Colombia 
$4.5 billion dollars in support of Plan Colombia - the Andean nation’s six-year plan 
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(1999- 2005) to end the armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic 
and social development.167  An additional $463 million dollars in Andean Counterdrug 
Initiative funding – “the primary U.S. plan that supports Plan Colombia” – and $90 
million in Foreign Military Financing are expected to be approved for FY2006.  Of the 
$463 million dollars, $310 million dollars has been allocated for interdiction efforts; 
$27.4 million dollars for rule of law programs; and, $124.8 million dollars for alternative 
development and institution building indicating a continued emphasis on the military 
component of Plan Colombia.168
The United States also assisted in creating, training, and equipping three counter-
narcotics battalions, and one brigade - the 5th Mobile brigade - charged with providing 
security to the nation’s economic lifeline – the Caño Limón – Coveñas oil pipeline.  In 
2001, the FARC-EP attacked the pipeline a record 171 times causing it to shutdown for 
four-months and costing the Government of Colombia $500 million dollars in lost 
revenues - approximately two-percent of the national budget.169  However, by 2004, 
improved security measures along the length of the pipeline would reduce the number of 
FARC-EP attacks to just seventeen.170
The United States provided additional assistance to the Government of Colombia 
when, in the summer of 2002, the Congress removed restrictions which until that time 
had limited the use of Plan Colombia related funds and equipment for exclusively 
counterdrug purposes.  The removal of this restriction meant that the Colombian military 
could now employ U.S. supplied military aid and equipment against the FARC-EP and 
other insurgent organizations.  With the Congress’ removal of this restriction, the United 
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counterinsurgency.  To carry out its expanded mission, the U.S. Government in 2004 
increased its military presence in the Andean nation from 400 to 800 personnel and 
augmented the amount of civilian contractors from 400 to 600.171
8. Libertad Uno, Plan Patriota, and the FARC-EP’s Strategic 
Withdrawal 
The renewed emphasis on counterterrorism operations, increased investment in 
state-building efforts, and strengthening of the state security services quickly began to 
pay high dividends.  By the end of President Uribe’s second year in office, the 
Government of Colombia had made great strides in increasing the level of security 
throughout the nation.  The police had been redeployed to each of Colombia’s 1,098 
municipalities; 3,500 members of the illegal self-defense groups or paramilitaries had 
been demobilized; homicides had fallen from 28,837 in 2002 to 20,167 in 2004 – an 18% 
decrease in two years; and the rate of kidnappings had been reduced significantly.172  
Overall, the Democratic Security and Defense Policy seemed to be working.  However, 
the FARC-EP and the nation’s smaller and weaker guerrilla organization, the Army of 
National Liberation (ELN), continued to be a threat to the national security.  
Consequently, the President ordered the Colombian military to go on the offensive to 
break the back of the guerrilla organizations. 
In July 2003, 8,000 soldiers, under the leadership of General Reynaldo 
Castellanos, began a military operation – Libertad Uno – focused on attacking the 
thirteen FARC-EP fronts operating in Cundinamarca, the department which surrounds 
Bogotá.173  By the time the operation had concluded in late 2003, the vast majority of the 
22nd front, responsible for most of the kidnappings that took place between Bogotá and 
the outlying countryside, had been destroyed.  Those that survived the army’s attack fled  
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and later joined the ranks of the neighboring 42nd front.  However, the army pursued the 
fleeing guerrillas and later dealt the 42nd a significant blow which forced the guerrilla unit 
to restructure its internal command.174
As a result of Libertad Uno, the FARC-EP fronts responsible for maintaining 
control over the approaches to Bogotá were weakened significantly, forcing the 
remaining guerrilla units to regroup and train new personnel capable of filling the void 
left by the army’s advance.  While Libertad Uno proved to be a successful first effort at 
retaking a relatively small amount of territory formerly controlled by the FARC-EP, the 
Military’s offensive into the jungles of Southeastern Colombia may prove to be the 
decisive confrontation that forces the FARC-EP to concede to unrelenting governmental 
pressure. 
The Colombian military’s ongoing push into “the FARC-EP’s backyard” is part 
of a larger military campaign plan, known as Plan Patriota or the Patriot Plan, which is 
designed to return security to the entire nation.175  The current phase of the operation, 
which includes an immense area of land – approximately 300,000 square kilometers -- 
located in the jungle covered Southeastern region of the country, is focused on the 
departments of Meta, Caquetá, Guaviare, and Vichada.176  The Colombian military has 
assembled in these departments the largest offensive military force in the history of the 
republic.  Composed of some 18,000 personnel drawn from all of the nation’s military 
services, Task Force Omega, the military command created to do battle with the 
estimated 5,000 guerrillas and militia members operating in the Southeastern region of 
the country, has thus far made significant progress. 
In September 2004, the former Minister of Defense, Jorge Alberto Uribe, 
announced the results of the first phase of military operations in the southeastern region 
of the country.  According to Uribe, the Military seized hundreds of weapons and 
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munitions, deactivated nearly 200 minefields and house-bombs, seized 148 pieces of 
communications equipment, and damaged more than 250 FARC-EP vehicles (including 
two airplanes and fifty four boats).  However, perhaps of greater significance, the former 
Minister of Defense stated that the military had been able to destroy numerous arms and 
drug trafficking corridors thereby significantly reducing the logistical capability of the 
guerrilla organization.177  Nevertheless, although the FARC-EP has been weakened it is 
definitely not out of the fight. 
9. The FARC-EP’s “Resistance Plan” and Strategic Withdrawal 
In response to the Government of Colombia’s launching of Plan Patriota, the 
FARC-EP initiated a retaliatory offensive known as the “Comandante Urías Rondón 
Resistance Plan.” Although little information is known regarding this endeavor, the 
FARC-EP’s recent rash of attacks against military installations and isolated towns and 
villages, located far from Task Force Omega’s theater of operations, suggests that the 
strategy behind the “Comandante Urías Rondón Resistance Plan” may be to relieve 
Colombian military pressure on the Southeast region by focusing its attacks on other 
parts of the nation.  The FARC-EP’s continued attacks also serve notice that the 
organization, while on the run, is still very much alive. 
Accompanying the insurgency’s guerrilla attacks on such targets has been the 
implementation of a new strategy that one political analyst has called a “strategic 
withdrawal.”178  This strategy, which emphasizes the cession of territory to the 
Colombian military and the avoidance of direct contact with the armed forces in favor of 
indirect attacks -- via the use of landmines, explosives, and mortars -- has been employed 
with success throughout Task Force Omega’s theater of operations.  Such actions indicate 
that the FARC-EP, like other guerrilla organizations which have preceded it, is simply 
conserving its strength and firepower in order to survive and fight another day.  In the 
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an effort to attrit and demoralize its forces. Later, when the military has tired of fighting, 
the FARC-EP will regroup and attempt to inflict devastating losses against the armed 
forces. 
Some observers, however, have interpreted the FARC-EP’s unwillingness to 
engage the Colombian military as a sign of the guerrilla organization’s impending defeat 
and imminent demise.179  They argue that the FARC-EP is quickly being defeated and is 
more concerned with preserving its illicit wealth than it is in defending its revolutionary 
cause. These individuals continue to assert that the FARC-EP is nothing more than a 
criminal organization whose dedication to the drug trade supercedes any professed 
commitment they may have to revolutionary change.  However, this argument fails to 
consider recent evidence uncovered by the Colombian military’s offensive into the 
jungles of southeastern Colombia. 
10. The FARC-EP’s Efforts at State-Building 
In 2004-2005, as the Colombian military advanced deeper into FARC-EP 
territory, it began to observe signs of the guerrilla organization’s efforts to create the so-
called “New Colombia.”  In many of the isolated towns and villages located in Task 
Force Omega’s theater of operations, where for decades the FARC-EP had reigned as the 
only semblance of political-military authority, the Colombian military found evidence of 
the guerrilla organization’s efforts to construct alternate societies or “shadow 
governments.”  John Baylis, a noted expert on revolutionary warfare, explains the 
significance of such actions: 
Most insurgent movements waste little time in establishing not only a 
local administrative network but also parallel governmental institutions, 
which act as a focal point in the battle for the loyalty of the public.  Such  
organs help both to provide a degree of legitimacy for the revolutionary 
forces and to break the monopoly of legitimacy held by the 
government.180
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Historically speaking, numerous guerrilla organizations which predate the FARC-
EP - including Mao Tse-tung’s Red Army and the North Vietnamese People’s Army, led 
by General Vo Nguyen Giap - created such alternate societies or “states within states.”  In 
1919, the political arm of the IRA, Sinn Fein, created the Dail Eireann – “a ‘parallel 
hierarchy that would compete for legitimacy with the British government.”181
In the FARC-EP’s case, the insurgency successfully established itself as the de 
facto governing force in the Southeast region of the country.  This was accomplished by 
several means: the FARC-EP’s issuance of new identification cards to each resident 
identifying their nationality as Farianos;182 the replacement of the Colombian national 
currency with a monetary system based on the exchange of grams of coca leaf or 
paste;183  the organization of the local populace into militias; the political indoctrination 
and organization of the masses in support of the revolution; the extraction of “taxes” from 
local merchants and livestock owners; the creation of several networks of spies and 
informants; and, the establishment of social regulations or laws governing the behavior of 
the local residents.184
These above mentioned examples illustrate that, despite the FARC-EP’s 
involvement in the illicit drug trade, participation in other illegal activities, and strategic 
withdrawal, the guerrilla organization clearly continues to aspire to political power.  The 
insurgency’s efforts to assert its control over the local populace, and to create a 
competing political entity in direct competition with that of the nation-state, illustrate the 
FARC-EP’s efforts at state-building.  Had the guerrilla organization not attempted to 
carry out any state-building activities, but rather had simply lived among the local 
populace as a mafia or similar criminal organization, the allegation that the FARC-EP 
 
181 John Baylis, “Revolutionary Warfare,” Contemporary Strategy II:  The Nuclear Powers, vol. 2 rev. 
and enl., ed. John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett, and Phil Williams (New York: Holmes and Meier 
Publishers, 1987), 215. 
182 “La secreta operación ‘J.M.’, trabajos militares con objetivos en más de 300 mil kms cuadrados,” 
El Tiempo (Bogotá), 2 May 2005, available from http://eltiempo.terra.com.co; Internet; accessed on 15 
June 2005. 
183 “Colombian Towns Still Skeptical of ‘Plan Patriota,’” 25 May 2004, FBIS, accession no. 
LAP20040525000038. 




                                                
had abandoned its ideological beliefs and devolved into a criminal enterprise would have 
more credibility.  However, the fact that the FARC-EP did in fact attempt to create 
political structures that resemble those of a  conventional nation-state, and acted in ways 
consistent with those of a governing force, argues in favor of the organization’s continued 
claims to be a revolutionary organization that aspires to political power. 
C. IDEOLOGICAL 
Following the collapse of the peace talks and dissolution of the despeje, the 
Government of Colombia characterized the insurgency as a “narcoterrorist” organization, 
devoid of any political ambition, and motivated exclusively by an unquenchable thirst for 
greater illicit revenues. However, whereas the average guerrilla’s commitment to the 
organization’s ideological beliefs has definitely been weakened in the last five-to-ten-
years, this is not due to the insurgency’s participation in the drug trade and related 
criminal activities, but rather is a consequence of three factors. 
First, the quality of recruits who joined the guerrilla organization during the 
period 1995-2002 was of an inferior quality.  Recruited from the poorest and most 
isolated regions of the country, many of the new recruits were children under the age of 
fifteen.  In fact, Human Rights Watch assesses that in 2003 approximately 4,100 of the 
FARC-EP’s estimated 16,500 rural guerrilla combatants were children.185  When the 
urban-based militias are included, an additional 3,300 children appear in the guerrilla 
organization’s ranks.  This means that more than 7,400 of the FARC-EP’s total estimated  
strength of 26,500 guerrillas are children.  The child combatants’ immaturity and lack of 
preparedness for the emotional and psychological horrors of war often make them more 
of a burden on the organization than an asset. 
Second, the rudimentary education of most of the FARC-EP’s recruits, ninety 
percent of whom are peasants or indigenous peoples who possess only one or two years 
of primary school education, prevents them from comprehending the organization’s 
complex ideological beliefs.186  FARC-EP commander Iván Ríos explains: 
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I think that the main difficulty that we have, and not only at the leadership 
level, but also at the level of the average guerrilla, is the low level of 
education.  It’s not that the people are stupid, but that they cannot retain 
everything that is being taught to them about the revolution.  Also, due to 
their academic limitations, they may have a lot of difficulty understanding 
many things.  This is not the only problem we have, but it is the main 
problem and the one with which we have the most difficulty.187
As a result, the FARC-EP is currently producing guerrillas who are competent 
warriors skilled in the tactics of guerrilla warfare and the handling of explosives.  
However, they seldom comprehend the political ideology of the organization or the 
purpose for which they are fighting.  Hence the common refrain that, “the FARC is a 
military giant and a political dwarf.”  This situation, if left unchecked, could degrade the 
organization as the success of the insurgency as a political actor will depend upon its 
members’ ability to articulate the social, political, and economic aspirations of the 
movement.  If the guerrillas are ill-educated in these political objectives or in the 
strategies to achieve them, the insurgency’s ability to rally supporters to the FARC-EP’s 
cause and maintain discipline and morale over time will be severely diminished. 
Third, due to increased operations tempo, the insurgency has had neither the time 
nor the opportunity to hold its daily political meetings.  As a result, the time that would 
have been dedicated to discussing subjects of political interest or to clarifying the FARC- 
EP’s political or ideological beliefs is no longer available.  This has had a negative 
impact on the average guerrilla’s understanding of the movement’s ideological beliefs.  
FARC-EP commander Yesid Arteta explained in 2002: 
Eight or ten years ago, the FARC’s operations tempo was more spread out, 
that is we can remember that some guerrilla fronts participated in an 
average of two to three military engagements each year.  What did that 
allow?  It allowed for greater emphasis on the political qualification and 
military training of the combatants.  You have to recognize that…since the 
attack on Casa Verde, in the el Duda region, there has been an unleashing 
of guerrilla forces throughout the entire country.  This is without 
precedence in the entire history of the guerrilla struggle in Colombia. 
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The FARC’s military requirements are reflected in the fact that there isn’t 
enough time to provide the guerrilla combatants with a greater 
understanding of the ideological or political aspects of the organization, 
nor to dedicate to the political qualification of the guerrillas.188
The poor academic preparation of the guerrillas and their youth and ignorance of 
the insurgency’s ideological beliefs and political objectives have already proven to be a 
problem.  This was evidenced in San Vicente del Caguán where local residents were 
reported to have complained about the guerrillas’ below-average intellectual capacity and 
shortsightedness.189  These impediments prevented the guerrillas from understanding the 
needs of the people and reinforced intangible, socio-cultural barriers that ultimately 
undercut support for the insurgency.  These cultural detractors, if left unchecked, could 
have a negative impact on the FARC-EP’s ability, not only to recruit new members to its 
cause, but also to propagate its message.  As a result, the guerrilla organization could run 
the risk of degenerating into a “revolutionary organization” without a cause. 
D. RESOURCES 
In an effort to fund the FARC-EP’s urbanization of the conflict, provide for the 
sustenance of a growing army, and to pay for specialized training in urban guerrilla 
warfare and the use of explosives, the guerrilla organization continued to expand its 
involvement in the drug trade during the period 1998-2005.  By 2000, 23 of the FARC-
EP’s 61 fronts were suspected of being active in coca cultivation zones and an additional 
six in opium producing areas.190  Additionally, a recent United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) survey noted that “out of 189 municipalities where coca cultivation 
has been detected, guerrilla groups may be found in 162.”  The document does not 
specify, however, whether or not these groups were FARC-EP or ELN guerrillas.”191
Of the estimated 86,000 hectares of coca produced in 2003, 46,605 hectares, or 
54%, were cultivated in the top three coca-producing departments of Nariño, Guaviare, 
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and Meta.192  The FARC-EP’s Joint Western Command and Eastern Bloc exercise 
influence over these departments where at least 12 fronts and one mobile column are 
active.193  Although the ELN and paramilitaries are also present in these regions, the 
FARC-EP maintains a dominant presence. 
According to the International Crisis Group, 65 of the FARC-EP’s 110 guerrilla 
units are involved either in coca or poppy cultivation.194  The participation in the 
cultivation and taxation of these illicit crops, creation of drug laboratories for the 
processing of coca base and cocaine hydrochloride, and the organization’s charge for 
allowing narco-traffickers to use guerrilla controlled clandestine airstrips and related 
infrastructure, allowed the FARC-EP in 2003 to earn between $489 million and $791.3 
million dollars.195  These figures, however, do not include FARC-EP dividends realized 
through its involvement in other illicit activities such as extortion, kidnapping, and bank 
robberies.  When these are taken into consideration, the FARC-EP is estimated to have 
earned between $960.7 million and $1.7 billion dollars in 2003.196
The FARC-EP’s level of participation in the drug trade seems to vary throughout 
the country.  In some sections of Colombia, such as in the departments of Caquetá, 
Guaviare, Putumayo, Nariño, and the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander, the 
guerrilla organization “…completely controls cultivation, initial processing stages, and 
refining of cocaine, either providing security to refining facilities installed by drug 
traffickers or, according to official sources, running their own….The local economy in 
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many regions under FARC control is founded on coca base barter.”197  Peñas Coloradas, 
and many other small towns located on the banks of the Caguán River in Caquetá, are 
examples of locations where the FARC-EP has implemented a monetary system based on 
the bartering of grams of coca paste or coca leaf.198  However, in other parts of the 
country, the guerrilla organization’s involvement in the drug trade is limited to territorial 
control of the coca crops located within its sphere of influence and coca base 
processing.199
At this time most observers agree that the FARC-EP has not developed the ability 
to engage in the international trafficking of drugs, but rather remains dependent upon a 
network of national and international narco-traffickers to move its product abroad.  
However, with the organization’s tremendous profits and growing monopolization of the 
drug trade, it may just be a matter of time before the organization acquires this ability.  In 
fact, as contracting narco-traffickers to transport the FARC-EP’s drugs to other 
distribution points diminishes the insurgency’s profits and therefore reduces its ability to 
finance the war, it would be naïve to think that the guerrilla organization is not already 
making plans to one day supplant the “drug traffickers” with “guerrilla traffickers.” 
1. FARC-EP’s Allocation of Resources 
Despite the FARC-EP’s immersion in the drug trade, the “combination of profit 
and power” has not been detrimental or undermined the coherence of the guerrilla 
organization’s political agenda.200  In fact, the guerrilla organization remains as 
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on 27 May 1964.  This will be illustrated by analyzing the FARC-EP’s allocation of 
financial revenues as reported in the Colombian Joint Intelligence Group’s 24 February 
2005 report on FARC-EP finances.201
According to the above mentioned document, in 2003 the FARC-EP spent 
between $845,000 and $2.5 million dollars on a trust fund created for captured guerrillas.  
An additional $253,285 to $633,214 dollars were given to assist the family members of 
detained guerrillas.  The existence of such trust funds and pensions for captured 
personnel, are more commonly associated with military or state institutions rather than 
with criminal enterprises. 
Similarly, the FARC-EP’s spends between $4,800 and $7,200 dollars a year to 
maintain twelve web pages in several languages, where the organization publishes and 
disseminates revolutionary propaganda -- another characteristic generally not associated 
with a criminal organization.202  In fact, criminal enterprises prefer to draw as little 
attention to themselves as possible and usually try to mask their presence by lurking in 
the shadows of everyday life.  The FARC-EP, on the other hand, goes out of its way to 
proselytize not just Colombians, but also the entire international community.  If the 
FARC-EP were a criminal organization, it would not maintain such a high profile or 
attempt to draw unwanted attention to itself.  Only an organization that seeks outside 
support would participate in such activities. 
In addition to the FARC-EP’s numerous, multilingual web pages, the insurgency 
also operates five clandestine radio stations known as the “Voice of the Resistance” (La 
Voz de la Resistencia).203  According to Colombian Ministry of Defense, the guerrilla  
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organization in 2003 invested between $97,500 and $154,000 dollars to maintain these 
illegal radio stations.  As with the FARC-EP’s use of the internet, the radio stations 
originate within Colombia, but can be received via shortwave radio throughout the world. 
The insurgency also invested an estimated $116,785 to $286,785 dollars in 
conferences, meetings, and propaganda designed to rally domestic and international 
support behind the FARC-EP.  The above amount also included fees associated with the 
publication of the organization’s bi-monthly magazine Resistance (La Resistencia). The 
FARC-EP’s use of the mass media to disseminate its political beliefs and to search for 
individuals who are sympathetic to its cause has been nothing less than impressive.  Such 
actions illustrate the organization’s ongoing efforts to propagate the legitimacy of its 
struggle. 
Finally, the FARC-EP invested an estimated $101,314 to $170,228 dollars in its 
so-called International Commission.  This group of senior FARC-EP representatives, 
formerly under the leadership of now captured guerrilla leader alias Rodrigo Granda, is 
charged with disseminating the FARC-EP’s political and ideological beliefs to 
sympathetic international audiences and with procuring resources from abroad.  
However, in recent years, the Government of Colombia has been able to deal a significant 
blow to the International Commission by capturing some of its representatives.  
Nevertheless, the International Commission continues to function and remains a vital 
component of the FARC-EP’s strategy for convincing the international community of the 
morality of its struggle. 
As can be seen from the above examples, the FARC-EP continues to utilize its 
financial resources in ways consistent with those of a revolutionary organization and not 
of a criminal enterprise.  The guerrilla organization’s continued attempts to secure 
support from abroad illustrate its desperation to prove the legitimacy of its cause.  
Similarly the FARC-EP’s efforts illustrate its need to appeal to outside sources for 
recognition as a political actor.  However, in the post September 11 environment, the 
guerrilla organization’s chances of securing the aid of any state, save those rogue nations 




FARC-EP will likely continue to establish alliances with other Latin American based 
leftist organizations and other groups sympathetic to the guerrilla organization’s struggle 
for political power. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has argued that the FARC-EP, despite its continued involvement in 
the drug trade and participation in other illicit activities, remains a revolutionary 
organization whose final objective is the attainment of political power.  This has been 
illustrated by examining the organization’s participation in the failed peace talks of 1998-
2002 and its disingenuous use of the despeje.  In both cases, it has been shown that the 
FARC-EP acted to further its political-military objectives and to advance its 
revolutionary cause. 
Evidence of the FARC-EP’s efforts to create the so-called “New Colombia” has 
recently come to light as a result of the Colombian military’s advance into the rearguard 
of the insurgency.  As a result of these operations, the FARC-EP’s alternate societies or 
shadow governments have been revealed to the public for the first time.  In these areas, 
the FARC-EP has supplanted the state as the de facto governing force and taken measures 
to create a new and competing society that directly challenges the legitimacy of the 
Colombian state.  These examples clearly illustrate the political intentions of the 
insurgency and dispel arguments which suggest that the organization has abandoned its 
ideological beliefs and devolved into a criminal organization. 
Nevertheless, the increased ops tempo, large recruitment of child combatants, and 
limited education and cultural awareness of the vast majority of FARC-EP combatants 
are in fact having a negative effect on the organization’s ideological underpinnings.  
Today’s guerrilla combatants, despite their proficiency as experienced warriors, do not 
understand the political, social, or economic reasons for their ongoing struggle.  More 
importantly, they are unable to articulate the insurgency’s professed solutions to the 
nation’s social ills.  If left unchecked, this could result in the organization’s degeneration 
into a rebel organization without a cause. 
Finally, by means of financial analysis this chapter has illustrated that the FARC-
EP continues to utilize its revenues for the attainment of political power.  This has been 
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evidenced by citing examples of the FARC-EP’s efforts, via the use of the internet, radio, 
and other means of communication, to propagate its faith, win new adherents to its cause, 
and morally justify its struggle for “social justice” to the international community. Such 
actions, which are inconsistent with those of a criminal organization, illustrate the 
insurgency’s efforts to disseminate its revolutionary message and defend itself against 
those who would accuse it of abandoning its revolutionary cause. 
103
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis has argued that the FARC-EP is currently a hierarchically organized, 
politically motivated, and ideologically driven insurgency whose strategic objectives 
include the defeat of the Colombian military, the toppling of the central government, and 
the establishment of a socialist regime founded on Marxist-Leninist and “Bolivarian” 
principles.  It challenges those who allege that the insurgent group has degenerated into a 
criminal organization driven by a desire to maximize profits earned through its 
participation in illicit activities. While recognizing the important role that resources 
earned from criminal activities have played in strengthening the FARC-EP’s challenge to 
the government, this thesis argues that the guerrilla organization’s involvement in the 
drug trade serves exclusively as a means to an end. 
To ensure the guerrillas’ commitment to their cause and to prevent their 
degeneration into a criminal organization, the senior leadership of the FARC-
EPcentralized power in the Secretariat and Estado Mayor Central.  It also implemented a 
draconian disciplinary system known as the Reglamento de Régimen Disciplinario that 
executes members who fail to adhere to the principles of the organization.  In this way, 
the FARC-EP has been able to maintain discipline of the insurgency and prevent its 
degeneration into a criminal organization. 
However, recent changes in leadership as well as the recruitment of non-
ideologically motivated and poorly educated fighters have led to the weakening of the 
ideological commitment of the base.  Additionally, the increased operations tempo has 
prevented the insurgency’s leadership from dedicating sufficient time to the political 
indoctrination of guerrilla combatants.  Consequently, many of the FARC-EP’s newer 
recruits, while skilled guerrilla combatants, are poorly educated in the political goals of 
the insurgency.  This, combined with the weakening of organization’s leadership could, if 
left unaddressed, result in the weakening of the ideological foundation of the insurgency, 






Since the FARC-EP’s Seventh Guerrilla Conference in 1982, the insurgency has 
proven itself to be a remarkably adaptable organization capable of adjusting its political-
military strategy and modus operandi to respond to the changing dynamics of Colombia’s 
conflict.  Examples include the insurgency’s decision to implement the “new method of 
operating” in 1996, to shift from guerrilla warfare to maneuver warfare in the same year, 
and the requirement to pass from the strategic offensive to the strategic defensive in 
2003.  In each case, the senior-leadership of the FARC-EP analyzed carefully the current 
situation and initiated changes that it felt would best advance the insurgency’s objectives 
and guarantee its continued survival. 
Today, the FARC-EP continues to show that it still possesses the ability to adapt 
to and overcome adversities.  In light of the Colombian Military’s offensive, the guerrilla 
organization has dispersed its forces and once again reverted to guerrilla warfare.  
Additionally, it has abandoned direct attacks in favor of indirect attacks and placed a 
premium on the use of stand-off weapons such as mortars, booby traps, landmines, and 
improvised explosive devices.  This modus operandi, which reduces the FARC-EP’s 
exposure, thereby improving its survivability, has allowed the guerrillas to flee from the 
pursuing soldiers while inflicting on them significant psychological and physical damage. 
The FARC-EP, although weakened by the Colombian Military’s offensive, has 
not been defeated.  Rather, it has decided to trade space for time to allow for the 
Colombian Military to exhaust its financial and military resources.  The senior leadership 
of the FARC-EP is well aware that the Colombian military offensive cannot continue 
indefinitely.  Nor will the United States, especially in light of its reconstruction efforts in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Louisiana, be able to sustain the same level of financial 
support for the Government of Colombia’s war against the guerrilla organization.  
Therefore, the insurgency is simply biding its time and waiting for the moment when  
Plan Colombia associated funds are exhausted and the Colombian Military is extended 
beyond its operational limits.  Once that moment arrives, the FARC-EP will regroup and 
attack the weakened military forces. 
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In the meantime, the insurgency, well aware of its need to take the war to the so-
called “Gordian knot of contradictions” – the nation’s cities – will likely continue to 
infiltrate personnel into Colombia’s primary and secondary cities.  As in 2003, the 
FARC-EP will likely conduct high-profile terrorist attacks against civilian and military 
targets located in these urban centers.  Discotheques, exclusive bars and restaurants, and 
other well-known locations will likely continue to appear on the FARC-EP’s target lists. 
Finally, the insurgency will continue to pressure the Government of Colombia to 
concede to a new despeje or demilitarized zone and will likely precondition future peace 
talks on its establishment.  However, if the FARC-EP does in fact participate in these 
talks, it will not negotiate in good faith, but rather will take advantage of the time and 
space afforded it to advance its political-military objectives.  The FARC-EP will also 
continue to clamor for recognition as a political organization and belligerent force and 
will mount a propaganda campaign to pressure congress into approving a prisoner 
exchange law.  Above all, so long as the senior leadership of the FARC-EP remains in 
power, the insurgency will not demobilize, hand in its weapons, or renounce its attempt 
to acquire revolutionary power.  However, a less ideologically-motivated and younger 
generation of guerrilla combatants may pursue an alternate course of action. 
2. Ideology 
Whereas the FARC-EP is currently a politically-motivated and ideologically 
driven guerrilla insurgency, at least three factors threaten to undermine the movement’s 
commitment to its revolutionary principles.  First, the quality of the recruits has dropped 
in the last five-to-ten years and has resulted in the influx of an estimated 7,000 child 
combatants.204  These individuals, many of whom were recruited between the ages of ten 
and fifteen, are neither mentally nor physically prepared for the horrors of war.  Nor did 
they join the insurgency for ideological purposes, but rather to escape abusive home 
environments, poverty, social-economic and class discrimination, and little chance of 
upward social mobility.205  Other factors which motivated these children to join the  
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insurgency included the opportunity to handle a weapon and to use walkie-talkies – both 
of which are recognized as symbols of power in the rural and impoverished areas of 
Colombia. 
Second, the limited education and cultural understanding of the vast majority of 
FARC-EP combatants, ninety per cent of whom are campesinos or peasant farmers, 
prevent most insurgents from comprehending the guerrilla movement’s complex 
ideological beliefs.206  Many insurgents cannot read or write and, so are incapable of 
digesting the teachings of Karl Marx or Joseph Lenin, not to mention the philosophical 
meanderings attributed to Simón Bolívar.  Finally, the high operations tempo prevents the 
common guerrilla combatants or guerrilleros rasos from receiving their daily instruction 
in political ideology.  The time that should be dedicated to discussing the FARC-EP’s 
ideological beliefs or reviewing the teachings of the organization’s founding fathers is 
instead utilized to plan and conduct offensive operations or, more recently, to flee from 
advancing soldiers.207  As a result, many of the current members of the FARC-EP, while 
possibly trained in the art of guerrilla warfare, little understand what they are fighting for, 
nor what the FARC-EP will do if it attains political power. 
Consequently, the FARC-EP is in serious danger of becoming a rebel movement 
without a cause or at least without a viable political strategy.  Additionally, the loss of 
significant military leadership because of the Colombian military’s offensive against the 
guerrilla organization, is removing the small percentage of guerrilla leaders who focus  
the ideological beliefs of the FARC-EP.  Therefore, unless the senior leaders address 
these issues, the guerrilla organization, in the long-term, runs the risk of losing its 
ideological compass. 
3. Organizational Dynamics 
There are three factors which hold the FARC-EP together and prevent it from 
devolving into a criminal enterprise:  first, strong senior- and mid-level leadership; 
second, the stern enforcement of the organization’s draconian disciplinary code; and 
third, the centralization of authority.  However, many factors including the advancement 
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in age of many of the insurgency’s senior leaders, the arrest, extradition, and/or 
assassination of mid-level commanders, and, the promotion of ill-prepared rank-and-file 
guerrilla combatants to positions of authority are weakening the command structure of 
the FARC-EP.  Consequently, the cohesion of the guerrilla organization is likely to 
weaken over time and result in the inability of the future leadership to maintain control 
over some of its units.  This in turn could undermine the command authority and 
centralization of power within the insurgency and cause the guerrilla organization to 
descend into criminality. 
Manuel Marulanda Vélez, the charismatic leader of the FARC-EP, has become a 
legend in Colombia.  He has taken on mythic proportions comparable to those of other 
Latin American revolutionary leaders such as Fidel Castro, Ernesto “Ché” Guevara, and 
Carlos Marighella.  Songs and stories recount his legendary exploits, while paintings by 
world renowned artists such as Fernando Botero, immortalize him as the eternal 
revolutionary. 
But Marulanda, now seventy-five years old, is quickly coming to the end of his 
quixotic adventure. While there have been rumors that a successor may have been named 
already, no one will ever be able to replace the charismatic leader.  Marulanda’s death 
will likely weaken the foundation upon which the FARC-EP is built and cause some to 
reconsider their commitment to the struggle. 
Additionally, the recent arrest, extradition, and/or assassination of some senior- 
and mid-level FARC-EP commanders have weakened the command structure of the 
guerrilla organization.208  Replacing these leaders will be difficult and could result in the 
promotion of ill-prepared and unqualified guerrillas to positions of authority.  This is due 
to the fact that promotions within the FARC-EP are very slow -- especially for those 
awaiting command positions.  In fact, most guerrillas have to invest ten to fifteen years in 
the insurgency and prove themselves in battle before they are given command of a 
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commander of the 46th front, alias Fidel Romero, and the former political ideologue of the 9th front, alias 
Plotter, abandoned the movement and demobilized.  Still others, including a well-known mid-level guerrilla 
commander and personal confidant to Jorge Briceño Suárez, alias Buen día, were killed in action. 
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guerrilla unit.  However, with the demise of many of the senior- and mid-level 
commanders, the senior-leadership of the FARC-EP will be required to promote more 
junior and less ideologically educated members to positions of power.  This will likely 
have a negative impact on the insurgency’s war fighting capabilities and will complicate 
the indoctrination of future recruits.  As a result, future FARC-EP units will probably not 
be as proficient in guerrilla warfare, or as ideologically driven, as those of today. 
Another factor which has allowed the senior leadership of the insurgency to 
maintain strict control over its subordinate guerrilla combatants is the stern enforcement 
of the movement’s strict disciplinary code – el Reglamento de Régimen Disciplinario.  
This code, combined with the swift implementation of revolutionary justice, discourages 
the vast majority of insurgents from acting in ways contrary to the wishes of his or her 
superior officer.  The culture of fear that surrounds the Reglamento de Régimen 
Disciplinario, and the knowledge that guerrilla leaders or cabecillas will not hesitate to 
execute a “convicted” guerrilla, enforces insurgent compliance with the senior 
leadership’s directives and the guerrilla organization’s code of conduct. 
Finally, the vertical command structure and centralization of power in the 
Secretariat and Estado Mayor Central (EMC), combined with strict adherence to the 
disciplinary code, ensure compliance with the senior-leadership’s dictates.  The use of 
ayudantías, or advisors, to ensure that commanders use their resources to accomplish the 
assigned political-military objectives, provides an additional layer of oversight and 
centralized control over the numerous FARC-EP units.  Fear and the ever-present threat 
of punishment provide additional incentives to carry out assigned tasks and accomplish 
mission objectives. 
4. Resources 
Throughout the last twenty-three years (1982-2005), the FARC-EP has 
demonstrated remarkable entrepreneurial skills and an uncanny ability to take advantage 
including kidnapping for ransom, extortion, cattle rustling, and armed clientelism.  
However, the enterprise which has provided the FARC-EP with the largest share of its 
illicit revenues is the drug trade. 
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The insurgency earns hundreds of millions of dollars annually from its 
participation in this illicit industry.  These profits, in turn, fuel the FARC-EP’s war 
machine against the Government of Colombia.  But interestingly, the guerrilla 
organization could earn even more money if it were to expand operations into 
international drug trafficking.  One must ask, therefore, why the FARC-EP has not taken 
this next logical step? 
One possible explanation might be that the FARC-EP realizes that if it were to 
create an international drug distribution network it would immediately attract the wrath of 
the international community.  The United States, in particular, might direct its military 
efforts at destroying the FARC-EP and ending its control on the drug trade.  Therefore, 
the insurgency prefers to maintain the status quo and to limit its involvement in the drug 
trade to less attention-grabbing activities. 
Given the FARC-EP’s proven ability constantly to seek out and participate in 
profitable business ventures, it is likely that the insurgency will continue to diversify its 
participation in the drug trade and other illegal activities. In this manner, the FARC-EP 
will diminish its reliance upon coca for an estimated forty five per cent of its income and 
diversify its involvement in other emerging illicit markets.209  This, in turn, will allow the 
organization to continue its war against the government and expand simultaneously its 
control over the country. 
The revenues derived from the organization’s ever-diversifying involvement in 
illicit activities may in fact provide the FARC-EP with a distinct advantage over its 
economically-strapped and resource-poor enemy, the Government of Colombia.  
Decreasing financial support for internationally sponsored counter drug/counterterrorism 
programs such as Plan Colombia could further undermine the Government of Colombia’s 
effort to defeat the guerrilla organization and allow the insurgency to get the upper hand.  
In the end, the FARC-EP may be able to out-resource the government and, via the 
purchase of high-tech military equipment and guns-for-hire, buy its way to victory. 
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Conversely, the ideological weakening of the insurgency and the ascension of 
unqualified leaders to positions of power could combine with the FARC-EP’s 
diversification of illegal market assets and result in the disintegration of the insurgency 
into numerous criminal organizations.  The guerrilla organization’s ability to indoctrinate 
its personnel and to appoint qualified individuals to senior- and mid-ranking positions 
will determine whether or not this occurs. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The nature of the insurgent threat confronting the Government of Colombia calls 
for the implementation of a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy that, while 
focused on defeating the FARC-EP on the battlefield, also contemplates the resolution of 
those political, economic, social, and cultural problems which led to its emergence.  As 
such, the Government of Colombia should continue to attack the symptoms of the 
conflict – the FARC-EP – while seeking simultaneously to treat its causes – social and 
economic inequality, poor distribution of land, poverty, and state abandonment.  
Additionally, the Colombian military should adjust its strategy in order to conceptualize  
the enemy for what it is – a self-funded, autonomous, communist insurgency that is 
driven by a desire for political power.  Finally, greater efforts should be made to freeze 
the financial assets of the insurgency and neutralize its leadership. 
1. Attack the Leadership and Conduct Psychological Operations 
According to the Government of Colombia, the FARC-EP presently consists of 
approximately 22,000 insurgents – 12,000 of whom are rural, guerrilla combatants while 
the remainder consists of members assigned to the urban guerrilla militias.  However, of 
the estimated 22,000 insurgents only a very small percentage – probably less than five 
per cent – occupies positions of command authority within the insurgency.  These 
individuals, found at the senior- and mid-levels of command, represent the political-
military and ideological backbone of the insurgency and are one of the FARC-EP’s 
centers of gravity.  If they could be eliminated, the FARC-EP would likely find 
themselves rudderless. 
The Colombian military should focus its efforts on eliminating the principal 
leaders of the insurgency.  By removing the so-called “brain trust” of the organization, 
the military would inflict an irrecoverable blow to the insurgency that would probably 
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lead to its disintegration.  Additionally, the sudden disappearance and/or removal of these 
leaders from their positions of power would create great tumult within their respective 
units and instill a sense of panic or fear in the surviving guerrillas. 
Psychological operations, which currently target primarily the rank and file, 
should be expanded to focus on the mid-level guerrilla leaders. [See Figures 7 and 8 for 
examples of the leaflets which urge rank-and-file guerrillas to desert and demobilize.]  
While themes which presently emphasize familial abandonment, malnourishment, 
physical and sexual abuse, humiliation, and disillusionment will likely continue to 
convince low-ranking guerrillas to desert, a different strategy will probably be required to 
convince mid-ranking guerrilla leaders – who have more of a stake in the organization -- 
to demobilize.210  Since this stake may be ideological or material (or a combination of the 
two), psychological operations will have to target both possible motives. 
Instead of using mass distributed leaflets, the Colombian military should send 
personally addressed letters to the commanders of the FARC-EP’s fronts, columns, and 
companies urging them to demobilize.  These should be professionally written documents 
that are signed by senior-ranking military officers.  In this manner, the mid-level FARC-
EP commanders will feel that they are being treated respectfully and with regard for the 
positions that they occupy.  However, instead of focusing on some of the above 
mentioned themes, the letters to the commanders should address their disillusionment 
with the armed struggle.  Emphasis should be placed upon the amount of blood that has 
been spilled on both sides of the conflict as well as the suffering of the Colombian 
people.  The authors of these letters should write in such a manner that the FARC-EP 
commander is forced to question his commitment to the struggle and the “benefits” that 




210 For more information on the Government of Colombia’s highly successful and robust 
psychological operations campaign see “Con canciones y publicidad, el Gobierno ha atraído a los 
combatientes para que se desmovilicen,” El Tiempo (Bogotá), 21 September 2005, Internet version; 
Government of Colombia, Programa de Atención Humanitaria al Desmovilizado, “Estratégia 
Comunicacional: Prevención y Desmovilización de Organizaciones Armadas Ilegales,” Power Point 
Presentation. 
approach will cause the reader to reflect upon the war, its casualties, and the damage that 
has been done to the country.  This, in turn, may cause some leaders to dissert and 
demobilize. 
 
It states, “Recover your Spot: Your family, your country, liberty, life, and new opportunities await you.” 




This side urges the guerrilla not to hesitate any longer, but rather to demobilize immediately.  Instructions are provided as to how the 
insurgent can make contact with the Government. 
Figure 8.   The Back of the Same Leaflet 
 
2. Attack the FARC-EP’s Financial Resources 
The Government of Colombia must curtail the FARC-EP’s access to its financial 
resources.  This could be accomplished by continuing to attack the insurgency’s primary 
source of revenues – illicit crops – and by gaining control of the group’s financial assets.  





                                                
in the tracking, analysis, and seizure of financial assets belonging to subversive 
organizations: the Information and Financial Analysis Unit (UIAF) and the Inter-
institutional Committee for the Study of Subversive Finances.  The Government of 
Colombia should increase its support for these institutions and grant them greater legal 
authority to seize assets suspected of belonging to the FARC-EP.  Additionally, these 
institutions should improve their cooperation with international law enforcement 
agencies.  Finally, the Government of Colombia should pressure the public and private 
sectors not to submit to extortion, which provides financial resources for the FARC-EP.  
In exchange for compliance with the government’s policies, the central government 
should provide cooperative organizations with increased security and redouble its efforts 
to uncover the guerrilla units responsible for extorting these entities.  Only by 
guaranteeing the safety of these sectors from FARC-EP reprisals will the government be 
able to deny the insurgency access to revenues. 
3. “Know Your Enemy” 
In 500 B.C., the Chinese general, Sun Tzu, admonished his followers to “know 
their enemy.”  He stated, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear 
the result of a hundred battles.  If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory 
gained you will also suffer a defeat.  If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you 
will succumb in every battle.”211  These words, which were written more than 2,500 
years ago, continue to be valid today and explain one of the many reasons why the 
Colombian military has been unable to defeat the FARC-EP. 
For the last forty-one years, the Colombian military has considered the FARC-EP 
to be nothing more than a group of “delinquents” or “bandits.”  As such, they have 
prescribed military strategies aimed at defeating a criminal enterprise rather than a 
guerrilla insurgency.  This failure to “know their enemy” and to understand how the  
FARC-EP operates has led to the prolongation of the conflict and the unintentional 
strengthening of the insurgency.  Alfredo Rangel, a Colombian political scientist and 
expert on the internal war, explains: 
 
211 “Sun Tzu on The Art of War: The Oldest Military Treaties in the World,” trans. Lionel Giles, 
available from http://www.chinapage.com/sunzi-e.html; Internet; accessed on 17 August 2005. 
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This equivocated definition of their adversary has prevented the military 
forces from conducting what Clausewitz referred to as the “critical 
analysis” of the conflict.  Such an analysis is necessary in order to 
understand the conflict’s dynamics and to identify the proper objectives.  
“Critical analysis,” according to this theoretician of war, has a few main 
elements:  describing and interpreting facts, tracing effects to their causes, 
and evaluating the applied methods.  In fact, in spite of having access to 
invaluable, first-rate information, the military forces have been unable to 
construct a comprehensive image of the guerrillas, as it is that one can 
know nothing about the adversary when one deals exclusively with 
immobile stereotypes.212
The political nature of the FARC-EP requires that the Colombian military revisit 
its conceptualization of the guerrilla organization and the insurgency’s modus operandi.  
For unlike a criminal organization, a guerrilla insurgency operates simultaneously on 
multiple levels - including the political, economic, social, and cultural.213  Therefore, 
given this fact, the Colombian military, with the assistance of the National Police and 
other state institutions, should study all levels of the conflict in order to determine if 
and/or how the FARC-EP may be operating within these realms.  Once this determination 
has been made, the Colombian military will be better prepared to design a 
counterinsurgency strategy capable of countering the FARC-EP’s actions. 
4. Address Legitimate Social Grievances 
Since the FARC-EP’s inception in 1964, the insurgency has clamored for the 
state’s redress of what it perceives to be are numerous social injustices.  Two of these 
include the unfair distribution of land and the lack of state presence in rural areas.  Both 
of these issues, which most inhabitants of Colombia’s countryside consider to be 
legitimate social grievances, undercut support for the government, weaken the state’s 
legitimacy, and, by default, strengthen the insurgent cause.  Therefore, in order for the 
Government of Colombia to increase its support among the rural populace and to counter 
the FARC-EP’s influence, the state should double its efforts to carry out agrarian reform 
and increase its investment in the development of the social infrastructure of the nation’s 
rural communities.  By strengthening the state’s presence in those isolated areas and 
 
212 Alfredo Rangel, Guerra Insurgente (Bogotá:  Intermedio Editores, 2001), 422. 
213 John Baylis, “Revolutionary Warfare,” Contemporary Strategy II: The Nuclear Powers, vol.2 rev. 
and enl., ed. John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett, and Phil Williams (New York: Holmes and Meier 
Publishers, 1987), 212. 
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providing for the economic and social well-being of its inhabitants, the Government of 
Colombia will likely be able to win more adherents to its cause while denying them to the 
FARC-EP. 
One of the problems which has continued to afflict Colombian society, and has 
served as one of the primary incentives of the FARC-EP’s rebellion against the 
government, is the perennial issue of land tenure.  Historically, this conflict has its roots 
in the peasant farmer or campesino’s inability to purchase or acquire the legal titles to the 
lands on which he worked.  This was later complicated by the arrival of wealthy feudal 
landlords who purchased vast tracks of land, evicted the local peasants, and transformed 
the local economies. 
Today, land tenure continues to be a divisive issue within society.  According to 
the International Crisis Group, 1.3 per cent of the population owns 48 per cent of the best 
land.214  Additionally, 4.4 million hectares, valued at $2.4 billion dollars, and accounting 
for 43 per cent of the nation’s arable land is owned by narcotraffickers.215  Of this 43 per 
cent, only nine per cent is cultivated while the remaining amount (more than 5 million 
hectares) is left unattended or underutilized.216  By purchasing large tracts of virgin land 
and not developing the properties, the narcotraffickers inflate the value of their estates 
and create a virtual monopoly on land ownership in rural Colombia. 
As a result of this “perverse agrarian revolution,” which “…has concentrated the 
best land in the hands of the few, displaced the traditional farmer population and social 
structure, and hurt productive agriculture, as the land controlled by drug dealers is 
generally used for cattle-ranching,” local peasant farmers have been forced to abandon 
their native lands and relocate to other parts of the country.217  In many cases these 
campesinos, possessing limited education and desperate to earn a living by whatever 
means possible, have settled in “frontier” areas where coca production is the main means 
 
214 International Crisis Group (ICG), “War and Drugs in Colombia,” Latin America Report No. 11, 27 
January 2005 (London” ICG, 2005), 5. 
215 Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia 
(Albany: State University of New York, 2002), 34. 
216 Ibid. 
217 International Crisis Group (ICG), “War and Drugs in Colombia,” 5. 
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of employment.  For example, 578,000 people, eager to take advantage of the economic 
benefits associated with the so-called “bonanza cocalera,” settled in southeastern 
Colombia between 1988 and 1993.218  There they worked for the FARC-EP as 
raspachines or coca leaf pickers and indirectly assisted the insurgency in prosecuting its 
war against the government. 
As can be seen, issues associated with land tenure continue to be a major problem 
which fuels the fire of the ongoing internal conflict. Although only twenty-five per cent 
of the Colombian population resides in the countryside, according to FARC-EP 
commander Fernando Caicedo, ninety percent of the insurgency’s recruits are drawn 
from this disaffected group.219  Therefore, in order for the Government of Colombia to 
dissuade the rural populace from supporting the FARC-EP and to prevent potential 
recruits from joining its ranks, the state should redouble its efforts to conduct an agrarian 
land reform aimed at expropriating territory from the narcotraffickers and redistributing it 
among the nation’s peasant farmers. 
In addition to the above recommendation, the state should also endeavor to 
improve the social infrastructure of the nation’s rural communities and of those areas 
formerly under guerrilla control or influence.  In particular, emphasis should be placed 
upon the provision of basic social services including safe and stable supplies of drinking 
water, electricity, functioning sanitation facilities, and access to hospitals and clinics.220  
Additionally, the state should construct roads and bridges which link the isolated 
communities with the larger towns and cities. In this manner, rural inhabitants will be 
able to ship their agricultural products to nearby towns and sell them on the local 
markets. This, in turn, will increase their income and improve their overall quality of 
life.221  Finally, the state should build more educational and vocational facilities.  By 
 
218 International Crisis Group (ICG), “War and Drugs in Colombia,” 5. 
219 Juan Guillermo Ferro and Graciela Uribe, El orden de la guerra (Bogotá: Centro Editorial 
Javeriano, CEJA, 2002), 64. 
220 Association of the U.S. Army and Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction, Task Framework,” May 2002, copyright 2001, available from 
http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/framework.pdf; Internet; accessed on 20 July 2005. 
221 Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency 
(Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 2004), 235. 
117
 
                                                
providing the rural populace with access to a good education and/or teaching them a 
vocational skill, the government will provide them with the possibility of improving their 
livelihood and attaining upward social mobility.  This, in turn, will encourage the 
populace to work and invest in their communities and will instill in them a sense of 
appreciation and loyalty to the state.222
At this time, the Government of Colombia is receiving financial support from 
various international organizations such as the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development.223  However, rather than focusing the majority of this aid on 
the development of the countryside, the Government of Colombia continues to emphasize 
urban development.  While this makes sense, especially considering that seventy-five 
percent of Colombia’s population resides in the nation’s primary and secondary cities, 
greater attention needs to placed upon the development of those areas from which the 
FARC-EP derives the majority of its recruits.  By improving the socio-economic 
opportunities and living conditions in which Colombia’s rural inhabitants reside, the 
government may be able to diminish support for the FARC-EP, stem the flow of new 
recruits to the insurgency, and strengthen the legitimacy of the state. 
 
222 Derived from Human Rights Watch (HRW), You’ll Learn Not to Cry: Child Combatants in 
Colombia (New York: HRW, 2003), 35-40. 
223 The World Bank, “Colombia Country Brief,” available from www.worldbank.org/co; Internet; 
accessed on 23 August 2005 and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “USAID/Colombia 
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